BOOK L permanence and development. The reason is partly this, that hatred and the rest are not ends in themThe irascible selves; the passion is not a desire for the increase § 68. type. of the same emotion, but a desire for the suffering, injury, or total destruction, of the person hated. Thus, in the second place, the satisfaction of the passion removes the emotion, while the satisfaction of love increases it; new ground is given for love by loving; new ground is not given for hatred by hating. It is true that the natural tendency to the emotion of hatred is increased by its indulgence and activity, as all nerve actions are; but new grounds, new objects, for the emotion must be sought for, they are not supplied by the old acts or feelings. The factitious increase of the passion by interposing obstacles to its satisfaction, which produces irritation, is also a phenomenon common to hatred with eros and its passion; but in both cases the increase of the passion is factitious not natural, caused by circumstances which do not belong to the emotion itself and to its supporting cerebral movements, original to the organisation of the brain. To use the technical language then which has been here adopted, the emotion of hatred and its representational framework do not grow and develop together pari passu, but the emotional element, the passion, represents the destruction, injury, or suffering of its framework, which is the object of the emotion; its framework is necessary to its existence, and yet its continuance and increase involves the destruction of its framework, that is, involves the representation of the destruction of that which is represented as its object, and is its condition. In other words, the series of changes which it works in its framework are contradictory of each other; and therefore the career of the emotion is limited to the time of that destruction being complete, and that contradiction worked out. This view seems in harmony with the fact, that we often see sudden reactions in anger and hatred when they are glutted by the complete humiliation or destruction of their object; see them not only ceasing but passing into some opposite emotion; the reason being, not that the blaze of passion has burnt out, or that sudden storms are short, but that the present representation of the humiliation of the object of hatred is so vivid as, with the emotion proper to it, suppose sorrow or compassion, to take the place of the former emotion, hatred, now no longer supported by its representation. 2. Love, on the contrary, develops its framework with the increase of its own intensity; its career has no limits set by itself. Hence love is an emotion which will combine with that mode of reasoning activity which has been here called constructive. So also will the love of duty. But hatred and the antipathetic emotions, having no career of their own, and denying themselves a career by their own nature, are incompatible with, and cannot be taken up into, any scheme or total which is organised with reference to an ultimate end. They can only be taken up into such a scheme when they are directed against such objects, or have such objects as framework, which are themselves hostile or incompatible with the scheme; that is to say, when they take the form of indignation, which is their justice. But even here, ideally or in an ideally perfect state, indignation will cease with the ceasing of injustice and wrong. The preponderance of the antipathetic emotions in the cha BOOK I. CH. IV. § 68. type. racter of the individual, or in mankind collectively, would be the preponderance of disorder and disThe irascible organisation; their complete removal from human nature would be the removal of the last trace of moral evil. Their place would be well supplied by the gradual spreading of emotions which are capable of organisation, most properly perhaps by the sympathetic, which culminate in love; and this would have to be brought about through desuetude of the cerebral movements supporting the emotional element of hatred and the rest in the brain; whereby the representational frameworks which were once pervaded by the antipathetic emotions would be pervaded by the sympathetic, and the command "love your enemies" would be obeyed; for, as already remarked, we are not called upon to love our enemies eo nomine, which would be contradictory, but to love those persons as friends whom we once hated as enemies; that is, in changing the emotion to change the representation also. 3. The antipathetic emotions combine readily with the active disposition, since the gratification of them exposes us to injuries inflicted in return; and therefore whoever has not courage, boldness, and high-spirit, to defend himself in return for these attacks, will soon endeavour to restrain his antipathetic tendencies. Hence the natural combination of hatred and revenge, not only with courage and spirit, but also with bodily aptitude for endurance and activity. Intellectual ability also is requisite, and accordingly often found in company with these emotions; but it is, as might be expected, ability of the effective and accumulative modes of reasoning, not of the teleological or constructive. The adaptation of means to mediate not ultimate ends will be its characteristic; and the combination of the two is effected by the redintegration of the means to the desired gratification being stimulated by dwelling on the passion and the image of its satisfaction, according to the law already explained. This is often found caricatured in lower animals than man. "The camel," says Mr. Palgrave, in his Central Arabia, vol. i. p. 40, "is a most stupid animal, but he has one strong passion-revenge; and accordingly in gratifying this he shows considerable astuteness." 4. This combination of antipathetic emotion with the active disposition of emotion and intellect is often an object of the better kind of pride and honour; and in this combination the antipathetic emotions may seem to have a career open to them, as well as that which they have in their form of indignation. Sometimes indeed we hear people praised as being "good haters;" but in all such cases it will, I think, be found that the active disposition, emotional, muscular, or intellectual, or the openness of avowal of antipathy, is really the object of pride, or honour, or praise, and not the antipathetic emotion itself. This may be seen from its combination with the opposite characteristics, with cowardice and sluggishness of disposition; for in this case the total combination is mean and sneaking, and, even if intellectually active, is developed only into what we call low cunning and craftiness. Men of these two combinations, antipathetic emotion with an emotionally active disposition on the one hand, and with an emotionally sluggish disposition on the other, the brave hater and the cowardly hater, commonly hate each other more than they hate any one else, even any one from BOOK I. CH. IV. $68. type. whom they may have received greater injuries. The combination of the antipathetic emotions and their The irascible compounds, envy and jealousy, with that form of cowardice which is unveracity, simulation or dissimulation springing from fear, is the vice of insincerity or hypocrisy, the most generally hateful of all characters. This is perhaps meant by Achilles in $ 69. The ambitious type. the lines: ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Αίδαο πύλησιν, ὅς χ ̓ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζῃ. Some writers indeed think that there is no moral evil but insincerity. This however seems to me an overstatement. The grossness of it in some cases, the evil which it inflicts, the insecurity which it causes, its complex nature, being a compound of many bad feelings, and above all its subtilty and penetration into all domains, so that there is no evil but readily allies itself with this, have rendered it the most obvious and conspicuous mark for moralists. It is not the only moral evil, but the worst of them. A peculiar form of malice, which when found is usually allied with cowardice, is the love of cruelty and torturing, seemingly for the sole pleasure of inflicting suffering. It seems, in point of nature, to belong to the type of character founded on the antipathetic emotions, and to be a remnant of some savage or rather brutal state of humanity, a remnant of habits fostered by the circumstances of a desperate and unceasing struggle for existence with other animals or with men in a similar condition. § 69. 1. Another type of character seems to be founded on the two groups of emotions of comparison, the passions of which are envy and jealousy of the one group, and emulation of the other. Emu |