Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

§ 35. The true ideas of infinitude and first cause lie at the basis

of educational psychology, because they make possible the higher

orders of knowing; without them the ideas of education (God,

freedom, and immortality) are not possible; Herbert Spencer's

self-contradiction in denying ultimate religious ideas while affirm-

ing the doctrine of the persistence of force. § 36. True insight

into causality as originating distinctions and differences—as pro-

ducing variations and modifications is necessary for any progress in

understanding psychology; Herbert Spencer's denial of free will.

CHAPTER IX.-The Logic of Sense-perception. What Figure

of the Syllogism Apperception uses

Pp. 62-70.

§ 37. The logical structure of the intellect an important part of
rational psychology; the syllogistic activity of the mind used not
only in conscious reasoning, but also in the lower activities, such
as sense-perception and even feeling. § 38. Sense-perception uses
the second figure of the syllogism in recognising its object; it is
identified by perceiving some mark or quality in it that is remem-
bered as belonging to an object formerly perceived, the common
mark being the middle term. § 39. The four valid modes of the
second figure; the technical terms of logic; definitions of figures.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

§ 40. The class or species of the object having been identified
by the second figure, the first figure is used to anticipate other
features of the object known to belong to the class, and these are
identified one after another in the object, or, if not found, lead to
a correction of the first act of recognition and a new classifica-
tion. § 41. It is important to note that the so-called valid modes
are not used in sense-perception; certainty is reached by multi-
plied acts of verification. § 42. School instruction gives the pupil
the stored-up results of human experience, and prepares him to
anticipate experience by using the first figure to test the results
of the second figure and revise its conclusions; hence, quick per-
ception is taught not so much by repeated perceiving as by ap-

[ocr errors]

Pp. 78-89.

§ 44. In the third figure the object is the middle term; two
predicates are found in it and thus united, making a definition of
a new subclass; the valid modes of the third figure; explanation
of the words used to name the modes; significance of the letters
b, c, d, f, and s, p, m; baroco and bocardo explained. § 45. How
the third figure in sense-perception presupposes the action of the
second figure. § 46. After the action of the third figure the first
and second verify by new observations, and store up experience in
regard to the existence of few or many examples of the new class.
§ 47. Causality perceptions through third figure. § 48. Subjec-
tive and objective causal relations in the third figure suggest
names for subclasses. § 49. Mistake of ordinary psychology in
explaining the formation of general ideas; formed by division of
still more general ideas, which are vague and empty till they re-
ceive content by recognising their subclasses through the third
figure. 50. Natural system of mnemonics arises through the
third figure; peculiarities observed, aid the memory. § 51. Ex-
amples of subjective and objective use of the causal idea in nam-
ing classes and subclasses. § 52. The third figure produces a
definition; experience may discover many or few individuals that
fall under it; summary statement of the three figures. § 53. How
the subclasses arise by division from the more general classes; the
particular categories from the universal, and all from the self or
ego as the summum genus; Hegel's logic.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

CHAPTER XIII.—Brain Centres of Sensation and Motion.

Pp. 93-98.

§ 55. Early observations of sensor and motor nerves. § 56. The

spinal cord thickens to form the medulla oblongata, the pons Va-
rolii, the optic thalami, and the corpora striata; the use of analogy
by Luys; action of the great ganglia described in language adapted
to explain the digestion of food in the stomach. 57. Difference
between reflex and deliberative movements; sensory impulses con-
verted into motor impulses; automatic actions do not need out-
side stimuli.

CHAPTER XIV.-The Localization of Functions of the Brain.
Pp. 98-114.

§ 58. Early conjectures as to the bodily seat of the mind and

its several functions. § 59. Gall and Spurzheim's phrenology.

§ 60. Defect of Spurzheim's definitions of faculties; his omis-

sion of the higher faculties (of the third order) of knowing. § 61.

