cumftances which contribute to excite them. The genuine and proper use of the paffions undoubtedly is to rouze men to juft and vigorous action upon every emergency, without the flow intervention of reafon. It is, therefore, wifely provided, that they should be raised by the immediate view and apprehension of the circumstances proper for their exertion. Being, therefore, blind and mechanical principles, they can only be connected with the view of fuitable circumftances; fo that, whenever these are prefented, whether the paffion would, in fact, be useful or not, it cannot fail to be excited, and to rise to its usual height.

This obfervation supplies us with a reason why our minds are as fenfibly affected with scenes of past, or even of ideal distress, as with a mere relation of what is present and real. All the advantage that the latter circumftances united have, is, that they engage us to think more intensely of the cafe, which will confequently make the ideas more vivid, and the scene more interesting. But that scenes of ideal diftrefs have as much power over the imagination as scenes of diftrefs that are past, cannot but be allowed, when we confider, that even reason can plead nothing more in favour of the one than of the other; fince the paffion is equally unavailing in both cafes. Why may I not, with reason, be as much interested in the adventures of Æneas or Telemachus, as in those of Themistocles, Xenophon, or any of the heroes

of

of Greece or Rome? If the one never had any exiftence, neither have the other any at present, which, with refpect to the final causes of our paffions, is the fame thing.

The faithful hiftorian, and the writer of romances, having the fame accefs to the fprings of the human paffions, it is no wonder that the latter generally moves them more forcibly, fince he hath the choice of every circumftance that contributes to raise them; whereas the former hath nothing in his power but the difpofition of them, and is reftricted even in that. I fancy, however, that no perfon of reading and obfervation can doubt of the fact, that more tears have been shed, and more intenfe joy hath been expreffed in the perufal of novels, romances, and feigned tragedies, than in reading all the true hiftories in the world. Who ever, upon any occurrence in real history, ever felt what he must feel in reading Clariffa, George Barnwell, Eloifa, and many other well-contrived fictions. It is to no purpose to say to ourselves, "This is all a fiction, why am I thus affected?" if we read, and form an idea of the scenes there exhibited, we must feel in fpite of ourselves. The thought of its being a fiction enables us to make but a feeble and ineffectual effort to reprefs our feelings, when the ideas which excite them are very ftrong and vivid. Some perfons, however, may have acquired fuch an averfion to all works of fiction, that they cannot be prevailed upon

H

on of confiderable confequence, it will be frequently repeated, and applied to the particular figures, when they come to be separately explained and illuftrated.

LECTURE

LECTURE XII.

The Divifion of this Part of the Work into what affects the PASSIONS, JUDGMENT, and IMAGI

NATION.

Of the Effect of VIVID REPRESENTATION, the Use of the PRESENT TENSE in defcribing paft Scenes, and of PARTICULAR NAMES and CIR

CUMSTANCES.

HAVING confidered the nature of taste, and of figurative language in general, I proceed to confider diftinctly the feveral objects that offer themselves to our attention refpecting the ornament that fentiment admits of. These, as they were before pointed out, are either fome of the more remarkable and general affections of the ftronger paffions; thofe forms of addrefs which are adapted to engage affent, or thofe finer feelings which conftitute the pleasures of the imagination. Each of these three objects will engage our attention in the order in which they are here mentioned.

The first obfervation I fhall make on the general affections of the passions, is, that they are engaged, and we feel ourselves interested, in proportion to the vividness of our ideas of thofe objects and cir

cumstances

cumftances which contribute to excite them. The genuine and proper ufe of the paffions undoubtedly is to rouze men to just and vigorous action upon every emergency, without the flow intervention of reason. It is, therefore, wifely provided, that they should be raised by the immediate view and apprehension of the circumftances proper for their exertion. Being, therefore, blind and mechanical principles, they can only be connected with the view of fuitable circumftances; fo that, whenever these are prefented, whether the paffion would, in fact, be useful or not, it cannot fail to be excited, and to rise to its usual height.

This obfervation supplies us with a reason why our minds are as fenfibly affected with scenes of paft, or even of ideal diftrefs, as with a mere relation of what is prefent and real. All the advantage that the latter circumstances united have, is, that they engage us to think more intensely of the cafe, which will confequently make the ideas more vivid, and the fcene more interesting. But that scenes of ideal diftrefs have as much power over the imagination as fcenes of diftrefs that are past, cannot but be allowed, when we confider, that even reafon can plead nothing more in favour of the one than of the other; fince the paffion is equally unavailing in both cafes. Why may I not, with reason, be as much interested in the adventures of Æneas or Telemachus, as in those of Themiftocles, Xenophon, or any of the heroes

of