BOOK I. $ 54. Analysis of voluntary them as better or worse than one another, as well as the actual choice between them. These two branches of practical reasoning are both imperative of ends, redintegration. both fix on a feeling or emotion as desirable, or as the object of wish. At this point the process of practical reasoning changes into one of speculative; the represented object fixed on becomes the starting point of a reasoning which redintegrates the images in connection with it as means and obstacles to its attainment, and every one of the means in its turn becomes an end commanded by the practical, discovered by the speculative reason. Again, the greater certainty or attainability of the means to some desired ends than that of the means to other ends, perhaps more desirable in themselves, causes the practical reason itself to reconsider its own verdict, by setting on foot a new process of practical reasoning, the starting point of which is the image resulting from the previous process of speculative reason. These two branches of immanent voluntary redintegration, speculative and practical reasoning, the latter of which falls again into two subordinate branches, actual feeling and judgment of feelings, seem to exhaust the whole remaining field of consciousness, and of the nervous organism on which it depends. For the sake of clearness I append a table of voluntary redintegration: Voluntary Redin- Transeunt Action. Speculative Immanent Action. Practical Passion. Reasoning. Judgment. It remains to analyse the processes of speculative and practical reasoning, and to show how, in all their branches, they are but exemplifications of the mode of action already described at the beginning of the present §. BOOK I. $ 55. Analysis of reasoning. § 55. 1. Putting the subsidiary processes of observation and experiment aside, all speculative reasoning speculative is an exercise of memory; critical generalisation, which consists in harmonising already given conceptions, is an exercise of memory simply, the objectmatter being modified only by the logical instinct; while acquisitive generalisation, which consists in the development of principles, either by applying an old analogy to new facts, or by arranging old facts by a new analogy, that is to say, by the methods either of deduction or induction, is an exercise of imaginative memory. (For the distinction of critical and acquisitive generalisation see "Time and Space" § 36.) We must distinguish the memory of spontaneous from that of voluntary redintegration. The former is where we remember without effort things which have once happened to us, or of which we have read, or which have been by a previous effort learned by heart; the latter is where we recall at will things, names, persons, or events, which have at some time or other stood in connection with what is at present in our minds, from which we start. It is this latter kind of memory which is valuable, not only in and for itself, but also as being the foundation of the reasoning powers; for without an ample supply of facts at command no wide exercise of the inductive process is possible, since it is impossible to have the facts supplied us ab extra, by observation or experiment, or even by reading notes, in sufficient abundance and with sufficient opportuneness. It is then the condition of excellence in inductive reasoning; BOOK I. Сн. ІІІ. $55. Analysis of speculative analytical power on the other hand does not require memory in the same degree. The reactive and retentive powers appear to be equally concerned in reasoning. supporting this kind of memory, for we not only recall much, but we recall what is to the purpose, that is, we recall with reference to the central interest from which we start. But even in the memory of spontaneous redintegration we may distinguish two kinds, according as the retentive or the reactive movements predominate. In the first case we have what is called a mechanical memory for things in their actual order, or in what has been made their actual order in learning by heart. What is learned by heart is acquired originally by volition, exercised once for all, not springing from the interest of each verse, date, or name, as it is acquired and added to the series of things committed to memory; although of course it is true that, the greater the interest attaching to the things learned, the less will be the effort required to learn them. The whole series is impressed on the memory, thenceforth belongs entirely to the retentive powers, and is brought forth again by a process of spontaneous redintegration when one of the things in the series is recalled, depending solely on the one factor, habit, and not on the other factor, interest. The other kind of memory in spontaneous redintegration is the foundation or source of the power of recalling at will, and, equally with this, rests on the equal strength of the reactive and retentive powers. This kind of memory is when a person recalls past events accurately and copiously, and with their points of interest in relief, as they were felt in fact at the time of their first occurring to him, or of his first reading them, the BOOK I. CH. III. $ 55. speculative reasoning. points of interest forming the stepping stones to his redintegration of the entire picture. Vividness of perception and rapidity of change by means of plea- Analysis of sure or interest are here involved; such a mind is said to be lively and quick as well as retentive; and a mind which possesses this power in a high degree is sure to be able very easily to learn by heart things that interest him, since so much less effort will be required. How mistaken then, for the purpose at least of strengthening the memory, must be the practice of learning by heart; I do not say it may not be advisable for other purposes, such for instance as affording a supplement for an incurable deadness of interest in subjects which nevertheless it is important for us to keep in memory; but so far from strengthening the memory, it strengthens only that which is already perhaps too preponderant, the retentive power; it is the reactive power which most needs. strengthening; and this may best be done by fostering the intellectual interests, and making them the starting points whence the interest may spread to connected subjects. The only memory that is of any intellectual value, the power of recalling at will, and that kind of spontaneous redintegration upon which it rests, may be strengthened by the indulgence of the natural intellectual tastes, and the gradual connection of them with allied subjects. For instance, an interest in plants or animals may be fostered into an interest in knowing the laws of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and a memory for the entire range of facts which concern them. 2. Memory of the voluntary kind, Aristotle's Ongevos, or hunting for forgotten facts, is the groundwork of all speculative reasoning; the total com BOOK I. § 55. Analysis of speculative reasoning. plement of facts to be redintegrated is the same in |