to make a few remarks on the kind of qualities and powers for which organs may be expected, and the kind of evidence, and means of enquiry, which the nature of the science admits.

It is observed by Helvetius, that all new ideas come into the mind unexpectedly and by chance, that they cannot be sought or anticipated; a remark unquestionably just, for otherwise the ideas would not be altogether new. The commencement of every science proves this fact, but the progress of the same sciences also proves that, however gratuitously the elements of knowledge are given us, there is in man a power and an impulse to take the work of chance under the direction of his own thinking and anticipating mind. However few the data may be with which he is furnished, he instantly generalises his observations, makes systems, plans experiments, fails in them, is helped in his progress by new accidents, amends his theory, reverses it, discovers new properties and powers, and goes on daily in adding to the mass of his individual observations and facts; but still he is unsuccessful in his attempt to bring these observations to unite and bear upon one great result. The lovers of science, in the course of its progress, naturally

rally arrange themselves under two great classes, one of which seem to regard the individual facts they learn, as of no value, except as they lead to the one great idea they are seeking; and these are the metaphysicians and speculative philosophers: And they would willingly dispense with all individual things, and single phænomena, could they get at their theory and system without them. The other party consists of those who are searching in all directions for something new; they hoard up every discovery with much indifference as to its tendency, regard the quantity more than the quality of their information, and absolutely despise all general views and notions of things. These are the experimentalists-the matter-of-fact men. But as their aim is still the acquisition of more knowledge, and as facts and things do not generally present themselves to those who do not seek them; they have no means of acquiring further knowledge, but by arranging and classing that which they have already, generalising, in some measure, their notions, and pursuing their researches by something like a theory and system, though it may not look far, or be very complete. Thus it happens, that in the progress of science we are reminded of the ancient fable of The Blind F 2

Man,

Professing to

Man, and The Lame Man, who were obliged to unite their powers in order to proceed on their journey. But the union, though necessary, is not cordial; hence we see speculative and practical philosophers, as they are called, much more intent to decry the powers of their rivals than to borrow their aid. Gall is an instance of this. be a mere observer of the phænomena of nature, he is a despiser of all speculation and metaphysics. And no one has suffered more than himself from this narrowness of mind. for as in spite of himself he must have something like a theory and system, as he cannot state his observations but in general words, as he must draw something like a conclusion, he finds himself within the territory of metaphysics before he is aware of it. Here he shews himself disadvantageously, not having been in the habit of scientific reflection and abstraction. As he has not even a language adapted to the subject, no chart of mind previously drawn, he is utterly unable to generalise his observations with taste or propriety Hence his doctrine has often an absurd and ridiculous appearance, which the possession of other than experimental habits and talents would have enabled him to remove, These remarks I thought necessary

here,

here, that certain gross defects (in the doctrine of which an account is to be given,) may not prevent its merits of another kind being attended to, as both may be reconciled together.

In answering the enquiry concerning the powers and dispositions of mind, for which we may expect to find especial organs in man, Gall thinks it proper to ask, What is the world? and answers shortly; It is that which is revealed to our senses and understanding. The world is nothing to that thing which perceives nothing; and it is and becomes something, and is more or less to all sensible and thinking beings, according to the respective organs of sensation and thought with which they may be endowed. The animal is distinguished from the lower species of beings, by perceiving things without itself, (extra se) by consciousness of such perception, and the power of acting, as it were, out of itself upon the external world. The animal perceives more or less of the external world, according to its organs of perception, that world being revealed to it by its organs of external sense. The sensations from without generate, or rather are metamorphosed, into ideas or thought, from the internal sense or organ whatever it may be. In the higher F 3

excellence,

excellence, and more perfect construction of this internal sense, which we may call the power of thinking, lies the superiority of man over the brute creation. Many animals surpass man in the delicacy and force of the external sense, yet man has more knowledge of the external world than they; because he has a sense or organ to perceive more relations and modifications of that world than they perceive, in other words because he has mind pre-eminently, if not exclusively.

What then are the modifications of the external world which man perceives by means of organs; and which of these organs are to be considered as independent and self-subsisting?

In general we call the power man possesses understanding, that of the animal, instinct. But, considered in themselves, instinct and understanding are not different. Power and sense are the basis of both. In both is impulse, which we name differently, according to a circumstance which is merely accidental. We call the impulse, which is understood by the subject in whom it resides, understanding. When we wish to express that the impulse is not understood, we call it instinct.

In men and animals we are alike compelled to assume the existence of an organ corre

sponding