selves from the delusions of nature, and reject the evidence presented to our senses.230 For, says Descartes, nothing is certain but thought; nor are there any truths except those which necessarily follow from the operation of our own consciousness. We have no knowledge of our soul except as a thinking substance 231 and it were easier for us to believe that the soul should cease to exist, than that it should cease to think.232 And, as to man himself, what is he but the incarnation of thought? For that which constitutes the man, is not his bones, nor his flesh, nor his blood. These are the accidents, the incumbrances, the impediments of his nature. But the man himself is the thought. The invisible me, the ultimate fact of existence, the mystery of life, is this: "I am a thing that thinks." This, therefore, is the beginning and the basis of our knowledge. The thought of each man is the last element

the external world; nor does the passage quoted from him by Mr. Jobert (New System of Philos. vol. ii. pp. 161, 162, Lond. 1849) at all justify the interpretation of that ingenious writer, who confuses certainty in the ordinary sense of the word with certainty in the Cartesian sense. A similar error is made by those who suppose that his "Je pense, donc je suis" is an enthymeme; and having taken this for granted, they turn on the great philosopher, and accuse him of begging the question! Such critics overlook the difference between a logical process and a psychological one; and therefore they do not see that this famous sentence was the description of a mental fact, and not the statement of a mutilated syllogism. The student of the philosophy of Descartes must always distinguish between these two processes, and remember that each process has an order of proof peculiar to itself; or at all events he must remember that such was the opinion of Descartes. Compare, on the Cartesian enthymeme, Cousin, Hist. de la Philos. I. série, vol. iv. pp. 512, 513, with a note in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant's Werke, vol. ii. pp. 323, 324.

230 Meditations, in Œuvres de Descartes, vol. i. pp. 220, 226; and again in the Objections et Réponses, Euvres, vol. ii. pp. 245, 246.

231 "Au lieu que, lorsque nous tâchons à connoître plus distinctement notre nature, nous pouvons voir que notre âme, en tant qu'elle est une substance distincte du corps, ne nous est connue que par cela seul qu'elle pense.' Euvres de Descartes, vol. iv. p. 432. Compare vol. iii. p. 96, Principes de la Philosophie, part i. sec. 53.

232

"En sorte qu'il me seroit bien plus aisé de croire que l'âme cesseroit d'être quand on dit qu'elle cesse de penser, que non pas de concevoir qu'elle soit sans pensée." Euvres de Descartes, vol. viii. p. 574. That "the soul always thinks," is a conclusion also arrived at by Berkeley by a different process. See his subtle argument, Principles of Human Knowledge, part i. sec. 98, in Berkeley's Works, vol. i. p. 123; and for a curious application of this to the theory of dreaming, see Burdach, Physiologie comme Science d'Observation, vol. v. pp. 205, 230.

to which analysis can carry us; it is the supreme judge of every doubt; it is the starting-point for all wisdom.233

Taking our stand on this ground, we rise, says Descartes, to the perception of the existence of the Deity. For, our belief in His existence is an irrefragable proof that He exists. Otherwise, whence does the belief arise? Since nothing can come out of nothing, and since no effect can be without a cause, it follows that the idea we have of God must have an origin; and this origin, whatever name we give it, is no other than God.234 Thus, the ultimate proof of His existence is our idea of it. Instead, therefore, of saying that we know ourselves because we believe in God, we should rather say that we believe in God because we know ourselves.235 This is the order and precedence of things. The thought of each man is sufficient to prove His existence, and it is the only proof we can ever posSuch, therefore, is the dignity and supremacy of the human intellect, that even this, the highest of all matters, flows from it, as from its sole source.236 Hence, our religion should not be acquired by the teaching of others, but should be worked out by ourselves; it is not to be borrowed from antiquity, but it is to be discovered by each man's mind; it is not traditional, but personal. It is because this great truth has been neglected, that impiety has arisen. If each man were to content himself with that idea of God which is suggested by his own. mind, he would attain to a true knowledge of the Divine Nature. But when, instead of confining himself to this,

sess.

233 Euvres de Descartes, vol. i. pp. 251, 252, 279, 293, vol. ii. pp. 252, 283. 234 Ibid. vol. i. p. 419; and at p. 420: "Or de tout cela on conclut très manifestement que Dieu existe." See also pp. 159-162, 280, 290, 291. But the simplest statement is in a letter to Mersenne (vol. viii. p. 529): "J'ai tiré la preuve de l'existence de Dieu de l'idée que je trouve en moi d'un être souverainement parfait."

