BOOK I. § 64. Subdivisions of the emotional tendency; the several types of character. differences of character which depend upon differences in the favourite or predominant emotions. It is the reflective emotions which furnish us with these types; the direct emotions are too immediately under the influence of the presentations to admit of the original tendency to any of them being observed with accuracy, apart from the representations which are their framework, and consequently apart from the influence of external circumstances. It is only when the cerebral organs begin to react upon their representations that these original tendencies become manifest, and this point coincides with that period of representational development which is accompanied with reflection. The direct emotions however are taken up into the reflective, and are, as it were, their first stage, so that, in analysing and classifying the latter, we are in fact analysing and classifying both of them. Grief, joy, aversion, fondness, are included in the sympathetic and antipathetic emotions, for instance; the æsthetic emotions in the poetical; hope and fear in all, where there is any uncertainty about the objects which interest us. 2. The emotions or passions which accompany action by means of muscles, speaking, singing, shouting, praying, rebuking, arguing; or writing, working with the hands, fighting, riding, walking, running, climbing; all feelings which accompany acts like these, which are to very many persons the most pleasureable feelings of all, are compound states of consciousness which, so far as they are emotions or passions, are modifications of some of the direct or reflective emotions enumerated in Chapter ii.; and, so far as the remaining element in them is concerned, consist of the sensations caused by the several bodily organs which are set in motion or operation. In this latter respect they are purely sensational or presentative, and belong not to the character but to the influences upon it, which have been enumerated in § 60. As to their emotional element, which properly belongs to the character, the tendency to take pleasure in them, and the different degrees in which they are pleasureable, depend on the proportion between the active and sluggish dispositions of the cerebral organs, as distinguished in § 62; while the specific differences between them, by which one man takes pleasure in exercising the voice in singing, another in speaking, another in skill in shooting, another in riding, another in adventurous travelling, and so on, -all these, apart from their pleasures of sense or presentation, depend upon, and are modifications of, the several emotions which are ultimately or in themselves pleasureable. For instance, the pleasure of singing or speaking is a modification of æsthetic emotion; that of shooting and riding, of emotions of comparison between self and others, or of emotions purely self-regarding, as pride or shame; that of adventurous travelling, of the intellectual emotions of wonder and desire of knowledge. Apart from these and suchlike modifications of the emotions, and apart from the original tendency to action which belongs to the character, there is no active temperament, or active character, which produces men of action as distinguished from men of feeling and from men of thought. Activity of character is a disposition common to both tendencies, emotional and intellectual, and underlies them both. To classify characters as active, emotional, and intellectual, is to classify them empirically, by results or symptoms, not by differ VOL. I. II BOOK I. $ 64. Subdivisions of tendency; the of character. several types BOOK I. $64. ences in structure and function. The differences of modification which emotions manifest when they are Subdivisions of operative as the motives of external bodily action are tendency; the however very important and interesting, and must of character. be specially noticed in any complete enumeration of the emotional furniture of the mind. the emotional several types 3. It is clear, then, that we are to look to the reflective emotions of the several groups distinguished in Chapter ii. for the several types of character. But it is not a mere enumeration of these emotions that will suffice; it is not enough to point to the sympathetic or the affectionate emotions, for instance, as the ground of the benevolent or the affectionate character, to the antipathetic emotions as the ground of the irascible character, or simply to refer the vain, proud, shy, avaricious, ambitious, just, moral, religious, poetical, characters to the several particular emotions which these characters exhibit predominantly, and which in fact constitute them. There is a further problem before us, which is this, to discover the affinities and antagonisms between these emotions, and between the characters founded on them; to discover which among them are natural allies, whether as equals or as subordinate one to another, so that the subordinate up to and be included in the superior, making the entire character a complete and consistent whole; to discover if possible, in the case of antagonist emotions, marks, either in the one or in the other, which indicate its contradictory and transient nature, so as to give place finally to the other which exhibits no such marks; to point out the accordance which some or all of these emotions have with the influences coming from bodily organisation or from external circumstances, so as to be may lead promoted or hindered by them, and on the other hand the various degrees of capability which they possess of being carried up into ideals, so as to have before them an ideal career of development, extension, and perfection. This development of some emotions and characters, including and subordinating others, while others again are either eliminated or repressed, constitutes the ground or basis of moral progress and improvement, as the extension and coordination of knowledge of the facts of physical science constitutes the ground or basis of intellectual progress, and both together the progress of mankind in civilisation. If we should find, as the result of our analysis, that those emotions and those characters which we now prize the most highly are also those which have the promise in themselves of the greatest permanence, extension, and development, by the subordination of others which are allied to them, and by the elimination of others which are too antagonistic to be subordinated, we shall have removed the sceptical doubts of the possibility of improvement and of the fundamental consistency of human nature, which are apt to arise from observing the fact of antagonism between emotions and characters, and the apparent want of any power or any tribunal which can decide between them, when they conflict with equal forces either in the same or in different individuals. 4. The task of ethic is to enquire, and, since our wishes are engaged to one conclusion in advance, the problem of ethic is to show, that the evil emotions and passions, such as lust, envy, revenge, avarice, and so on; which are called evil because they will on no terms combine with the moral sense or sense of duty, which latter carries its value and its charm BOOK I. CH. IV. § 64. Subdivisions of the emotional tendency; the several types of character. in or as part of the specific emotion or quality of which it consists, just as sweetness of taste is pleasureable; - that these evil emotions, although pleasureable and seeming to carry their justification along with them in their pleasure, are nevertheless not of equal rank and value, in point of permanence and promise of development, with those emotions and passions which either constitute or will combine with the moral sense or sense of duty, or with those which are the imaginative or ideal perfection of these. The difficulty lies in the apparent self-justification inherent in every feeling that is pleasureable, which is apparently complete when these feelings are intense, and still more when so intense as to be absorbing or exclusive. The man who is occupied by one such feeling cannot even listen to or feel any antagonistic one, still less can he feel the antagonism between his own feeling and the moral sense or sense of duty. He feels at the moment completely justified by the interest of the feeling which is in possession of him. The value or interest of the moral sense also consists in a specific pleasureable feeling; and its superiority to the interest of the antagonistic feelings can be felt only when the two are compared, that is, in a reasoning process, a reflection upon feelings which have once been, but have ceased to be, violent. That the moral sense is of far higher interest when so judged by reflection, that its specific quality as an emotion is much better than other and antagonistic feelings, can only be felt by actual experience, and proved, or rather rendered verifiable, only by analysis of its representational framework, such as was offered in § 37. This analysis may be said to give the proof of its de jure supremacy, its superiority in specific |