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Pp. 147-250

CHAPTER XIX.-Method and System in Psychology. Pp. 147-150.

§ 95. System arises from the application of method; method is

the mode of activity of a principle; its activity produces an or-
ganic whole or system. § 97. Part I gave glimpses of the method,
discussing self-activity, the infinite, the absolute, mental pictures

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Pp. 160-166.

§ 111. Feeling a higher mode of reaction on the external world
than assimilation or digestion; desire a more developed form of
feeling, not merely a reproduction of the external, but a percep-
tion of mutual limits of subject and object that makes their unity
its object. § 112. Classification of feelings: (a) those that tend
toward intellect; (b) those that tend toward will; (a) sensations,
emotions, affections; (b) instincts, appetites, desires. § 113. How
to educate the feelings, not immediately but through intellect and
will; first give a correct intellectual view, and then make con-
formity to it a habit; then the correct view and correct habit be-
come a second nature and the old feeling is gradually replaced by
a new feeling, and the heart has been educated. § 114. Sense-

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Pp. 166-170.

§ 115. Feeling a sort of digestive activity not directed on its
food but turned inward and acting upon itself and for itself;
touch, taste, smell, hearing, and seeing considered more in detail.

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CHAPTER XXIV.-Recollection and Memory Pp. 170-190.

§ 116. Recollection can recall at pleasure the ideal object formed

in the act of perception; memory is systematized recollection; it

generates the faculty of perceiving things and events as individu-

als of species or members of classes, and this makes possible lan-

guage and the specially human form of mind; it looks behind the

object to its producing causes; it sees in each object many other

possibilities, a sort of halo of potentiality. § 117. This is a further

activity of introspection; it is an attention to the activity of rec-

ollection; for it re-enforces the present perception of the object by

adding to it its past perceptions, hence completing the present ob-

ject by adding to it its variations and thus seeing it in the perspec-

tive of its history; it thus transmutes the transient into the perma-

nent and sees each individual in its universal; the act of attention

here makes its appearance, since the mind in collecting its expe-

rience around one individual must needs neglect other objects.

§ 118. Generalization thus goes on in the swift unnoticed process

of sense-perception and memory. § 119. Mnemonic systems usually

attempt to strengthen the memory by attention to accidental as-

sociations instead of essential relations; cultivate the memory

directly where it is weak, but do not train the mind to notice acci-

dental relations, for this weakens the power of thought. § 120.

The scale of ascent from limitation of the subject by the object in

sense-perception to free reproduction of the object in memory.

§ 121. Memory a double self-activity as compared with sense-per-

ception. § 122. Overcultivation of sense-perception arrests de-

velopment in memory and thought; overcultivation of memory

likewise arrests or deadens the power of thought and also of im-

agination; the will also settles into passive obedience through too

much cultivation of the memory. § 124. Cases in which memory

should be cultivated; associations that assist the power of thought

and strengthen the memory at the same time. § 125. Memory not

a simple faculty, but an entire series of activities; return to child-

ish memory of trivial circumstances not desirable. § 126. Atten-

tion strengthens one kind of memory while it weakens other kinds,

and thereby makes the memory uneven. § 127. Memory less im-

portant when the higher faculties grow strong; how the memory

and sense-perception grow less and less important through the re-

sults of specialization; Goethe's Homunculus; Aristotle's observa-

tion that the lower faculties, the passive intellect, are moribund.

CHAPTER XXV.-From Perception to Conception; each Object

seen in its Class

Pp. 190-197.

§ 128. Memory versus recollection as a process of collecting
about an object its variations and seeing it in its history; nutri-
tion, sense-perception, and representation reviewed. § 129. The
seeing of an individual in its class is a consciousness of the free-
dom of the ego to recall or represent to itself a former perception
at pleasure; as the ego can reproduce its percepts, it is a generat-
ing activity. § 130. Here perception becomes conception, for the
ego transfers its generating activity to the objective world, and
sees everything as a product of a combination of causes, and as
only one specimen out of an infinite number that the causal com-
plex might produce. § 131. Universals not derived from particu-
lars by analysis and abstraction, but rather by synthesis-the
seeing of the individual object in its producing cause; how the
infant uses the third figure of the syllogism and brings out his
ideas from emptiness and vagueness to definiteness and fulness
of content. § 132. Concepts arise when the child can compare his
recollection with reality. § 133. Human sense-perception differs
from that of animals by the fact that it perceives all objects as speci-
mens of classes; each is a particular in a universal; man perceives
by means of concepts; apperceives as well as perceives. § 134.
The rise of self-consciousness, the perception of the ego is therefore
joined to the rise from perception to conception. § 135. Imagina-
tion and fancy freer than memory, but not with a rational freedom.
CHAPTER XXVI.-Language the Distinguishing Characteris-

tic of the Human Being .

Pp. 198-206.

§ 136. The word fixes the concept; language distinguishes the
man from the animal. § 137. Language an evidence of immortal

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§ 143. Common sense uses the principle of contradiction in

an abstract way, and does not admit relativity and dependent

being; can not solve the paradox involved in motion or becoming;

Herbert Spencer's denial of self-consciousness. § 144. Explana-

tion of the conviction of common sense that all things are com-

plete, independent totalities; it deals with universals without

being aware that all its percepts are likewise concepts. § 145. It

figures to itself an abstract world of self-existent, atomic beings.

§ 146. To refute common sense with its abstract law of contradic-

tion, show the object's relations of dependence and the significance

of becoming and change. § 147. The stage of reflection follows

that of common sense when the idea of the necessary relativity of

things is seized; the correlation of forces belongs as a doctrine

to the stage of reflection; scale of ideas: (a) sensuous ideas perceive

things, (b) abstract ideas perceive forces, (c) concrete idea perceives

persistent force, (d) absolute idea perceives self-determination;

Hume's psychology the reductio ad absurdum of Locke; Herbert

Spencer's "symbolic ideas." § 148. The understanding dogmat-

ical (common sense) and sceptical (reflection). § 149. The under-

standing holds to the finite, taking the perishable for the imper-

ishable and the noumenal for the phenomenal. § 150. Deduction

of the phenomenal. § 151. Deductions of negative unity as tran-

scendent; the Sankya philosophy, a doctrine of the negative

unity transcendent. § 152. The Aufklärung, or period of scepti-

cism; it is the advent o the idea of negative unity in reflection.

§ 152. Negative unity the summit of the understanding.

CHAPTER XXVIII.-The Reason

Pp. 220-227.

§ 153. The highest thought of the understanding is that of

negative unity wherein all individuality is swallowed up, as a sea
swallows up its waves; but the negative unity must also cause

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