Revelation or it may be projected also into the past, and viewed there in association with a past eternity.

(5.) It was when Butler saw personal identity, as he thought, in danger that he undertook to deal with the question of our existence in the unseen world.* This identity is in truth the very core of the whole subject. An immortality without identity is of no concern to us; and the transmigration of souls is a virtual denial of the doctrine.

(6.) We have to distinguish between a condition of deathlessness into which we grow by degrees, and an immortality which, ingrained (so to speak) from birth, is already our absolute possession. This distinction is a vital one for those who do not accept any dogma of immortality belonging to nature, but who look upon it as a gift resulting from union with Christ and with God.

With these diversities before us as to the nature of immortality, let us now consider the various ideas of the tenure on which it is to be held.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

(To be continued.)

*Analogy, I., i., 1.

HOW CONGRESS VOTES MONEY.-A REJOINDER.

BY THE HON. C. F. CRISP, EX-SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES.

IN an essay headed "The House of Representatives and the House of Commons," published in the last number of the REVIEW, Sir Reginald Palgrave compares the procedure on money bills in Congress with that in the House of Commons; and reaches the conclusion that the American method is bad, and the English plan is good.

In order that a comparison between methods should be instructive and valuable, it is essential that each should be distinctly and correctly stated. While I am not familiar with the rules of procedure in the House of Commons, I have no doubt that Sir Reginald is, and that he has fairly stated what those rules are. I have some knowledge of the rules and practice in the House of Representatives, and am perfectly clear that Sir Reginald misapprehends both.

"Owing to the national jealousy," says Sir Reginald, "of anything approaching a one-man power, and the consequent absence of any single authority, the House of Representatives have sought to acquire the motive force necessary to urge on and to regulate their energies by a subdivision of authority; by the delegation of their power to fifty-six standing committees."

This extract from the essay of Sir Reginald discloses that he has an entirely erroneous conception of the duties and powers of the standing committees of the House. Let me make this plain. The duration of a Congress is two years. At the first session of each a Speaker is elected ; and among other duties he is charged with the appointment of the standing committees of the House. These committees are composed of representatives of the different political parties, and each has jurisdiction defined by the rules.

The House of Representatives is composed of three hundred and fifty-six members, and has pending before it during each Congress more than ten thousand bills. Each member has the right to introduce a bill or bills, and this right belongs to him as a Representative. He can exercise, or fail to exercise, it as he sees fit, and that, too, without first obtaining the consent or approval of a Cabinet Minister, or any one else. When a bill is introduced it ought to have consideration. It may be public, or it may be private; it may be a good bill, or it may be a bad bill. ́ In any event, it must or should be considered, or disposed of in

some way.

Again, as all bills introduced cannot have consideration, there must be some method of calling to the attention of the House those most important. In the absence of committees, each member, as opportunity affords, might call up his bill and precipitate a discussion upon it in the House when no one, save himself, was at all familiar with its purpose and object, and when all were in ignorance that it would come up for discussion. In this way there could be no painstaking and careful consideration, and there would necessarily be much loss of time. The rules of the House, partly to obviate this difficulty, provide for standing committees. Each committee has defined jurisdiction.

Let me illustrate. There is a committee on elections, to which is referred all questions as to the right of a member to his seat; a committee on ways and means, to which is referred all questions affecting the revenue, or the bonded debt; a committee on appropriations, to which is referred all questions affecting the appropriation of the revenue; a committee on the judiciary, to which is referred all questions relating to judicial proceedings, or criminal and civil law. Now then, all memorials or petitions relating to the right of a member to his seat are referred to the committee on elections. That committee, in the room provided for it, can thoroughly examine into the matter referred. If necessary, it can hear evidence. It hears arguments. It carefully goes through voluminous testimony, and then reports to the House its conclusion. If it is not an unanimous agreement, then the minority reports its views; and when the case comes before the House for determination the reports disclose fully the important points in the law and in the evidence, and the House is thereby enabled intelligently to determine the question. The

same rule obtains as to appropriations, and as to every other question that comes before the House.

In no sense is there a delegation of the authority of the House to these committees; but, on the contrary, they are designed and intended to aid the House in arriving at fair and just conclusions.

In the House of Commons I understand select committees are appointed for the same purpose. In the House of Representatives, rather than appoint a select committee in each case as it arises, standing committees are appointed, to which are referred all bills that are introduced in the House. It does not create even a prima facie case. The reasoning of the committee may or may not convince the House of the correctness of its conclusions; the question may be as thoroughly investigated by the members when it reaches the House as though there had been no standing committee, and the conclusion finally arrived at may be the opposite of that reached by the committee. The great advantage of the system is that the committee in its own way and time, without formality, considers the question and reports to the House its conclusions, and the law and facts on which they are based. The House is then in possession of all the information necessary to a correct judgment.

Again, Sir Reginald says: "The contention I venture to raise is not against party, but against procedure. It is to show that while Congress, as I presume, exists to remove grievances, the biggest grievance that afflicts the United States lies in Congress itself, in the method used by both Houses for the appropriation of public money." And he further says, "the finance system of Congress" is "spending made easy," and cites increasing appropriations to prove it.

If Sir Reginald were better acquainted with our methods, he would see at once that this idea is incorrect. Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate this is to relate in detail the procedure in the House of Representatives on a money bill.

Each head of a Department, that is, the Cabinet officer, at the beginning of every session makes detailed estimates of the sum that will be required to conduct the business of his Department for the ensuing fiscal year. These estimates are sent to the Speaker of the House, and are by him referred to that committee which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Take for illustra

tion the estimates for expenditure in the legislative, executive and judicial Departments of the Government. These estimates are referred to the Committee on Appropriations. That committee carefully considers them, sends for heads of Departments and makes inquiry as to the necessity of each or any item in the estimate; determines, after investigation, what is necessary for the support of those branches of the Government, and thus makes up a bill. The committee may report in favor of granting more or less than the estimates; but cases are rare indeed when the estimates are exceeded, and as a rule they are very greatly reduced. The bill thus prepared is presented in open House, either by the Chairman of the Committee, or the member of the Committee who has charge of it. The Speaker orders the bill printed and referred to the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, a committee, as its name implies, composed of the entire membership of the House. Each member is furnished with a printed copy of the bill. On a subsequent day, the Representative having the bill in charge moves that the House resolve itself into a Committee of the whole for the purpose of considering the bill. If this motion prevails, the Speaker vacates the chair, and names some member to act as Chairman of the Committee. The bill is considered in that committee under rules established by the House. One of these rules is that "no appropriation shall be reported for any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works and objects as are already in progress; nor shall any provision in the bill change existing law, except it operate to retrench expenditures;" nor can the bill be amended either in Committee of the Whole or in the House, so as to violate this rule. When the House resolves itself into a Committee of the Whole, the bill is read through, and general debate is then in order. "General debate" means that any member obtaining the floor may speak to the bill for one hour; and this kind of debate continues until every one of the three hundred and fiftysix members who desires to do so shall have spoken, unless the Committee shall rise, report to the House, and the House shall by a majority vote close or limit debate in the Committee.

When general debate is closed, the Committee of the Whole proceeds to consider the bill for amendment under what is known as the five-minute rule. Under that rule the bill is read by paraVOL. CLXII.NO. 470.

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