235 Ainsi, quoique, de ce que je suis, je conclue avec certitude que Dieu est, je ne puis réciproquement affirmer, de ce que Dieu est, que j'existe." Règles pour la Direction de l'Esprit, in Œuvres, vol. xi. p. 274. See also Principes de la Philosophie, part i. sec. 7, vol. iii. p. 66.

236 On this famous argument, which it is said was also broached by Anselm, see King's Life of Locke, vol. ii. p. 133; the Benedictine Hist. Lit. de la France, vol. ix. pp. 417, 418; Mosheim's Eccles. Hist. vol. i. p. 239; and Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. vol. iii. p. 383.

he mixes up with it the notions of others, his ideas become perplexed; they contradict themselves; and, the composition being thus confused, he often ends by denying the existence, not, indeed, of God, but of such a God as that in whom he has been taught to believe.237

The mischief which these principles must have done to the old theology is very obvious.238 Not only were they fatal, in the minds of those who received them, to many of the common dogmas-such, for instance, as that of transubstantiation,239 but they were likewise directly opposed to other opinions, equally indefensible, and far more dangerous. For Descartes, by founding a philosophy which rejected all authority except that of the human reason, was, of course, led to abandon the study of final causes, 241-an old and natural superstition, by which, as we shall hereafter see, the German philosophers were long impeded, and which still hangs, though somewhat loosely,

240

237 Et certes jamais les hommes ne pourroient s'éloigner de la vraie connoissance de cette nature divine, s'ils vouloient seulement porter leur attention sur l'idée qu'ils ont de l'être souverainement parfait. Mais ceux qui mêlent quelques autres idées avec celle-là composent par ce moyen un dieu chimérique, en la nature duquel il y a des choses qui se contrarient; et, après l'avoir ainsi composé, ce n'est pas merveille s'ils nient qu'un tel dieu, qui leur est représenté par une fausse idée, existe." Euvres de Descartes, vol. i. pp. 423, 424.

238 This is delicately but clearly indicated in an able letter from Arnaud, printed in Euvres de Descartes, vol. ii. pp. 1-36: see in particular pp. 31, 34. And Duclos bluntly says: "Si depuis la révolution que Descartes a commencée, les théologiens se sont éloignés des philosophes, c'est que ceuxci ont paru ne pas respecter infiniment les théologiens. Une philosophie qui prenoit pour base le doute et l'examen devoit les effaroucher." Duclos, Mémoires, vol. i. p. 109.

239 On the relation of the Cartesian philosophy to the doctrine of transubstantiation, compare Palmer's Treatise on the Church, vol. ii. pp. 169, 170, with Hallam's Lit. of Europe, vol. ii. p. 453; and the remark ascribed to Hobbes, in Aubrey's Letters and Lives, vol. ii. p. 626. But Hobbes, if he really made this observation, had no right to expect Descartes to become a martyr.

240 Le caractère de la philosophie du moyen âge est la soumission à une autorité autre que le raison. La philosophie moderne ne reconnaît que l'autorité de la raison. C'est le cartésianisme qui a opéré cette révolution décisive." Cousin, Hist. de la Philos. II. série, vol. i. pp. 258, 259.

241 "Nous rejetterons entièrement de notre philosophie la recherche des causes finales." Principes de la Philos. part i. sec. 28, in Euvres de Descartes, vol. iii. p. 81. See also part iii. sec. 3, p. 182; and his reply to Gassendi, in Euvres, vol. ii. pp. 280, 281. Compare Cousin, Hist. de la Philosophie, II. série, vol. ii. p. 71, with Sprengel, Hist. de la Médecine, vol. v. p. 203.

about the minds of men.242

At the same time, by super

seding the geometry of the ancients, he aided in weakening that inordinate respect with which antiquity was then regarded. In another matter, still more important, he displayed the same spirit, and met with the same success. With such energy did he attack the influence, or rather the tyranny of Aristotle, that although the opinions of that philosopher were intimately interwoven with the Christian theology,243 his authority was entirely overthrown by Descartes; and with it there perished those scholastic prejudices, for which Aristotle, indeed, was not responsible, but which, under the shelter of his mighty name, had, during several centuries, perplexed the understandings of men, and retarded the progress of their knowledge.24

