ard, afcertaining what actions are right what wrong, what proper what improper, hath enabled moralifts to eftablish rules for our conduct from which no perfon is allow'd to fwerve. We have the fame ftandard for af certaining in all the fine arts, what is beautiful or ugly, high or low, proper or improper, proportioned or difproportioned and here, as in morals, we justly condemn every taste that deviates from what is thus afcertained by the common standard.

That there exifts a rule or fstandard in nature for trying the tafte of individuals, in the fine arts as well as in morals, is a difcovery; but is not fufficient to complete the task undertaken. A branch ftill more impor. tant remains upon hand; which is, to afcertain what is truly the ftandard of nature, that we may not lie open to have a falfe ftandard imposed on us. But what means fhall be employ'd for bringing to light this natural ftandard? This is not obvious: for when we have recourfe to general opinions and general practice, we are betray'd into endless perplexities. Hittory informs us, that nothing is more variable than tafte in the fine arts judging by numbers, the Gothic tafte of architecture must be preferred before that of Greece, and the Chinese tafte probably before either: it would be endless to recount the various tastes that have prevailed in different ages with refpect to gardening, and ftill prevail in different countries: defpifing the modeft colouring of nature, women of fashion in France daub their cheeks with a red powder: nay, an unnatural fwelling in the neck, peculiar to the inhabitants of the Alps, is relifhed by that people. But we ought not to be difcouraged with fuch untoward inftances, when we find not greater uniformity in moral opinions: was it not among fome nations held lawful for a man to fell his children for flaves, to expofe them in their infancy to wild beasts, and to punish them for the crime of their parents? was any thing more common than to murder an enemy in cold blood? nay more, did not law once authorise the abominable practice of human facrifices, not lefs impious than immoral? Such aberrations from the rules of morality prove only, that men, originally favage and brutal, acquire not rationality nor any de

licacy

licacy of tafte till they be long difciplined in fociety. To afcertain the rules of morality, we appeal not to the common fense of savages, but of men in their morè perfect state and we make the fame appeal in forming the rules that ought to govern the fine arts: in neither can we fafely rely on a local or tranfitory tafte; but on what is the most universal and the most lafting among 'polite nations.

In this very manner, a ftandard for morals has been afcertained with a good deal of accuracy, and is daily apply'd by able judges with general fatisfaction. The ftandard of taste in the fine arts, is not yet brought to fuch perfection; and we can account for its flower progrefs. The fenfe of right and wrong in actions is vivid and diftinct, because its objects are clearly diftinguishable from each other; whereas the fenfe of right and wrong in the fine arts is faint and wavering, because its objects are commonly not fo clearly distinguishable from each other. And there appears to me a ftriking final cause in thus diftinguishing the moral fenfe from the sense of right and wrong in the fine arts. The former, as a rule of conduct, and as a law we ought to obey, must be clear and authoritative. The latter is not intitled to the fame privilege, because it contributes to our pleafure and amufement only: were it ftrong and lively, it would ufurp upon our duty, and call off the attention from matters. of greater moment: were it clear and authoritative, it would banish all difference of tafte, leaving no diftinction between a refined taste and one that is not fo; which would put an end to rivalship, and conféquently to all improvement.

But to return to our fubject: However languid and cloudy the common sense of mankind may be as to the fine arts, it is notwithstanding the only standard in these as well as in morals. True it is indeed, that in gathering the common fense of mankind, more circumfpection is requifite with refpect to the fine arts than with respect to morals: upon the latter, any perfon may be confulted; but as to the former, a wary choice is neceffary, for to collect votes indifferently would certainly mislead us. Those who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of taste; of such a taite at least as can be

Ch. XXV. of ufe in the fine arts. This confideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining part, many by a corrupted tafte are unqualified for voting. The common sense of mankind must then be confined to the few that fall not under these exceptions. But as such selection feems to throw matters again into uncertainty, we must be more explicit upon this branch of our subject.

