or inorganic aggregate suffering dissolution-taste perceives the dissolution. Substances that do not yield to the attack of the juices of the mouth have no taste. Glass and gold have little taste compared with salt and sugar. The sense of taste differs from the process of nutrition in the fact that it does not assimilate the body tasted, but reproduces ideally the energy that makes the impression on the senseorgan of taste. Even taste, therefore, is an ideal activity, although it is present only when the nutritive energy is assimilating-it perceives the object in a process of dissolution.

c. Smell is another specialization which perceives dissolution of objects in a more general form than taste. Both smell and taste perceive chemical changes that involve dissolution of the object.

d. Hearing is a far more ideal sense, and notes a manifestation of resistance to dissolution. The cohesion of a body is attacked and it resists, the attack and resistance take the form of vibration, and this vibration is perceived by the special sense of hearing. Taste and smell perceive the dissolution of the object, while hearing perceives the defence or successful reaction of an object in presence of an attack. Without elasticity-i. e., reaction on the part of cohesion-there would be no vibration and no sound.

e. The sense of sight perceives the individuality of the object not in a state of dissolution before an attack, as in the case of taste and smell, nor engaged in active resistance to attack, as in case of hearing, but in its independence. Sight is therefore the most ideal sense, inasmuch as it is farthest removed from the real process of assimilation, in which one energy destroys the product of another energy and extends its sway over it. It is the altruistic sense, because it perceives the existence-for-itself of the object, and not merely its existence-for-others or its existence-for-me.

Sense-perception, as the developed realization of the activity of feeling on its intellectual side, belongs to the animal creation, including man as an animal. Locomotion also belongs to animals as the developed realization of feeling on its will side. Plant life does not possess that self-activity which returns into itself in the same individual, if we may so express it; it goes out of one individual into another perpetually. Its identity is that of the species, but not of the individual.—In feeling there is a reaction, just as in the plant. This reaction is, however, in an ideal form-the reproduction of the external without assimilation of it-and especially is this the case in the sense of sight, though it is true of all forms of sensation to a less degree.—But all forms of sensibility are limited and special; they refer only to the present, in its forms of here and now. The animal can not feel what is not here and now. Even seeing is limited to what is present before it. When we reflect upon the significance of this limitation of sense-perception, we shall find that we need some higher form of self-activity still before we can realize the

species in the individual-i. e., before we can obtain the true individual, the permanent individuality. The defect in plant life was that there was neither identity of individuality in space nor identity in time. The growth of the plant destroyed the individuality of the seed with which we began, so that it was evanescent in time; it served only as the starting point for new individualities, which likewise in turn served again the same purpose, and so its growth in space was a departure from itself as individual. But the animal is a preservation of individuality as regards space. He returns into himself (i. e., makes his self-activity the object of his self-activity, or becomes self-object) in the form of feeling or sensibility; but as regards time, it is not so, feeling being limited to the present. Without a higher activity than feeling, there is no continuity of individuality in the animal any more than in the plant. Each new moment is a new beginning to a being that has feeling, but not memory. Thus the individuality of mere feeling, although a far more perfect realization of individuality than that found in plant life, is yet, after all, not a continuous individuality for itself, but only for the species. In spite of the ideal self-activity which appertains to feeling in sense-perception, only the species lives in the animal, and the individual dies, unless there be higher forms of activity.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Recollection and Memory.

8116. WHILE mere sensation, as such, acts only in the presence of the object, reproducing (ideally, it is true) the external object, the faculty of recollection

is a higher form of self-activity (or of reaction against surrounding conditions), because it can recall, at its own pleasure, the ideal object. Here is the beginning of emancipation from the limitations of time. The self-activity of representation can summon before it the object that is no longer present to it. In this the soul's activity is a double one, for it can seize not only what is now and here immediately before it, but it can compare the present with the past object, and identify or distinguish between the two. Thus recollection or representation may become memory. We may distinguish memory from mere recollection by letting it denote systematized recollection -recollection organized into wholes of experience— relative wholes, which are called events. Memory may thus be regarded as the grouping faculty by whose aid sense-perception becomes a perceiver of species as well as individuals. Memory contains the stores of experience by which the present object is explained and interpreted by the first figure of the syllogism (Chapter X). It therefore uses general ideas or class ideas. It has already become conscious in its act of recollection that it can call up at will the past perceptions. It can summon before it the absent object and represent it. To represent is to create the object subjectively or mentally. The memory which

collects and arranges the recollections thus deals with an activity which reproduces individual sense-impressions; it unites the object to the activity that produces it. This activity (memory), accordingly, generates the faculty of perceiving things and events as individuals of species, or members of classes. Human sense-perception is nearly always not simple sense-perception, but complex, being united to memory in such a way that the objects perceived are identified (second figure of syllogism, Chapter IX) or apperceived as specimens of classes. This makes possible language; for language can not be used unless the special object of the senses can be expressed in general terms already become familiar in remembered experience.

As memory, taken in this sense of the organizer of experience into groups by subsuming all particulars under universal or general classes, the mind achieves a form of activity above that of sense-perception or mere recollection. It must be noted carefully that mere recollection or representation, although it holds fast the perception in time (making it permanent), does not necessarily constitute an activity completely emancipated from time, nor, indeed, very far advanced toward it. It is only the beginning of such emancipation. For mere recollection stands in the presence of the imaged object of sense-perception; although the object is no longer present to the senses (or to mere feeling), yet the image is present to the representative perception, and is just as much a particular here and now as the object of sense-perception. There inter