any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which is not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral nor scalene nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I considered, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal.' Thus it is that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular.' ('Principles of Human Knowledge,' Introd. secs. 15 and 16.)

6

that uni

in relation.

183. In this passage appear the beginnings of a process of value, as of thought which, if it had been systematically pursued by implying Berkeley, might have brought him to understand by the versality of percipi,' to which he pronounced 'esse' equivalent, defi- ideas lies nitely the 'intelligi.' As it stands, the result of the passage merely is that the triangle (for instance) in its own nature,' because particular,' is not a possible subject of general predication or reasoning: that it is so only as 'considered' under a relation of resemblance to other triangles and by such consideration universalized. 'In its own nature,' or as a 'particular idea,' the triangle, we must suppose, is so much tangible (or visible, as symbolical of tangible) extension, and therefore according to Berkeley a feeling. But a relation, as he virtually admits,' is neither a feeling nor felt. The triangle, then, as considered under relation and thus a possible subject of general propositions, is quite other than the triangle in its own nature. This, of course, is so far merely a virtual repetition of Locke's embarrassing doctrine that real things are not the things which we speak of, and which are the subject of our sciences; but it is a repetition with two fruitful differences -one, that the thing in its 'absolute positive nature' is more explicitly identified with feeling; the other, that the process, by which the thing thought and spoken of is supposed to be derived from the real thing, is no longer one of abstraction,' but consists in consideration of relation. It is true that with Berkeley the mere feeling has a 'positive nature' apart from considered relations, and that the considered relation, by which the feeling is universalised, is only that of resemblance between properties supposed to exist independently of it. The 'particular triangle,' reducible to feelings of touch, has its

2

See Principles of Human Knowledge,' sec. 89. (2nd edit.) 2 See below, paragraph 298.

But he fancies that each

idea has a positive nature apart from

relation.

triangularity (we must suppose) simply as a feeling. It is only the resemblance between the triangularity in this and other figures-not the triangularity itself—that is a relation, and, as a relation, not felt but considered; or in Berkeley's language, something of which we have not properly an 'idea' but a notion.''

6

184. But though Berkeley only renders explicit the difficulties implicit in Locke's doctrine of ideas, that is itself a great step taken towards disposing of them. Once let the equivocation between sensible qualities and sensations be got rid of-once let it be admitted that the triangle in its absolute nature, as opposed to the triangle considered, is merely a feeling, and that relations are not feelings or felt-and the question must soon arise, What in the absence of all relation remains to be the absolute nature of the triangle? It is a question which ultimately admits of but one answer. The triangularity of the given single figure must be allowed to be just as much a relation as the resemblance, consisting in triangularity, between it and other figures; and if a relation, then not properly felt, but understood. The particular' triangle, if by that is meant the triangle as subject of a singular proposition, is no more 'particular in time,' no more constituted by the occurrence of a feeling, than is the triangle as subject of a general proposition. It really exists as constituted by relation, and therefore only as 'considered' or understood. In its existence, as in the consideration of it, the relations indicated by the terms 'equilateral, equicrural and scalene,' presuppose the relation of triangularity, not it them; and for that reason it can be considered apart from them, though not they apart from it, without any breach between that which is considered and that which really exists. Thus, too, it becomes explicable that a single experiment should warrant a universal affirmation; that the mathematician, having once found as the result of a certain comparison of magnitudes that the square on the hypothenuse is equal to the square on the sides, without waiting for repeated experience at once substitutes for the singular proposition, which states his discovery, a general one. If the

1 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' Ibid. This perhaps is the best place for saying that it is not from any want of respect for Dr. Stirling that I habitually use 'notion' in the loose popular

way which he counts 'barbarous,' but because the barbarism is so prevalent that it seems best to submit to it, and to use 'conception' as the equivalent of the German Begriff.'

singular proposition stated a sensible event or the occurrence of a feeling, such substitution would be inexplicable for if that were the true account of the singular proposition, a general one could but express such expectation of the recurrence of the event as repeated experience of it can alone give. But a relation is not contingent with the contingency of feeling. It is permanent with the permanence of the combining and comparing thought which alone constitutes it; and for that reason, whether it be recognised as the result of a mathematical construction or of a crucial experiment in physics, the proposition which states it must already be virtually universal.