Phrenological organs do not correspond to the convolutions, nor

take account of the convolutions at the base of the brain or between

the two hemispheres. § 62. The fissures of Sylvius and Rolando;

other fissures. § 63. Boundaries of the lobes. § 64. Report of the

anatomists negative to the claims of phrenology; first positive dis-

covery made by Broca in 1861 connecting loss of speech with

disease of lower frontal convolution; Eckhard and Meynert's dis-

coveries; connection between the cortex and convulsive move-

ments. 65. Hitzig and Fritsch; centres of movement near the

fissure of Rolando; David Ferrier's experiments on monkeys.

§ 66. The results do not support the phrenological theory as to

the motor areas of the brain; Munk's theory as to mental images

and motor centres. § 67. Goltz agrees with Munk that the cere-

brum has to do with mental images; Ferrier's view; the second

figure of the syllogism does not enable the mind to form motives,

but the first figure is necessary for this because it brings the con-

ception of potentialities different from those realized in the object

before the senses. § 68. Exner's lines of investigation; cases of

lesion of brain and their mental effects; mutual criticisms of the

investigators. § 69. Results negative as to showing the real na-

ture of the mind, but very useful in pathology. § 70. Self-activity

perceptible only in introspection, and transferred by inference and

analogy to objects of external observation. § 71. The nerves and

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

$75. Psychology must show why a false doctrine seems to be
true, by the three stages of knowing; the motive seems to control
the will only when it is regarded as an external reality existing
independently of the will; but a motive is not an existing thing
any more than is a mental image; it is a purpose or ideal of some-
thing that does not yet exist, but will require an act of will to
make it exist; to say that a motive constrains the will is to say
that something acts before it exists; I must think away the con-
ditions of existence in order to conceive a motive, for a motive is
an ideal of a state of existence different from the actuality. § 76.
The will is thus creative in two ways in acting according to mo-
tive: First, it makes the motive by thinking an ideal that may

possibly exist in place of the actual; secondly, it realizes the

motive or ideal and annuls the actuality that was; here it proves

its freedom and superiority over the actuality, because it can con-

ceive an ideal in place of the actual, and then proceed to make it

take the place of the actual. § 77. The moral motive contains

the ideal self-the perfectly independent ego-as its object, or end

and aim; it is therefore transcendent of all reality and outweighs

death; the moral motive is therefore the strongest and at the

same time the arrival at perfect freedom of the will, because

the will makes its independent self the sole object in willing ac-

cording to the moral motive; in sacrificing its life for another,

it weighs in the balances all the motives of empirical reality and

outbalances them with its transcendent self; the moral is the

form of consistent self-activity; that self-activity which would

deny its own independence by nullifying the freedom of others

is immoral. § 78. Spontaneity distinguished from moral free-

dom; co-operation of the individual will with the will of the

social whole; Kant's “categorical imperative”: act so that the

deed will not contradict itself if it is made the universal act of all

intelligent beings; act so that if the social whole acted as you do,

it would not reduce your action to a zero. § 79. The moral the

highest motive, because it re-enforces the individual will by the

will of the community, and thereby consolidates all intelligent

will power into one; Hegel's thought on this point.

CHAPTER XVII.-Freedom versus Fate

Pp. 127-134.

80. Self-activity is presupposed as belonging to independent
being; dependent beings therefore presuppose it also. § 81. Free-
dom does not presuppose fate as its ground, but, on the contrary,
fate presupposes freedom as more fundamental; fate is phenome-
nal and freedom is noumenal. § 82. Dialectic of fate or necessity
shows it to be a part or side of the more comprehensive category
of self-activity or freedom; assuming that all things are necessi-
tated to be just as they are by the totality of conditions, it follows
that each thing is derivative from the environment or totality,
and hence there has been change; in change something new be-
gins and something old ceases to be; but the old was necessitated
to be as it was by the totality of conditions. § 83. The new also
is necessitated by the totality; hence there must be two totalities
of conditions, one for the old and one for the new, and therefore

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
« PredošláPokračovať »