Utilitarian theory of Hume, 303. 307. Pleasure as motive of action, 309. Modifications of his theory, 310. Actions judged by motives, not consequences, 313. 'Moral sense' as pleasure of a particular kind,' 317. Political application of the principle, 321. Self-interest the origin of society, 321. And of government, 325. Intuitive sense of duty, 327. Assault on contract, 328. Summary of Hume's political argument, 334. Inconsistencies of the theory, 337- Idea of Duty, 342. Attempt to prove that Duty is identical with pleasure, 345. Doctrine of sympathy, 347. Breakdown of his idea of the moral sense, 354. Breakdown of its political implica- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY POLITICAL theory goes hand in hand with history. As the conditions of the problem vary from age to age, so the solution of it must of necessity vary with them. Otherwise, theory in these matters would have little or no relation to practice; it would belong to a region almost as abstract as that of pure mathematics or astronomy. This, however, is far from being the case. The Republic or the Politics sprang from the City State, and would have been impossible without it. The rival claims of Church and Empire gave birth to De Monarchia; the first awakening of nationality once more, in conflict with the Church is reflected in De civili Dominio and De Dominio divino. The break-up of the old order in Church and State demanded a new statement of the first principles of political obligation: hence the whole line of thinkers from Hobbes to Rousseau and Burke. The industrial revolution, the sudden appearance of nationality as a dominant factor in the life of Europe, once more changed the whole face of politics: hence the Socialists on the one hand, the German philosophers and Mazzini upon the other. This, of itself, is enough to put out of court those who would treat political philosophy as a purely abstract study, divorcing it wholly from the causes for which men have shed their blood and sacrificed all that would have brought them worldly happiness and ease. Is, then, political philosophy but another name for the philosophy of history? is its aim nothing more than to translate into terms of thought the successive struggles through which men have passed in their pursuit of the ideal? That would be to leap at once into the opposite extreme: to forget, as Hegel and Comte would sometimes have appeared to forget, that, in and behind all the movement of man's civic history, there are certain problems which, however much their outward form may vary, still remain essentially the same. The nature and grounds of political obligation, the relation of the individual to the State, the relation of one State to another—these are the questions which recur under all VOL. I I B conceivable forms of political association, and recur in substantially the same shape. Other interests may drive them into the background; the special circumstances of the time may obscure, or even modify them, till they become hard to recognise. But, however overlaid, however modified, they are always present; always to be reckoned with; always the problems round which the speculative thought of any age must, in the last resort, inevitably turn. Much the same thing, with a significant difference, is true of ethics. The moral code of one age is not that of another; the moral problems of one age differ from those of another. Yet the fundamental question-what is the nature of duty, what the sanction of the moral code?-remains invariable; it is to this that the moral philosophy of every age inevitably returns. Only, in the field of morals the circumstances vary infinitely less from age to age than in that of politics. The central problem therefore stands out far more clearly; it is less liable to be obscured, much less likely to be sensibly modified, by the circumstances of the moment than in the kindred realm of politics. Moral duties are comparatively unchanging. Political duties are determined mainly by expediency: in other words, by the circumstances which, strictly speaking, are always unprecedented-of the given time and the given. situation. Even in morals, no one not wholly inexperienced or grossly rash supposes that circumstances count for nothing. But in politics it is evident that the allowance to be made for them is infinitely larger: that, as Burke said, 'circumstances, which with some men count for nothing, in reality give to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect.' The central problem of political philosophy, the first and chief aim of political action, is, without doubt, to secure the right relation between the individual and the State. Conditions alter; new elements constantly force their way into the reckoning. But experience proves that, in the end, each in turn receives its value from the place it wins in regard to the more primitive elements; that, in the last resort, everything depends upon the rightness of their relation to each other, upon the courage and wisdom with which that relation is established and maintained. Examples, both for good and for evil, abound in earlier as well as later times. One, from the last century, will suffice. At no time has an element more explosive than that of nationality been thrown into the crucible of political ideals. By no two men could it have been handled more differently than by Bismarck and /Cavour. The one employed it as a means for reinforcing the already overgrown powers of the State or rather, of a military autocracy masquerading as the State-at the expense of the individual. The other, under conditions beyond comparison more difficult, never forgot that, in making his people one and independent, it was his duty also to make them self-governing and free. The dream of the latter was a free Italy in a free Europe. The work, though not the conscious aim, of the former was to forge the slavish instrument by which others, more foolish than himself, have sought to bring all Europe under the yoke of their crazy hatreds and ambitions. And if the contrast lay between the thinkers who, in each country, prepared the way for the action of the statesmen, it would speak more strongly yet. The memory of Fichte and Hegel is for ever burdened with the theory of the absolute State,' to which Bismarck harnessed the principle of nationality. Mazzini, the prophet of nationality, is also, of all writers, the one who has most truly defined the relation between the individual and the State. A nation ordered upon his principles would be not only the most ardent, but the freest and noblest, ever known. Before the 'stark congealment' of blood and iron, in which their theories have resulted, even Fichte and Hegel, it may be hoped in charity, would have stood aghast. It is, of course, true that at some periods the influx of new elements has been more marked than at others; and at such times the main issue, in the field both of thought and action, is apt to be momentarily obscured. These, however, are just the moments when both thinker and statesman have most need to remind themselves of its importance. For history is there to show that those who have not done so have invariably had cause to rue their blindness. In the pursuit of other ends-ends in themselves, it may be, desirable enough-they have either reduced the State to impotence, or forged it into a machine without freedom, without ideals, without anything that deserves the name of life. The period covered by these volumes-the period from Hobbes to Mazzini - offers both positive and negative proof of these assertions: more abundantly, perhaps, than any other period in the long story of political theory and practice. During the first two-thirds of it, from Hobbes to the close of the French Revolution, almost the sole question present to men's minds was what is here presented as the main issue: the struggle between the rival claims of the individual and the State. By the time of Rousseau and Burke, the solution to that issue was virtually accomplished. All that was left was to harmonise their results; to work them out in greater detail; above all, to apply them in the field of practice. With the tyranny of Napoleon, however, a new element, that of nationality, was called into being: or rather asserted itself upon a scale, and with a sense of its own rights and its own powers, never |