object, is termed an idea. And therefore the precife and accurate definition of an idea, in contradiftinction to an original perception, is," That perception of a "real

mind; taking it for granted, that we are confcious of thefe ideas or images, and of nothing elfe. Those who talk the inoft intelligibly explain the doctrine thus: When I fee in a mirror a man ftanding behind me, the immediate object of my fight is his image, without which I could not fee him: in like manner, when I fee a tree or a house, there must be an image of these objects in my brain or in my mind; which image is the immediate object of my perception; and by means of that image I perceive the external object.

One would not readily fufpect any harm in this ideal fyftem, other than the leading us into a labyrinth of me-taphyfical errors in order to account for our knowledge of external objects, which is more truly and more fimply accounted for by direct plain perception. And yet fome late writers have been able to extract from it death and deftruction to the whole world, levelling all down to a mere chaos of ideas. Dr Berkeley, upon authority of the philofophers named, taking for granted that we cannot perceive any object but what is in the mind, difcovered, that the reafoning employ'd by Des Cartes and Locke to infer the existence of external objects, is inconclufive; and upon that difcovery ventured, against common fenfe, to annihilate totally the material world. And a later writer difcovering that Berkeley's arguments might with equal fuccefs be applied against immaterial beings, ventures ftill more boldly to reject by the lump the immaterial world as well as the material; leaving nothing in nature but images or ideas floating in vacuo, without affording them a fingle mind for thelter or fup-port.

When fuch wild and extravagant confequences can be drawn from the ideal fyftem, it might have been expected, that no man who is not crazy would have ventured to erect fuch a fuperftructure, till he should first be certain beyond all doubt of a folid foundation. And yet upon examination, we find the foundation of this terrible: doctrine

❝ real object which is raised in the mind by the power "of memory." Every thing we have any knowledge of, whether internal or external, paffions, emotions, thinking,

doctrine to be no better than a fhallow metaphyfical argument, viz. "That no being can act but where it is;

and, confequently, that it cannot act upon any fub"jea at a distance." This argument poffeffes indeed one eminent advantage, that its obfcurity, like that of an oracle, is apt to impofe upon the reader, who is willing to confider it as a demonftration, because he does not clearly fee the fallacy. The best way to give it a fair trial, is to draw it out of its obfcurity, and to ftate it in a clear light, as follows. No fubject can be perceived "unless it act upon the mind, but no diftant fubject can "act upon the mind, because no being can act but " where it is; and, therefore, the immediate object of "perception must be fomething united to the mind, fo "as to be able to act upon it." Here the argument completed in all its parts feems to be justly stated; and from it is derived the fuppofed neceflity of phantafms or ideas united to the mind, as the only objects of perception. It is fingularly unlucky for this argument, that it concludes directly against the very fyftem of which it is the only foundation; for how can phantafms or ideas be raised in the mind by things at a diftance, if things at a distance cannot act upon the mind? I fay more, that it affumes a propofition as true, without evidence, viz. That no diftant fubject can act upon the mind. This propofition undoubtedly requires evidence, for it is not. intuitively certain. And, therefore, till the propofition be demonftrated, every man without fcruple may rely upon the conviction of his fenfes, that he hears and fees things at a distance.

But I venture a bolder ftroke, which is, to fhew that the propofition is falfe. Admitting that no being can act but where it is, is there any thing more fimple or more common, than the acting upon fubjects at a distance by intermediate means? This holds in fact with respect both to feeing and hearing. When I fee a tree, for example, rays of light are reflected from the tree to my

eye,

thinking, refolving, willing, heat, cold, &c. as well as external objects, may be recalled as above, by the power of memory *.

15. The original perceptions of external objects, are either fimple or complex. Some founds are fo fimple as: not to be resolvable into parts, and the perception of fuch

eye, forming a picture upon the retina tunica: but the object perceived is the tree itself, not the rays of light, nor the picture. In this manner diftant objects are perceived, without any action of the object upon the mind, or of the mind upon the object. Hearing is in a fimilar cafe: the air put in motion by thunder, makes an impreffion upon the drum of the ear; but this impreffion is not what I hear, it is the thunder itself by means of that impreffion.

