first commences to act on the senses. Its first action produces what is called attention. Attention selects one object out of the manifold and collects the various impressions made upon its senses, while it wilfully neglects the multitude of other objects that are in its presence-it inhibits the consideration of these others. Attention, then, may be regarded as the name of the the first union of the will with the intellect. It turns the chaos of sense-impressions into a system by connecting them about a focus arbitrarily chosen.

Intellectual training begins with the habit of attention. In this activity will and intellect are conjoined. The mind in this exercises its first self-determination. It says to the play of sense and idle fancy: Stop, and obey me; neglect that, and notice this. The infinitely manifold objects always present before the senses vanish, and one object engrosses the mind. This is the sine qua non of intellectual culture. All the grades of intellectual power that follow are successive stages of strength to concentrate the mind, and exclude extraneous objects. Hence attention becomes analysis, and this deepens to reflection, or the perception of other objects implied in the one before the mind. Continued analysis discerns in the isolated object the influence of other objects, and hence its (the object's) relativity, its connection and interdependence with other things; and this is properly named reflection, because it is the discovery of the object in what seemed extraneous to it-namely, the discovery of the being of its object in the being of the environment. Reflection is (etymologically) a bending back of the mind, and in the discovery of essential relations one finds in what is outside of or beyond the object that which bends him back to the object which he started with.

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§ 165. Attention gathers, one after the other, the sense-impressions that proceed from the particular object, and it discriminates these; and by this discrimination it separates the object from other objects and defines it. Hence the first product of attention is analysis, and we may therefore call analysis the second product of the union of the will and the intellect. All specialization of the attention is analysis. By analysis the sense-impressions are properly grouped and carefully discriminated, and through them the object is defined. Continued analysis discerns in the isolated object the influence of other objects and its influence on them. To recapitulate: The object is isolated by attention; analysis discriminates and defines its properties and qualities. Analysis is composed of repeated acts of attention. The will isolates the object and excludes others from it; then again it selects a portion of this object for its minuter attention, excluding the rest of the object; again and again narrowing its attention down to more and more limited fields of observation, it approaches the simplest elements. Such is analysis. But in taking account of the simplest elements of the object, it discovers its (the object's) complication with other objects. It notes the reaction of other objects upon the object it has chosen for its attention; it notes evi

dences within the object of reaction upon other objects. It thus traces the object into its unity with other objects. Hence the result of repeated analysis is synthesis. It appears that we have analysis as the result of repeated acts of attention, and that we have synthesis as the result of repeated acts of analysis.

The activity which we have defined as reflection is therefore the ultimatum of analysis and the beginning of synthesis. The mind, analyzing, abstracts and isolates, but at length discovers the relativity of the isolated object, and finds reflected in it other objects, and, thus synthesizing, it comes to define the isolated object as a bundle of relations to the rest of the universe. Attention, analysis, and reflection result in generalization, because they discover community of being between the object and its environment. These stages of reflection, analysis and synthesis, belong to the understanding. Perception deals with isolated properties; the understanding with abstractions and relations, the realm of relativity; the reason deals with totalities or wholes.

§ 166. Synthesis, then, is the discovery of connections, of reciprocal actions, of the action of the object upon other objects, and of the reaction in turn of these objects upon it. Synthesis, then, results in the discovery of relativity-a system of relations which connect the object with other objects. The continuation of this process is called reflection. Reflection consists of analysis and synthesis-the descent to the elements and the ascent to the complex interrelations which form the constitution of the object.

Here I use analysis and synthesis only in their application to objects of experience. This activity of reflection and of its separate elements of analysis and synthesis is called the understanding.

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Naming these in a different way, we can say that these are the potencies of the mind, the first potence being attention simple; the second potence being analysis; the third potence synthesis; the fourth potence reflection. Still further, if we regard the essential personality as will power, we can describe the various stages of growth thus far considered as the directing of the will or personality upon its intellect, overcoming its passivity, and directing it actively toward the mastery of the world. In this study the transition from mere attention to the stage of analysis is involved. Analysis is attention, but carried to a higher power. Attention simple should be the concentration of the activity of the mind on an object. Analysis concentrates the activity on the results of attention, and is thus in a certain sense self-related, for herein attention notices itself-it uses itself as an instrument. Again, in reflection, as synthesis, self-activity concentrates on the results of its own work in the stage of analysis; it perceives relations, and thus retraces its analysis, and connects the object with the elements that were excluded in the first act of attention (hence reflection is a self-activity twice self-related). There are two kinds of attention: that which relates to the environment, and that which follows a process of thought; the former is critical alertness and the latter absorption; these are opposite and mutually exclusive. The former kind of attention is spoken of here.

§ 167. There is another step of the intellect above that of reflection just described. We may call it insight, or philosophic knowing. Just as each of the

other stages of knowing arises from the persistent and systematic use of the lower orders of knowing by the will, so the highest, or insight, arises from the systematic use of reflection through the will. Reflection follows out relations of dependence, and acknowledges relativity as its highest category. Its doctrine is that each thing depends on everything else. It holds that all knowledge is relative because all things are relative, existing in a system of mutual dependence. The final result of this process of reflection is to reach a whole of mutually dependent beings. This is evident if one considers that, when reflection arrives at the conclusion that dependence is everywhere present among things, it is able to state its principle in a universal form; and hence it now has before it a whole to it there is one system of interdependent things in time and space. This is the summit of the understanding. But now it becomes possible to discern some facts regarding the whole as a whole. This order of knowing is called reason by some psychologists. For illustration of the character of its knowledge, take as an instance, first, the insight that the whole can not be dependent on another whole. The whole must be independent. Second, it follows that the whole must be self-active, because it can not by any possibility receive its attributes and properties