Cognition and Commitment in Hume's PhilosophyOxford University Press, USA, 5. 12. 1996 - 288 strán (strany) It is widely believed that Hume often wrote carelessly and contradicted himself, and that no unified, sound philosophy emerges from his writings. Don Garrett demonstrates that such criticisms of Hume are without basis. Offering fresh and trenchant solutions to longstanding problems in Hume studies, Garrett's penetrating analysis also makes clear the continuing relevance of Hume's philosophy. |
Obsah
11 | |
The Copy Principle | 41 |
The Separability Principle | 58 |
Reason and Induction | 76 |
Two Definitions of Cause | 96 |
Liberty and Necessity | 118 |
Miracles | 137 |
Personal Identity | 163 |
Moral Evaluation | 187 |
Skepticism and Commitment | 205 |
Notes | 243 |
References | 259 |
Index | 265 |
Časté výrazy a frázy
abstract ideas argues asserts belief Berkeley calls causal relation cause and effect chapter claim cognitive psychology conceive conception concerning conclusion connexion constant conjunction continued and distinct Copy Principle counterexamples David Hume definitions of cause demonstrative deriv'd derived Descartes determinism discussion distinct existence distinguish doctrine of necessity ECHU empiricism endorses Enquiry evidence example experience explain explicitly fact Fogelin George Berkeley hence Hume Hume's argument Humean imagination inductive inferences inductive reasoning intellect interpretation Jonathan Bennett judgment kind law of nature Leibniz liberty Locke Locke's mean memory mental mind missing shade moral distinctions moral evaluations moral sentiments necessary connection objects observed operations particular perceptions personal identity philosophical possible premises probability problem produce proof propositions qualities question reflection regard rejection representational faculty resemblance result revival set sense Separability Principle simple ideas simple impressions sion skeptical arguments spatial term tion Treatise I.iv.7 understanding Uniformity Thesis virtue vivacity vulgar writes
Populárne pasáže
Strana 37 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he •calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things ; in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person...
Strana 167 - In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Strana 166 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Strana 142 - When any one tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then,...
Strana 92 - ... confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was...
Strana 73 - The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it.
Strana 66 - There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them.
Strana 126 - Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life.