no possibility of change or of an ideal different from the real. The possibility which may be substituted for the reality breaks the tyrannical necessity of existing environment.

877. 8. I have supposed a motive of appetite— a motive to eat a fruit. Even this sort of motive makes for freedom. But there are much higher motives. Let us suppose that when I am about to eat the apple I think of the idea of property-" Whose apple is this?" I recall the fact that this apple belongs to my neighbour. I at once think that to eat his apple. violates my neighbour's right to his own. A moral motive now comes in and I annul the motive to eat the apple, and repress my appetite. What seemed desirable no longer seems desirable. Instead of this trivial matter of the apple, let it be something more than the good things of life; let it be life itself, and weigh this against moral integrity. The moral motive outweighs all motives of earthly reward. The patriot chooses the post that is sure to bring death for the sake of his country. The suicide proves his transcendental freedom by cutting even the thread of life with his own hand.

9. In the case of moral motive the will sets up its own ideal self as motive. In the case of appetite it sets up an ideal condition of some thing or fact as a

motive. In the moral ideal the mind conceives the true form of its own highest being the form of social co-operation with a universe of intelligent beings.

10. The will can so act in its freedom as to contradict itself. For example, it may act so as to create a fate outside itself. It can act so as to prevent the realization of possibilities in the external world favourable to the development of mind in knowledge of truth and right. It can thus work against the freedom of others—not against their spontaneity, but against their realization of highest motives.

§ 78. 11. Here we come to a great distinction— that between spontaneity, or formal freedom, and moral freedom or true freedom. The worm has spontaneity, but only a minimum of moral freedom. The will is essentially a social being. It may create and realize motives of a purely individualistic order—motives that when realized result in appropriating for one's selfish interest things and facts which it at the same time prevents from being useful to others. Secondly, it may create and realize motives of an altruistic order. It may change things and events so that they benefit others. In other words, a will may cooperate with other wills or it may come into antagonism with other wills. The ideal of action that reenforces all wills and does not thwart any is the ideal

called morality: "So act that thy deed will not contradict itself if it is made the universal act of all intelligent beings."

12. If one person steals the property of another, he acts immorally, because, if all persons steal, no one is left in the safe possession of what he steals—all property is annulled. But property is a means of rational freedom. It is a means of conquest over time and space; a' means by which all wills may re-enforce each will; a means of elevating the individual into the species. Add to each will the aggregate will of all intelligent beings in the universe and you make each will infinite.

13. There is, therefore, a spontaneous or formal will and a moral or rational will. Both are free so far as the ordinary sense of the word "free" is concerned, because both are self-active and both create and use motives. But in a higher sense only the moral will is free, because it alone progressively conquers its environment. It effects this conquest in two ways: First, as regards the environment of things and events, the world of material and non-spiritual existence, it makes combinations which result in the production of food, clothing, shelter, and means of intercommunication. Secondly, as regards the human environment, it makes social combination by adopting ethical forms

-forms in which all may act without contradiction and with mutual help and co-operation.

§ 79. 14. The moral motive is now seen to be the highest motive, because it is the form that consolidates all intelligent will-power into one power, so that the action of each assists the action of all. This one power is the will of the social whole. Hence it is properly called by Hegel the form of pure will, because it places as supreme motive the harmony of all wills-the mutual re-enforcement of all wills. Outside of the moral form of action each will contradicts others and also itself; for its acts of one day contradict those of a previous day and reduce them to zero. The immoral man is perpetually annulling his own action; the moral man continually re-enforces the days by the years and the moments by eternity.

Thus our psychology of the will has brought us into the presence of the psychology of morals.

Let us consider in the next chapter the psychology that underlies the metaphysical thought of Necessity or Fate, an idea or thought which causes so much confusion in the moral world that it has long been regarded as one of the most important objects of higher education to bring the pupil out of its enthralment. It has also had baneful effects in religion.

CHAPTER XVII.

Freedom versus Fate.

§ 80. I HAVE already pointed out that psychology furnishes a solution of the problem of free will. It shows how the category of quality (or "thing and environment") seems to exhaust the entire range of possibilities and to shut out that of freedom completely. But the category of self-activity is as much a fact of internal observation as quality is a fact of external observation, and, as we shall see, even things and their environments presuppose self-activity in the beings on which they depend. Our thinking, feeling, and willing are forms of self-activity, and inconceivable without admitting it. Moreover, self-activity must be assumed in order to explain any form of living being. We have discussed this in Chapter III, in the case of the plant and the animal.

§ 81. We now come to the very important question how to reconcile these two categories-self-activity and quality; for quality is the category of fate, while self-activity is the category of freedom. In other words, we are here to study the fundamental nature of these two forms of thinking and see which