to view every thing in the grandest and noblest point of light; whereas other minds are more inclined to attend to what is little and beautiful in the objects they view. And as every thing we are converfant with hath various, and very dif ferent properties, every mind hath an opportunity of indulging its own tafte, by contemplating thofe forms of things which afford it the moft pleafing gratification. I cannot conclude this article without observing, that inftances of the true fublime abound no where more than in the Scriptures. Never were grander ideas prefented to the human mind, than we find in the representations of the Divine Being in Ifaiah, particularly chapter XL. in the book of Job, in feveral places in the Pfalms, and in the wri tings of Moses. The falfe fublime, or the bombaft, will be confidered when I treat of the Hyperbole. LECTURE XXI. Of the Pleafure we receive from Uniformity, and Variety; and firft of Comparisons. THE HE pleasure we receive from the view of objects in which there is a visible mixture of uniformity and variety, hath, no doubt,, more fources than one: however, as one of its fources is the moderate exercise which fuch objects give to our facul ties, I fhall treat of it in this place. To comprehend an object, the parts of which have no fort of analogy to one another, we must of neceffity, go over the whole of it; and after this furvey, which (from the uniform manner in which our minds are employed when we attend to it) must be very tedious, nothing but the memory is exercifed, to connect and retain the idea of the whole: whereas the moment we perceive that the parts of any object are analogous to one another, and find, or are informed, what that analogy is, the fight of a part, without any farther investigation, fuggefts the idea of the whole; and the judgment is most agreeably and fuccefsfully employed in completing the image. This is very evident upon the view of a part of any thing the proportions of which are known, as of an animal body, of a regular curve, or polygon, a regular building, a regular garden, or of a consistent set of political, philofophical, or theological principles. With what fatisfaction may we often hear perfons fay, upon feeing part of fuch an object, or such a scheme, "You need fhew me no more: I fee the whole." When being fhewn fo little of an object fuffices to comprehend it, it shews confiderable experience, and an extensive acquaintance with the forms and properties of things. To difcern the analogy of the things we are converfant with, is to become poffeffed of the clue of knowledge, by which we are led, with unfpeakable ease and satisfaction, through the feeming labyrinths of nature. In this manner, by the help of a few general principles, we become masters of a great extent of valuable science: whereas, with out fuch general principles, which are derived from the knowledge of the analogy or uniformity of things, our speculations prefent nothing but a scene of confufion and embarraffment, Moreover, wherever we see analogy in objects, we see the marks of intelligence and defign; which will be mentioned hereafter as another fource of pleasure in works of genius and imagination: and the more complex is the object we view, or the greater the variety we perceive, consistent with strict analogy, the more doth it employ our facul : ties to comprehend it, and the higher idea do we conceive of the intelligence of the being who formed it. Befides, the contrast there is between twọ properties fo different as uniformity and variety in the fame object, contributes not a little to increase the pleasure resulting from a view of the whole. But perhaps it is to affociation that we are indebted for the greatest part of the pleasure we re ceive from the view of uniformity and variety. In fact, almost every pleasing object in nature or art is poffeffed of it. The human body, all animal bodies, and all vegetable nature, infinitely various as thofe objects are, have their parts formed with perfect analogy to one another. These properties are, likewife, for reafons of convenience, imitated in our houses, in our gardens, in our furniture, utensils, and, in short, in every thing in which the ingenuity or induftry of men are employed. Can it be any wonder then, when every thing around us, that is adapted to give us pleasure, hath these properties, that even the firft appearance of them in objects, the ufes of which we are wholly unac-, quainted with, should be pleasing. The pleasure we receive from what is called the just proportions of objects, is borrowed, by affociation, from the idea of the ufes to which fuch. proportions are fubfervient. What is a well-proportioned plough, a well-proportioned houfe, or a well-proportioned fhip, but things, or inftruments, of of such a form as is found by experience to be the most proper and convenient for the purposes to which they are applied? If proportion be any thing different from this, it must coincide with the idea of uniformity and variety. From this fource of uniformity and variety, is derived the pleasure which comparisons, metaphors, and allegories, in works of genius and imagination, give us. This is a confideration distinct from that of the light they throw upon a subject. Comparifons give us clear ideas of things, by means of the refemblance between the ideas they exhibit and those which a writer hath occafion to introduce; in which it is evident that the property of fimilarity or uniformity alone is concerned; though we may confider it as heightened by its contraft with those properties in the objects which are not fimilar. But uniformity alone, however heightened, doth not affect the imagination with any fenfe of pleasure. In order to produce this effect, it is neceffary that variety be joined to it. Let us take for an example the following celebrated fimile in Addifon's Campaign. So when an angel, by divine command, The light which this fimile throws upon the principal object in the poem, can only arise from the |