Nothing tends more than voluptuousness to corrupt the whole internal frame, and to vitiate our taste, not only in the fine arts, but even in morals: voluptuoufnefs never fails, in course of time, to extinguish all the fympathetic affections, and to bring on a beaftly felfishnefs, which leaves nothing of man but the shape: about excluding fuch perfons there will be no difpute. Let us next bring under trial, the opulent who delight in expence : : riches roufe the appetite for fuperiority and refpect; which in that cafe is vented upon coftly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, fumptuous feasts, every thing superb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders: fimplicity, elegance, propriety, and things natural, fweet, or amiable, are despised or neglected; for thefe are not appropriated to the rich, nor make a figure in the public eye; in a word, nothing is relished, but what ferves to gratify pride, by an imaginary exaltation of the poffeffor above those who furround him. Such fentiments contract the heart, and make every principle give way to felf-love: benevolenee and public fpirit, with all their refined emotions, are little felt, and lefs regarded; and if these be excluded,. there can be no place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.

The exclufion of claffes fo many and numerous, reduces within a narrow compafs thofe who are qualified to be judges in the fine arts. Many circumstances are neceffary to form fuch a judge: there must be a good natural tafte; that is, a tafte approaching, at least in fome degree, to the delicacy of taite above defcribed *: that tatte must be improved by education, reflection,

* Chap. 2. part 2..

and.

and experience *: it must be preserved alive in a regular courfe of life, by ufing the goods of fortune with moderation, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which give welcome to every rational pleasure without deviating into excefs. This is the tenor of life which of all contributes the most to refinement of taste; and the fame tenor of life contributes the most to happiness in general.

If there appear much uncertainty in a ftandard that requires fo painful and intricate a felection, we may poffibly be reconciled to it by the following confidera0 4

tion,

That these particulars are useful, it may be faid neceffary, for acquiring a difcerning tafte in the fine arts, will appear from the following facts, which fhow the influence of experience fingly. Those who live in the world and in good company, are quick fighted with refpect to every defect or irregularity in behaviour: the very flighteft fingularity in motion, in fpeech, or in drefs, which to a peafant would be invifible, efcapes not their obfervation. The most minute differences in the human countenance, fo minute as to be far beyond the reach of words, are diftinctly perceived by the plaineft perfon; while, at the fame time, the generality have very little difcernment in the faces of other animals to which they are lefs accustomed: fheep, for example, appear to have all the fame face, except to the fhepherd, who knows every individual in his flock, as he does his relations and neighbours. The very populace in Athens were critics in language, in pronunciation, and even in eloquence, harangues being their daily entertainment. In Rome, at prefent, the moft illiterate fhopkeeper is a better judge of ftatues and of pictures, than perfons of the highest education in London. These facts afford convincing evidence, that a difcerning tafte depends still more on experience than on nature. But these facts merit peculiar regard for another reason, that they open to us a fure method for improving our taste in the fine arts; which, with refpect to those who have leifure for improvements, ought to be a powerful incitement to cultivate a taste in thefe arts: an occupation that cannot fail to embellish their manners, and to fweeten fociety.

tion, That, with refpect to the fine arts, there is lefs difference of tafte than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or elegant, ftrong or weak: these, if at all perceived, are feldom mifapprehended; and the fame marks are equally perceptible in works of art. A defective tafle is incurable; and it hurts none but the poffeffor, because it carries no authority to impofe upon others. I know not if there be fuch a thing as a tafte naturally bad or wrong; a tafte, for example, that prefers a groveling pleasure before one that is high and elegant: groveling pleasures are never preferred; they are only made welcome by thofe who know no better. Dif.. ferences about objects of tafte, it is true, are endless: but they generally concern trifles, or poffibly matters of equal rank, where preference may be given either way, with impunity: if, on any occafion, perfons differ where they ought not, a depraved taste will readily be difcovered on one or other fide, occafioned by imitation, custom, or corrupted manners, fuch as are defcribed above. And confidering that every individual partakes. of a common nature, what is there that should occafion any wide difference in tafe or fentiment? By the principles that conftitute the fenfitive part of our nature, a wonderful uniformity is preserved in the emotions and feelings of the different races of men; the fame object making upon every person the fame impreffion, the fame in kind, if not in degree. There have been, as above obferved, aberrations from thefe principles; but foon. or late they prevail, and reftore the wanderer to the: right road.

And this leads to the only remaining mean that occurs to me for afcertaining the common fenfe of mankind; and let it be observed, that I throw it out, not in defpair, but in great confidence of fuccefs. As the tafte of every individual ought to be governed by the. principles above mentioned, an appeal to these principles muft neceffarily be decifive of every controversy that can arise upon matters of taste. In general, every doubt with relation to the common fenfe of man, or. standard of tafte, may be cleared by the fame appeal. and to unfold thefe principles is the declared purpose, of the prefent undertaking.

A P