In these two preceding parts of this course, therefore, those things have been confidered which are more peculiarly the proper objects of an orator, and effential to his views. In what remains will be explained what is, though very greatly, yet indirectly of service to him, and an advantage rather than a neceffary part of his art. This thought, by the way, fuggefts an important advice, with which I fhall conclude this part.

Let the first, and principal view of every orator, whether in writing or speaking, be to inform the judgment, and thereby direct the practice; and let him only attempt to please, or affect, when it is fubfervient to that defign; when the occafion itself, in a manner, prompts to it, and the bent of his own genius leads him to comply with fuch an invitation.

PART

THE third part into which the art of

oratory is diftributed, comprehends whatever is ornamental in a difcourfe or compofition. The bare materials, and even the difpofition of them in a difcourse, are adapted to do little more than make an impreffion upon thofe perfons who, of themselves, and from a regard to the nature and importance of the fubject, will give their attention to it; whereas the fubject of this laft part is calculated to attract and engage the attention, by the grace and harmony of the ftyle, the turn of thought, or the ftriking or pleasing manner in which fentiments are introduced and expreffed. We have hitherto examined what we may call the bones, muscles, and nerves of a compofition; we now come to

the

the covering of this body, to defcribe the external lineaments, the colour, the complexion, and graceful attitudes of it.

In treating of this part of my fubject, I fhall endeavour to lay open the fources of all the pleafures we receive from this most refined art, explaining what are the properties or principles, in our frame which lay the mind open to its influences, as well as defcribe the various forms of expreffion which are found, by experience, to affect our minds in fo agreeable a manner, and give examples of fuch forms of expreffion.

Whatever contributes to adorn a discourse, muft either give life and beauty to the sentiment, or harmony to the diction. I fhall confider each of these in their order. By ornament of thoughts, I mean that manner of introducing and presenting them to the mind which will give them the most favourable appearance. This, therefore, comprehends all the pleasures which may be faid to be perceived by the mind; whereas, when I treat of the ornament of diction, I fhall confider the language as affecting the ear only.

Whatever it be, in the fentiment or ideas, that makes a difcourfe to be read with pleasure, muft either be interefting, by exciting those grofs and more fenfible feelings we call paffions, or muft awaken thofe more delicate fenfations, which are generally called the pleafures of the imagination. Each of these kinds of feelings are, by some philo

fophers,

fophers, referred to fo many diftinct reflex, or internal fenfes, as they call thofe faculties of the mind by which we perceive them; whereas, according to Dr. Hartley's theory, those sensations confift of nothing more than a congeries or combination of ideas and fenfations, feparately indiftinguishable, but which were formerly affociated either with the idea itself that excites them, or with fome other idea, or circumstance, attending the introduction of them. It is this latter hypothesis that I adopt, and, by the help of it, I hope to be able to throw fome new light on this curious fubject.

An enumeration of the stronger paffions of the human mind, which are roused by the powers of oratory, and the art of compofition, I regard as foreign to my undertaking to attempt: but it may, with reason, be expected that I fhould defcribe those finer feelings which conftitute the plea fures of the imagination, and which are feldom attended to in any delineations of human nature; as alfo fome critical fituations of mind respecting the paffions and emotions in general, the knowledge of which is effential to criticism upon works of genius and imagination; and explain thofe forms of addrefs which are adapted to gain affent. But, previous to this, I shall give some account of Taste, and of the difference between plain and figurative language.

An

An exquifite feeling of the finer fenfations abovementioned, may be said to constitute a fine tafte: but no person can be a complete judge of the merit of a compofition unless he perfectly understand the fubject of it, so as both clearly to diftinguish the character of the defign; as whether it be great or mean, new or common, &c. and alfo to judge how far the execution is adapted to the undertaking.

The well-known ftory of the fhoemaker viewing the Venus of Apelles, may affift us to distinguish our ideas in this cafe. This artifan difcovered no ftrong sense of pleasure upon the fight of fo extraordinary an effect of human genius, and therefore could not be said to have taste, but he certainly was a very good judge of the proportions of the foot and of the shoe.

Judgment is univerfally acknowledged to be altogether acquired, and that tafte, too, or the capacity of perceiving the pleafures of imagination, may also be acquired, to a very great degree, is evident from the actual acquirement of a variety. of fimilar taftes, even late in life. Inftances of this may be given in a tafte for flowers, for gardening, and for architecture, which are hardly ever acquired very early in life.

It is hardly poffible that any person who never attempted to sketch out an object himself, fhould have a high relish for the beauties of painting; but let any person be instructed in drawing, let him be

much