Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy

Predný obal
Oxford University Press, USA, 5. 12. 1996 - 288 strán (strany)
It is widely believed that Hume often wrote carelessly and contradicted himself, and that no unified, sound philosophy emerges from his writings. Don Garrett demonstrates that such criticisms of Hume are without basis. Offering fresh and trenchant solutions to longstanding problems in Hume studies, Garrett's penetrating analysis also makes clear the continuing relevance of Hume's philosophy.

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Obsah

Cognition and Imagination
11
The Copy Principle
41
The Separability Principle
58
Reason and Induction
76
Two Definitions of Cause
96
Liberty and Necessity
118
Miracles
137
Personal Identity
163
Moral Evaluation
187
Skepticism and Commitment
205
Notes
243
References
259
Index
265
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Strana 37 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he •calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things ; in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person...
Strana 167 - In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Strana 166 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Strana 142 - When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then,...
Strana 92 - ... confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was...
Strana 73 - The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it.
Strana 66 - There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them.
Strana 126 - Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life.

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