185. Of such a doctrine Berkeley is rather the unconscious Traces of forerunner than the intelligent prophet. It is precisely upon his idealprogress in the question whether, or how far, he recognised the constitu- ism. tion of things by intelligible relations, that the interpretation of his early (which is his only developed) idealism rests. Is it such idealism as Hume's, or such idealism as that adumbrated in some passages of his own 'Siris'? Is the idea, which is real, according to him a feeling or a conception? Has it a nature of its own, consisting simply in its being felt, and which we afterwards for purposes of our own consider in various relations; or does the nature consist only in relations, which again imply the action of a mind that is eternalpresent to that which is in succession, but not in succession itself? The truth seems to be that this question in its full significance never presented itself to Berkeley, at least during the period represented by his philosophical treatises. His early idealism, as we learn from the commonplace-book brought to light by Professor Fraser, was merely a cruder form of Hume's. By the time of the publication of the 'Principles of Human Knowledge' he had learnt that, unless this doctrine was to efface 'spirit' as well as 'matter,' he must modify it by the admission of a 'thing' that was not an idea,' and of which the esse' was 'percipere' not percipi.' This admission carried with it the distinction between the object felt and the object known, between ‘idea' and 'notion'—a distinction which was more clearly marked in the Dialogues.' Of 'spirit' we could have a notion,' though not an 'idea.' But it was only in the second edition of the Principles' that 'relation' was put along with 'spirit,' as that which could be known but which was no 'idea;' and

His way of

dealing with physical truths.

If they

imply per

manent relations, his theory properly excludes them.

then without any recognition of the fact that the whole reduction of primary qualities to mere ideas was thereby invalidated. The objects, with which the mathematician deals, are throughout treated as in their own nature 'particular ideas,' into the constitution of which relation does not enter at all; in other words, as successive feelings.

186. If the truths of mathematics seemed to Berkeley explicable on this supposition, those of the physical sciences were not likely to seem less so. As long as the relations with which these sciences deal are relations between 'sensible objects,' he does not notice that they are relations, and therefore not feelings or felt, at all. He treats felt things as if the same as feelings, and ignores the relations altogether. Thus a so-called 'sensible' motion causes him no difficulty. He would be content to say that it was a succession of ideas, not perceiving that motion implies a relation between spaces or moments as successively occupied by something that remains one with itself-a relation which a mere sequence of feelings could neither constitute nor of itself suggest. It is only about a motion which does not profess to be 'seen,' such as the motion of the earth, that any question is raised-a question easily disposed of by the consideration that in a different position we should see it. The question whether the earth moves or not amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude from what hath been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them: and this by the established rules of nature, which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena' ('Principles of Human Knowledge,' sec. 58).1

6

187. Now this passage clearly does not mean-as it ought to mean if the 'esse' of the motion were the 'percipi' by us— that the motion of the earth would begin as soon as we were there to see it. It means that it is now going on as an 6 established law of nature,' which may be collected from the phenomena.' In other words, it means that our successive feelings are so related to each other as determined by one present and permanent system, on which not they only but Cf. 'Dialogues,' page 147, in Prof. Fraser's edition.

divine

shall

all possible feelings depend, that by a certain set of them we He supare led-not to expect a recurrence of them in like order poses a according to the laws of association, but, what is the exact decree that reverse of this-to infer that certain other feelings, of which one feeling we have no experience, would now occur to us if certain con- follow ditions of situation on our part were fulfilled, because the another. 'ordo ad universum,' of which these feelings would be the 'ordo ad nos,' does now obtain. But though Berkeley's words mean this for us, they did not mean it for him. That such relation-merely intelligible, or according to his phraseology not an idea or object of an idea at all, as he must have admitted it to be-gives to our successive feelings the only 'nature' that they possess, he never recognised. By the relation of idea to idea, as he repeatedly tells us, he meant not a necessary connexion,' i.e. not a relation without which neither idea would be what it is, but such de facto sequence of one upon the other as renders the occurrence of one the unfailing but arbitrary sign that the other is coming. It is thus according to him (and here Hume merely followed suit) that feelings are symbolical-symbolical not of an order other than the feelings and which accounts for them, but simply of feelings to follow. To Berkeley, indeed, unlike Hume, the sequence of feelings symbolical of each other is also symbolical of something farther, viz. the mind of God: but when we examine what this 'mind' means, we find that it is not an intelligible order by which our feelings may be interpreted, or the spiritual subject of such an order, but simply the arbitrary will of a creator that this feeling shall follow that.

explained reality by relation of ideas to

outward

body.

188. Such a doctrine could not help being at once confused Locke had in its account of reality, and insecure in its doctrine alike of the human spirit and of God. On the recognition of relations as constituting the nature of ideas rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality. An isolated idea could be neither real nor unreal. Apart from a definite order of relation we may suppose (if we like) that it would be, but it would certainly not be real; and as little could it be unreal, since unreality can only result from the confusion in our consciousness of one order of relation with another. It is diversity of relations that distinguishes, for instance, these letters as they now appear on paper from the same as I imagine them with my eyes shut, giving each sort its own reality: just as upon