ment was based upon a consideration of the conditions of South Africa as a whole. Then for the first time the eyes of her Majesty's Government were officially opened to the existence of two facts which had from the first governed the course of South African history, and which, acting in combination, made the administration of South Africa more difficult than that of any other colony or dependency of the Empire. Yet these two facts were plain enough to eyes which were not thus officially blind, being nothing more than the natural desire of the Europeans to possess themselves of fruitful and unoccupied lands, and the natural property of the darkskinned people, to increase and multiply.

With certain other special conditions of South Africa the Imperial Government had been acquainted from the first. They were aware that the Europeans were not the sole claimants to the soil; that, on the contrary, every step in advance taken by the colonists brought them into more serious conflict with a numerous and courageous race of dark-skinned people; and they were inclined, at least at one period, when the tide of philanthropic zeal ran high in England, to over-estimate the value of the claims advanced by the Bantu both in point of fact and equity. They were aware, too, that the Europeans were themselves divided into two nationalities, and that the Dutch and English colonists were separated by differences of language, customs and character.

A knowledge of these conditions had been forced upon the Imperial Government by the logic of facts. In the one case the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony had been maintained by a series of costly and disastrous Kafir wars; and in the other, a measure acceptable enough to English sentiment, the abolition of slavery, had produced the expatriation of many thousands of the Dutch settlers.

Obviously this was a country which required the

establishment of a strong central power, for such an authority could alone grasp the general conditions, and control the political and social tendencies arising out of them.

What prevented the Imperial Government from assuming the responsibilities and exercising the rights of a paramount power in South Africa was at first the feeling that no adequate return could be expected from the necessary expenditure of moral and material force. I speak now of the period after the great emigration, when it had become apparent that a central authority was necessary to preserve the unity of the separate European communities, and to effectively regulate the relationships of those communities with each other and with the coloured races, but before the commercial importance of the country was recognised. This attitude was maintained—with intervals of spasmodic activity—during the period between the great emigration and the discovery of diamonds1836-1870. In plain words, it was not thought worth while for England to assume the rôle of paramount power. This was the impression in England. It was an erroneous view, and one which was quite opposed to the best local opinion.

In 1858 Sir George Grey wrote :

"In recommending a remedy . . . I would urge that experience has shown that the views which led to the dismemberment of South Africa were mistaken ones. That in point of fact, Her Majesty's possessions here are of great and yearly increasing value to the trade and commerce of Great Britain, and may be made valuable to an almost indefinite extent. That it has now been conclusively shown that the people do not desire Kafir wars; that they are fully aware of the much greater advantages they derive from the peaceful pursuits of industry, and from cultivating their valuable exports." * Despatch to Sir E. B. Lytton, November 19th, 1858.

*

Sir George Grey's remedy, of course, was the immediate creation of a central authority by uniting the colonies and now independent Dutch communities, founded by the emigrant farmers, in a federal system.

During this period it would have been comparatively easy to have established this central authority by means of which the paramount rights of England could have been effectively exercised. Subsequently, that is to say, after the discovery of diamonds had produced a material alteration in the attitude of England towards South Africa, the Imperial Government were extremely anxious to apply this "remedy"-federal union-of Sir George Grey. But the difficulties of the situation had then enormously increased.

At the same time mere lukewarmness and shortsightedness on the part of the Imperial Government is not in itself sufficient to account for the very special disasters, and the general ineffectiveness, which has characterised our administration of South Africa up to 1881-the year of the retrocession of the Transvaal. Indeed, after the establishment of the diamond industry the Imperial Government ceased to be lukewarm.

In order to explain this comparative failure we must look deeper.

Up to this date the two authorities which should have unitedly given effect to the power of England were in constant conflict. The cause which lay at the root of the endless "divergencies of opinion" between the home and colonial authorities lay in the simple fact that the information, or rather the data, upon which the respective opinions of Downing Street and Capetown were founded, was different. The home authorities were guided by certain general principles, the colonial by a knowledge of the actual facts of the case acquired locally and impossible to communicate. It is to this conflict between "the man in Downing Street" and "the man on the

spot"--whether a civil or military officer-that the disasters suffered by the British arms, and the losses incurred by the British treasury, are directly attributable. It is this conflict, too, which has made South Africa " grave of reputations" for the colonial administrator.

Let us take some examples :

a

After the colony had been cleared of the Kafirs who had swept over the Eastern frontier in 1834-5, Sir Benjamin Durban was of opinion that certain measures were necessary for the future security of the colonists. He proposed to grant lands between the Keiskamma and the Fish Rivers to the settlers who had suffered most in this and the preceding Kafir invasions. The object of this proposal was at once to compensate the sufferers, and at the same time to form " a belt of a dense European population," in advance of the Fish River. He also pro

posed to locate between the Keiskamma and the Kie a body of loyal Kafirs who were to be at once controlled and protected by a chain of forts occupied by a military force. These measures were reversed by Lord Glenelg's despatch of December 26th, 1835. The Imperial Government were of opinion that the colonists and not the Kafirs were the aggressors, and that future conflicts could be avoided by a recognition of the claim of the Kafirs to the country beyond the Fish River, and they, therefore, ordered the evacuation of the country eastward of that river.

In the year 1858, Sir George Grey was of opinion that the application of the Orange River Free States for the resumption of British authority over them should be favourably entertained, and that a Federal Union might be established between these States and the British Colonies; and that by means of this union the solidarity of the Europeans in South Africa might be regained, and the danger of future conflict between the Dutch and English sections avoided.

The Imperial Government decided "not to assent to any project for the resumption of British sovereignty in any shape over the Orange River Free States." They were of opinion that Sir George Grey's action in endeavouring to reunite the Europeans in South Africa "had so far compromised them, and endangered the success of that policy which they must deem right and expedient in South Africa, that his continuance in the administration of the government of the Cape could be no longer of service to public interests.” *

In December 1878, Sir Bartle Frere was of opinion that the necessity for immediate action against Ketshwayo was so great as to render it impossible for him to incur the delay which would have been involved in submitting the terms of his ultimatum to the Imperial Government. He wrote:- †

"The Zulus . . . had violated English territory, slain persons under English protection, and had repeatedly refused the redress which we demanded. Could a final demand for redress on this account be postponed ? It seems to me clearly not, with any safety to Natal and its inhabitants."

He adds that this reference would have required a delay of two months. These two months would not have passed without "fresh manifestations of Zulu impatience," or an outbreak in the Transvaal, for "whatever were the chances of Zulu acquiescence, there was no question of the bitter anger with which [the award] was received in the Traansvaal."

The Imperial Government were of opinion that, notwithstanding these circumstances, the delay should have

* Correspondence, etc., relative to recall of Sir George Grey. Printed, April 17th, 1860.

+ Despatch, March 1st, 1879. C-2316.