who are poor already possess that advantage. To what purpose then the toilsome pursuits to which multitudes doom themselves?

The comparatively small share of direct influence or of wealth allotted to mind in the general arrangements of life, will not appear surprising if we reflect, that moral worth has still less of these external accompaniments than mental.

It is a rare thing for avarice to prevail in the extremes of great opulence or great poverty; but in all the intermediate gradations, it can flourish without difficulty.

For the most part men are pressed with poverty, and thus excluded from many gratifications; or if possessed of riches, are prevented from enjoying them by ill-health, passionate or envious temper, or some other misfortune.

Poverty is despised by few so much as by the

poor.

Lost objects of affection often live longer in the feelings of the poor than of the rich. The former have few other objects or pleasures to fill the void; the latter, a great number and variety.

Avarice seldom abounds in the ruder stages of society; but when luxuries have begun to mul

tiply, a desire is created for money as the means of their attainment. Afterwards, a desire for money as an instrument of purchasing pleasures, frequently degenerates into a passion for accumulation itself; the end being supplanted by the means, in consequence of the influence of habit.

More wisdom is necessary to acquire riches.

use than to

Poverty delights to

revel in ideal scenes of

wealth and splendour. On the other hand, affluence and distinction delight in the contemplation of the simpler and more obscure walks of life. In each situation, the mind feels its own barrenness of pleasure; and therefore turns from real dissatisfaction in what is known, to fancied happiness in what is unknown.

If, according to the opinion of Socrates, and to the natural signification of the term, only those things can be denominated the goods of a man, which are instruments of his benefit, how few are the goods even of the most affluent! and what a disproportion subsists between the possessions and the goods of the generality of mankind.

PART XI.

ON MISCELLANEOUS POINTS IN MORALS.

WHEN duty and pleasure are incompatible, we are to regard the former, however slight, in opposition to the latter, however considerable.

Respect yourself if you wish others to respect

you.

Any particular virtue is strengthened by the improvement of the general character.

There is so much injustice and selfishness in the world, that it would be one of the most extraordinary things imaginable, were we to experience none of their effects.

It is a beautiful trait in Virgil, where Æneas, about to revenge himself on Helen, is reminded of the duties which he owes to his parent, wife, &c.* The best way to conquer the suggestions of improper feeling is to attend to the obligations of present duty.

See Æneid, Lib. ii. 567-603.

ON MISCELLANEOUS POINTS IN MORALS. 193

Prejudice should invariably be treated with lenity, unless connected with intolerance or bad temper; for man, constituted as he is, almost inevitably becomes prejudiced under certain external circumstances.

It would be interesting to trace the process by which a mind, naturally unsuspecting and generous, becomes decidedly selfish and suspicious, through contact with selfishness and unkindness,

Propensities to vice often run counter to each other, as avarice and vanity, or avarice and the love of pleasure. This is never the case with virtuous principles or dispositions. The more excellences a man possesses, the more vigorous and harmonious is their operation.

Supposing temper depends chiefly on physical causes, which there is perhaps reason to believe, this furnishes no apology for a bad temper, because the mind is not thus deprived of a power of selfcontrol; and because, with those who are subject to the failing, the chief point of probation may be, whether they will counteract their tendency to its indulgence.

Affliction is often an excellent casuist.

Some minds are so humble and diffident, as almost to admit the representations of falsehood and calumny against themselves.

No passion carries with it more of its own punishment than pride.

Amiableness is not blindness to faults, but candour and benignity towards them. This is compatible with decided aversion. If we resent, or treat with the utmost rigour of justice, undoubted faults, we shall be very unamiable.

In disapprobation of the vices and follies of others, we are more influenced by selfishness than we may suppose. Improprieties of conduct excite little regret, unless our own interest or consequence is affected.

Consider rather the slight aggregate of evils which you suffer, than the individuals or circumstances by which they are occasioned.

Complaints seldom exceed suffering; for it would be idle to suppose, that he who felt himself happy, should be querulous. It does not, however, follow, that complaints are justifiable; for suffering is always inferior to desert.

In opposing evil, you will be most likely to succeed in your own case; for you have more control over yourself than over others.

Time will almost infallibly give you the advantage over calumny or ill-treatment, but the