discussion, and pronounce that they have no weight in them? Are you sure that you are not free agents-sure there are no conditions in salvation-sure that if y you should die in a state of intoxication, or kill yourselves, God will produce holiness in you at the last moment? Can you meet the objections to this, or say that they have been fairly met in the course of this discussion?

Finally. The doctrine now proposed for your acceptance involves the greatest responsibility. In this respect it differs from all other systems ever proposed to the children of men. The question is, Shall all men be saved in the future state? If you say, yes, and trust to the doctrine, and it should prove false, you are of all men most miserable, because the most deceived, and disappointed, and nothing can retrieve your loss. In view of this subject, and in view of the arguments which, in the course of this discussion, have been urged against the doctrine of universal salvation, I ask you, in the fear of God, whether there is one in this assembly who is so fully satisfied of the truth of the doctrine, that he is willing, without repentance, without faith, without holiness, to meet his final hour-and -his Judge!

Nov. 23, 1827.

ANSWER IV.

Remarks on Mr. Paige's Reply to Answer III.

"Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel!" Ezek. xxxiii, 11.

In my opponent's reply of Nov. 23, he advanced the doctrine of necessity, as founded on the Divine foreknowledge of human actions and events; but I declined discussing this subject with him any farther at that time, for the following reasons:—

First, he did not bring this subject forward till the

evening of the third discussion upon my second lecture. Previous to this he had pursued a course which had the appearance of design to wear out the congregation by protracting the discussion till the cold season should drive the congregation from the place of meeting;—particularly his playing off from the points at issue, neglecting many of my proofs and arguments, and bringing in foreign matter, as he did in his second reply. Upon this I took the resolution not to discuss any more new matter upon the second lecture; and waited on him with this view. I observed to him that we had gone over a good deal of ground-that the points in dispute had not been closely discussed, and that I thought it not proper to bring in any more new matter till the old was disposed of. He made no objection, but said he thought as I did upon the subject. If these are not the exact words made use of, the conversation was substantially as here related.

Secondly. In my second answer upon this lecture I had anticipated his views of foreknowledge and necessity, and framed an article explanatory of the former, and offered three arguments against the latter. And yet in his third reply, contrary to the mutual understanding between us, and without noticing my arguments against necessity, he brought in that doctrine, and argued it at length, making more new matter than he had brought into any reply since the commencement of the discussion. My principal reason, however, for not discussing the doctrine of necessity with him was his passing over my arguments on that subject without noticing them. It was evident that in this way we might continue the discussion all winter, without bringing any thing to a close. Rather there can be no discussion when the arguments on one side are entirely overlooked on the other.

I now propose to examine closely the ground of his doctrine of necessity, and the arguments by which he attempts to support it. His particular views of necessity,-whether

the moral necessity contended for by our Calvinist brethren, or the philosophical fatal necessity contended for by the deists in general, he has never given us; but I suppose they accord with the latter, not only because he has used the word fate in this connection with arguments of this character, but because these are the views of Mr. Ballou, with whom he appears to agree in all points.* He was called upon to make this expression of his particular views on this subject, but never did it; and this is one circumstance among many, that shows with what reluctance he brought this subject forward. He probably anticipated that this would not only be unpopular with the public at large, but with many of his own brethren in particular, who, it is said, are known to be opposed to the doctrine of necessity.†

The proposition which he lays down, and endeavours to support, is the following:

"Man is an agent, free to do what God may choose, and no more." This proposition is at variance with itself; for if man be an agent, he is not a patient-if he be free, his actions are not necessary: and to say that man is an agent, and a patient-that his actions are free and are necessary, is not less absurd than to say, a man is a slave and has full liberty at the same time. Freedom and necessity are as much opposed to each other as any conditions of life, or any principles that can be imagined. There is a perfect contrariety between them. We will, however, hear my opponent, and we will consider his arguments.

* My opponent was understood to say, on the evening of the last discussion, that though the Treatise on Atonement by Mr. Ballou had been before the public thirty years, it had never been answered. This is a mistake, as may be seen by the 6th volume of the Methodist Magazine. I believe also that the Rev. Mr. Hudson of Westminster, a Universalist preacher, has answered this work in connection with some other of Mr. Ballou's.

Since the discussion closed, he has said that "he advanced and defended the doctrine of philosophical necessity," in his "account" of the discussion published in the Universalist Magazine.

I. He" offers some reasons in support of this doctrine : and,

II. Produces some of the Scripture proofs of the same.” I. He "offers some reasons in support of this doctrine." 1. His first reason is founded on the "certainty of an event that is foreknown ;" and the second is an inference, "that man is not free to do what God knows he never will do." Now I shall admit the certainty of an event that is foreknown, but deny the necessity of that event. Let it, however, be observed, that by event here, is meant human action.

I am happy to agree with my late opponent in one thing respecting foreknowledge, viz. that when we speak of the Divine foreknowledge, we speak after the manner of men, and according to the conceptions of men ;-that properly speaking there is no such thing as foreknowledge, or afterknowledge with God, but only present knowledge. This follows, of course, if God fills all time, past and future, as he fills all space, that is, if he pervades and comprehends eternity, as he pervades and comprehends all space. And that he does so, will appear from the Scriptures. "A thousand years with him are as one day, and one day as a thousand years." And says the prophet, "Thou art from everlasting to everlasting." Here, if you divide æternitas a parte ante, from æternitas a parte post, that eternity which is past, from that eternity which is to come, you may see how they are brought into the present moment by the prophet," Thou art from everlasting to everlasting."

And indeed our reason will tell us that if God be infinite, and his knowledge absolute, it must be so. Past and future have respect to man, who had a beginning, and must have an end in this world, and whose progress through life is measured by the lapse of time; but the duration of the Divine existence is not measured by days, months, and years, nor does he obtain his knowledge in the way that man doth. Man is dependent on a course of instruction

and education for all his knowledge; but we cannot say this of God. There is a time, that is, before they are instructed, when mankind are ignorant; but we cannot say this of God. Man is dependent on means for all his knowledge, and obtains knowledge by slow degrees; but we cannot say this of God, whose knowledge is absolute, intuitive, and infinite. Man knows with certainty only a few future events, namely, those which are dependent on the uniform operation of the laws of nature, as the phases of the moon, the ebbing and flowing of the tides, &c, but God, whose knowledge is independent, sees all the volitions and actions of free agents with as much certainty as those events which are dependent on the laws of nature. While we have an imperfect knowledge of the objects which surround us in this place, and of the actions which are going on here, we are ignorant of what is going on in another place, because we are not there; but God has a perfect knowledge of whatever is, in every part of the earth, and throughout the universe, because he is not confined to one place, but is present in all places at the same time. We know not what we, or others, shall be doing a year hence; but God knows perfectly what shall be our condition, and what we shall be doing at that time, because that time is present with him. And he knows how all his creatures will act in all future time, because all their actions, and all future time, are present with him.

And hence it will follow, that if we can have an imperfect knowledge of the objects which now surround us, and of the actions of the present moment, without those objects and actions being necessary, and without our knowledge having the least influence in producing them, God may have a perfect knowledge of all future events, even the volitions and actions of free agents, without those events and actions being necessary, and without his knowledge having the least influence in producing them. Of course, when we say that God cannot know the future