a part of psychology, and a very important one. A consideration of its significance will throw light on the structure of sense-perception. Sense-perception is not a simple act that can be no further analyzed. In its most elementary forms one may readily find the entire structure of reason. The difference between the higher and lower forms of intelligence consists not in the presence or absence of phases of thought, but in the degree of completeness of the consciousness of them-the whole is present, but is not consciously perceived to be present, in the lower forms. The whole structure of reason functions not only in every act of mind, no matter how low in the scalesay even in the animal intelligence-nay, more, in the life of the plant which has not yet reached the plane of intellect—yes, even in the movement of inorganic matter: in the laws of celestial gravitation there is manifested the structural framework of reason. "The hand that made us is divine." The advance of human intellect, therefore, consists not in realizing more of the logical structure of reason, but in attaining a more adequate consciousness of its entire scope. Let us imagine, for illustration, an entire circle, and liken the self-activity to it. (Self-determination is a movement of return to itself, like the circle.) The lowest form of life (the plant) is not con

scious of the smallest arc of this circle; but the animal with the smallest amount of sensation is conscious of points or small arcs of it. The lowest human intelligence knows at least half a circle. The discovery of ethical laws, of philosophic principles, of religious truths, gradually brings the remaining arc of the entire circle under the focus of consciousness. What is more wonderful is this: There are degrees of higher consciousness. The lower consciousness may be a mere feeling or emotion-much smoke and little flame of intellect. There are, in fact, degrees of emotional consciousness, covering the entire scale: First, the small arcs or points; next, the half circle; finally, the whole. Think of emotions that concern only selfish wants; next, of emotions that are æsthetic, relating to art; next, of emotions that are ethical and altruistic; then, of religious emotions relating to the vision of the whole and perfect. Next above the purely emotional (all smoke and no flame of abstract intellect), think of the long course of human history in which man becomes conscious of his nature in more abstract forms, and finally reaches science. The progress is from object to subject, and finally to the method that unites both. We act, and then become conscious of our action, and finally see its method.

§ 38. The structure of reason is revealed in logic. Logic is thus a portion of psychology—it is “rational psychology." Let us examine sense-perception and see what logical forms make themselves manifest. Take the most ordinary act of seeing; what is the operation involved there? Is it not the recognition of something? We make out the object first as something in space before us; then as something limited in space; then as something coloured; then as something of a definite shape; and thus on until we recognise in it a definite object of a kind familiar to us. The perception of an object is thus a series of recognitions a series of acts of predication or judgment: "This is an object before me in space; it is coloured gray; it looms through the fog like a tree; no, it is pointed like a steeple; I see what looks like a belfry; I make out the cross on the top of the spire; I recognise it to be a church spire." Or, again: "Something appears in the distance; it is moving; it moves its limbs; it is not a quadruped; it is a biped; it is a boy walking this way; he has a basket on his arm; it is James." First we recognise a sense-impression, and through that impression an object; then the nature of the object; its identities with well-known kinds of objects; its individual differences from those wellknown kinds of objects. But the differences are

recognised as identical with well-known kinds of difference. It is the combination of different classes or kinds of attributes that enables us to recognise the individuality of this object. It is like all others and different from all others. Let us notice what logical forms we have used. First, the act of recognition uses the second figure of the syllogism. The second figure says S is M; P is M; hence S is P; or, in the case of sense-perception, (a) this object (the logical subject) has a cross on the summit of its spire, or is a cross-crowned spire; (b) church spires are crosscrowned; (c) hence this object is a church spire. We notice that the syllogism is not necessarily true. It may be true, but it is not logically certain to be true. This uncertainty attaches to sense-perception. Its first act is to recognise, and this takes place in the second figure of the syllogism, which has "valid modes" (or necessary conclusions) only in the negative. But sense-perception uses in-valid modesi. e., syllogisms which do not furnish correct inferences. Sense-perception, using a valid mode of the second figure (the mode called "Cesare "), might have said:

No natural tree is cross-crowned.

This object is cross-crowned.

Hence this object can not be a natural tree.

(No P is M; S is M; hence S is not P.)

The structure of reason, as revealed in logic, shows us always universal, particular, and individual ideas united in the form of inference or a syllogism.

Grammar shows us the logical structure of language. Language is the instrument of, and reveals the structure of, reason. Grammar finds that all speech has the form of a judgment. A is B-something is something. All sense-perception is a recognition of this sort: Something (an object before me) is something (an attribute or class which I have known before). This is an act of apperception or an identification of the new with what is already familiar. But this recognition or apperception takes place through some common mark or property that belongs to the object and to the well-known class—this mark or property being the middle term. Hence the judgment is grounded on other judgments, and the whole act of senseperception is a syllogism. The mind acts in the form of a syllogism, but is dimly conscious or quite unconscious of the form in which it acts when it is engaged in senseperception. I perceive that this is a church steeple. But I do not reflect on the form of mental activity by which I have recognised it. If asked, "How do you know that it is a church steeple?" then I elevate into consciousness some of the steps of the process, and say, "Because I saw its cross-crowned summit." This implies the syllogism in the second figure: (a) Church spires have cross-crowned summits; (b) this object has a cross-crowned summit; (c) hence it is a church spire. But this is not a necessary conclusion-it is not a valid mode" of the second figure. The mind knows this, but is not conscious of it at the time. An objection may be raised which will at once draw into consciousness a valid mode. Let it be objected: "The object that you see is a monument in the cemetery." The reply is, "Monuments do not have belfries, but this object has a belfry." Here sense-perception has noted a

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