With refpect to vifion in particular, we are profoundly ignorant by what means and in what manner the picture on the retina tunica contributes to produce a fight of the object. One thing only is clear, that as we have no knowledge of that picture, it is as natural to conceive that it fhould be made the inftrument of difcovering the external object, and not itself, as of discovering itself only, and not the external object.,

Upon the chimerical consequences drawn from the ideal fyftem, I fhall make but a single reflection. Nature determines us neceffarily to rely on the veracity of our fenses; and upon their evidence the existence of external objects is to us a matter of intuitive knowledge and abfolute certainty. Vain therefore is the attempt of Dr. Berkeley and of his followers, to deceive us, by a metaphyfical fubtilty, into a difbelief of what we cannot entertain even the flightest doubt.

From this definition of an idea, the following propofition must be evident, That there can be no fuch thing as an innate idea. If the original perception of an object be not innate, which is obvious, it is not lefs obvious, that the idea or fecondary perception of that object cannot be innate. And yet, to prove this felf-evident pro--pofition, Locke has beftow'd a whole book of his treatife upon human understanding. So neceffary it is to

fuch founds must be equally fo: the like with refpect to the perception of certain taftes and fmells. A per-ception of touch, is generally compounded of the more fimple perceptions of hardnefs or foftne's, joined with fmoothnefs or roughnefs, heat or cold, &c. But of all' the perceptions of external fenfe, that of a visible object is the most complex; because the eye takes in more particulars than any other organ. A tree is compofed of a trunk, branches, leaves; it has colour, figure, fize. Every one of these feparately produceth a perception in the mind of the fpectator, which are all combined into the complex perception of the tree.

16. The original perception of an object of fight, is more complete, lively, and diftinct, than that of any other object. And for that reason, an idea or fecondary perception of a vifible object, is alfo more complete, lively, and diftinct, than that of any other object. A fine paffage in mufic, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable accuracy; but, after the shorteft interval, it becomes not lefs obfcure than the ideas of the other objects mentioned.

17. As the range of an individual is commonly with.. in narrow bounds of fpace, it rarely happens, that eve ry thing neceffary to be known comes under our own perceptions; which therefore are a provifion too fcanty for the purposes of life. Language is an admirable con-trivance for fupplying that deficiency; for by language every man may communicate his perceptions to all: and the fame may be done by painting and other imitative arts. The facility of communication is in proportion to the liveliness of the ideas; especially in language, which hitherto has not arrived at greater perfection than to exprefs clear and lively ideas: and hence it is, that poets and orators, who are extremely fuccessful in defcribing objects of fight, find objects of the

other

give accurate definitions, and fo preventive of difpute are definitions when accurate. Dr Berkeley has taken great pains to prove another propofition equally evident, That there can be no fuch thing as a general idea: all our original perceptions are of particular objects, and our fecondary perceptions or ideas must be equally fo..

other fenfes too faint and obfcure for language. An idea thus acquired of an object at fecond hand, ought to be diftinguished from an idea of memory, though their resemblance has occafioned the fame term idea to be apply'd to both; which is to be regretted, because ambiguity in the fignification of words is a great obftruction to accuracy of conception. Thus Nature hath furnished the means of multiplying ideas without end, and of providing every individual with a fufficient stock to answer, not only the neceffities, but even the elegancies of life.

18. Further, man is endued with a fort of creative power: he can fabricate images of things that have no existence. The materials employ'd in this operation, are ideas of fight, which he can take to pieces and combine into new forms at pleasure: their complexity and vivacity make them fit materials. But a man hath no fuch power over any of his other ideas, whether of the external or internal fenfes: he cannot, after the utmost effort, combine these into new forms, being too obfcure for that operation. An image thus fabricated cannot be called a fecondary perception, not being derived from an original perception: the poverty of language however, as in the cafe immediately above mentioned, has occafioned the fame term idea to be apply'd to all. This fingular power of fabricating images without any foundation in reality, is diftinguished by the name imagina

tion.

19. As ideas are the chief inaterials employ'd in reafoning and reflecting, it is of consequence that their nature and differences be understood. It appears now, that ideas may be distinguished into three kinds; first, Ideas derived from original perceptions, properly termed ideas of memory; fecond, Ideas communicated by language or other figns; and, third, Ideas of imagination. Thefe ideas differ from each other in many respects; but chiefly in refpect that they proceed from different caufes the firft kind is derived from real existences that have been objects of our fenfes : language is the caufe of the fecond, or any other fign that has the fame power with language and a man's imagination is to himself the caufe of the third. It is fcarce necessary

to