244

242 Dr. Whewell, for instance, says, that we must reject final causes in the inorganic sciences, but must recognize them in the organic ones; which, in other words, simply means, that we know less of the organic world thau of the inorganic, and that because we know less, we are to believe more; for here, as every where else, the smaller the science the greater the superstition. Whewell's Philos. of the Inductive Sciences, 8vo, 1847, vol. i. pp. 620, 627, 628; and his Hist. of the Induc. Sciences, vol. iii, pp. 430, 431. If the question were to be decided by authority, it would be enough to appeal to Bacon and Descartes, the two greatest writers on the philosophy of method in the seventeenth century, and to Auguste Comte, who is admitted by the few persons who have mastered his Philosophie Positive, to be the greatest in our own time. These profound and comprehensive thinkers have all rejected the study of final causes, which, as they have clearly seen, is a theological invasion of scientific rights. On the injury which this study has wrought, and on the check it has given to the advance of our knowledge, see Robin et Verdeil, Chimie Anat. Paris, 1853, vol. i. pp. 489, 493, 494, vol. ii. p. 555; Renouard, Hist. de la Médecine, vol. i. pp. 232, 237; Sprengel, Hist. de la Médecine, vol. ii. pp. 220; Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, Hist. des Anomalies de l'Organisation, vol. iii. pp. 435, 436; Herder, Ideen zur Gesch. der Menschheit, vol. iii. p. 270; Lawrence's Lectures on Man, p. 36; and Burdach, Traité de Physiologie, vol. i. p. 190.

243 Auf das innigste verbunden mit der Theologie, nicht allein in den katholischen, sondern selbst auch in den protestantischen Ländern." Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. vol. ix. p. 516. Descartes, in a letter to Mersenne (Euvres, vol. vi. p. 73), writes, in 1629, "La théologie, laquelle on a tellement assujettie à Aristote, qu'il est impossible d'expliquer une autre philosophie qu'il ne semble d'abord qu'elle soit contre la foi." Compare vol. vii. p. 344, vol. viii. pp. 281, 497.

244 Dr. Brown (Philosophy of the Mind, Edinburgh, 1838, p. 172) calls Descartes "that illustrious rebel, who, in overthrowing the authority of Aristotle," &c. See also Duvernet, Hist. de la Sorbonne, vol. ii. p. 192; Cuvier, Hist. des Sciences, part ii. p. 532; and Locke's Works, vol. iii. p. 48. This, I need hardly say, refers to the habit of appealing to Aristotle as if he were infallible, and is very different from that respect which is naturally felt for

These were the principal services rendered to civilization by one of the greatest men Europe has ever produced. The analogy between him and Richelieu is very striking, and is as complete as their relative positions would allow. The same disregard of ancient notions, the same contempt for theological interests, the same indifference to tradition, the same determination to prefer the present to the past: in a word, the same essentially modern spirit, is seen alike in the writings of Descartes, and in the actions of Richelieu. What the first was to philosophy, that was the other to politics. But, while acknowledging the merits of these eminent men, it behoves us to remember that their success was the result, not only of their own abilities, but likewise of the general temper of their time. The nature of their labours depended on themselves; the way in which their labours were received, depended on their contemporaries. Had they lived in a more superstitious age, their views would have been disregarded, or, if noticed, would have been execrated as impious novelties. In the fifteenth, or early in the sixteenth century, the genius of Descartes and of Richelieu would have lacked the materials necessary to their work; their comprehensive minds would, in that state of society, have found no play; they would have awakened no sympathies; their bread would have been cast upon those waters which return it not again. And it would have been well for them if, in such a case, indifference were the only penalty with which they would be visited. It would have been well if they had not paid the forfeit incurred by many of those illustrious thinkers who have vainly attempted to stem the torrent of human credulity. It would have been well if the church had not risen in her wrath,-if Richelieu had not been executed as a traitor, and Descartes burned as a heretic.

Indeed, the mere fact that two such men, occupying so conspicuous a place before the public eye, and enforcing views so obnoxious to the interests of superstition, should

a man who was probably the greatest of all the ancient thinkers. The difference between the Aristotelian and Cartesian systems is touched on rather hastily in Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. vol. i. pp. 170. 171,