enlightened views on all fundamental points, such as the doctrine of God, the world, the destination of man, sin and its cure;-views which must lead to a sound practical judgment, and a conformable course of life. So far, therefore, from faith being unreason, it is in truth the highest form of reason, and the only way to progressive perfection of the intellect. Innumerable instances might be adduced to prove this power of faith in thoroughly cultivating and infinitely raising our moral intuitions. The fact that the opponents of revelation so often reproach its defenders with "obscurantism," only goes to prove that they completely misapprehend the nature and the effects of faith.

And, as in the case of individuals, so also in that of the whole race and its Natural Theology, Revelation merely steps in to its aid, setting up, as it were, landmarks for necessary guidance in the region of moral and religious thought, and supplying a support for human infirmity in a few fundamental facts and truths; its purpose being to indicate to men, by a few master-strokes, their divine destiny and the way to its fulfilment; and that not in order to perplex, but to enlighten; not to bring into bondage, but to lead aright, to save from wandering in endless aimless labyrinths, and at the same time guide investigation of the traces of Divine Revelation in the world, in history, and in Scripture, and, in a word, assist the search after their underlying unity. Nor, in good sooth, does Reason forfeit aught of her dignity in thankfully accepting such assistance. If this assistance came from an inferior, Reason might find some excuse for despising it. But surely no creature need to be ashamed of help from its Creator; it does but honour itself in accepting it. "True Christianity," says Pascal," consists in the submission as well as in the use of reason. It is Reason's last step to acknowledge that there is an infinity of things which transcend her powers. She remains weak till she comes to the acknowledgment of this her own insufficiency. Doubt and assert we all must at times, but must learn at proper times to submit also. He who cannot do this, knows not yet the true strength of Reason."

And that brings us to the right point of view from which to decide the last question,-To which of the two must we con

cede the superiority when Reason and Revelation diverge from one another? Although they are not, as we have seen, opposed in principle, still in certain cases the teachings of Revelation frequently lie so far beyond the scope of Reason as to make her slow to accept them. In this case, rationalism would make Reason the superior judge, and accept only that which can be logically demonstrated. Here we see a growing faculty that is ever changing, and constantly requires fresh material, without ever coming to maturity, put forward claims which would presuppose it complete and perfect. Instead of this, we gather from the preceding that the only true view is that which subordinates reason to revelation. Not, First understand and then accept, is the maxim to be adopted in seeking religious truth, but, First submit and accept the truth, then you will be able to obtain a thorough intellectual knowledge of it. Finite reason must submit itself to infinite; the never fully educated human understanding, limited as it is by time, matter, and individuality, must yield to the perfect truth which proceeds from God; a judgment which is subject to vacillations and disturbances, to one that is ever settled and abiding. "To improve religion by means of reason," exclaims Claudius on one occasion, "appears to me just as if I were to try to set the sun by my old wooden clock."

Let Reason ever remain mindful of her own limitations. Let her not summon everything before her judgment-seat alone, especially questions, the final decision of which belongs to the moral feelings and the will. Let her especially cease to confound that which is above reason with that which is against reason: an error fraught with evil consequences for so many. Those parts of revelation which it is beyond the power of Reason fully to comprehend-such as miraculous facts and the mysteries of faith-are presented to her not as absurdities to be laughed at and rejected, as is often done by intellectually slothful and superficial Unbelief, but as deep and earnest problems, which it is our solemn duty to investigate, although to master them a whole life-time, yea, eternities, were requisite. Mysteries like these, which in this life we cannot fully comprehend, need by no means fill us with mistrust of faith. For "if all life has its mysteries, how much more the highest life! It all turns upon the question whether Reason recognises

faith as life, and, indeed, the highest form of life," and has learnt to see that everywhere the higher life transcends the laws of the lower, and, so that no higher form of being can be comprehended by the laws which regulate those beneath it (see Lect. v., on Miracles). Let Reason therefore seek in herself, and not in faith or in revelation, as such, the cause of what is obscure and incomprehensible; and let her conclude, from that which she has learnt to see of revelation, as to the truth and excellence of that which still seems dark to her. Let her endeavour to bring light into this obscurity as far as possible, not, however, in a merely intellectual way, but first of all in that which revelation itself indicates as indispensable, the way of moral action and obedience (John vii. 17). If, without pursuing this course, she seeks to appropriate supernatural truths, she will never attain her end. Only, let her not say that these truths are incredible and irrational, since she will not take the one possible way to understand and appropriate them.

If, on the contrary, Reason would only seek in the right way to penetrate into the mysteries of revelation, she would, with regard to much that might be new to her, and which she never could deduce from her own premises, be enabled, as it were, to follow the divine thought and sympathize with the divine intention; to recognise what was at first incomprehensible to her more and more in its wisdom and fitness, and, indeed, as the expression of the highest Reason, as the most certainly and absolutely True. In this way the objective facts of revelation would be ever growing more subjectively certain, and the original difference between the two would be tending more and more to disappear.

But what, in all conscience, gives Reason a right to reject historically attested matters of fact, merely because she is unable to derive and prove them directly from her own consciousness, or because she cannot forthwith understand them, while there are millions who testify that, in their case, the conviction of their truth only gradually dawned upon them? The same is the case with Conscience. Let him who would make conscience the criterion of revelation show us first of all-a much more difficult task than is generally supposedwhat there is in the witness of conscience that is so peculiar,

independent, and immutable as to constitute it the measure of the truth of revelation. Let him show us, further, that those portions of revelation which conscience would reject are really of immoral tendency, and run counter to our inherent sense of right. If our previous delineation of the character of revelation has shown that this is impossible, and if history irrefutably proves that conscience in itself has no adequate. guarantee against constant vacillations and errors, then surely it is sufficiently clear that conscience must be subordinate to the revealed Word as its fixed rule and guiding-star. Do we not perceive this in ourselves? Honestly speaking! must we not confess that our conscienee is always clearer, tenderer, and more acute when we open it to the influence of revelation; and, on the other hand, that it is always duller, laxer, and more obscure when we withdraw it from that influence? Is not this again a proof that conscience must be guided and enlightened by revelation, and not vice versa? But clearly, whatever a thing is guided by, to that it must be subordinate.

True enough, it has been maintained, in order to claim for conscience greater fixedness of character, that it is the conscience of the whole body of Christians, and not that of individuals, which is to be the rule and measure of revelation. But who will show us this collective conscience? What differences would not present themselves on inquiry between the collective consciences of various Christian churches? And would not whatever they might hold in common be the fruit of the one revelation? Is the Christian conscience to sit in judgment on that from which it has virtually sprung? The truth is, that the conscience even of whole nations and churches is subject to great obscurations and disturbances, as we have previously hinted. How blinded, for instance, was the collective Christian conscience of the Southern States of North America with regard to the question of slavery? If revelation did not form the criterion of our belief, we should have no firm ground to stand upon. To make conscience the measure of our faith, is simply "to degrade the greatness of divine thoughts to the narrowness and smallness of human."

Revelation is for our theology what the telescope is for

our knowledge of the stars, and bears the same relation to reason and conscience as the telescope does to the naked eye. One in either case requires the other. The telescope enhances, sharpens, and extends the powers of the natural eye, but demands at the same time its full activity. Any one who should study astronomy without the use of the telescope would attain some slight degree of knowledge, but many thousand stars and beauties of the heavens would escape his observation. So he who would know God without the aid of revelation must suffer from the same poverty and insecurity in his religious knowledge. But just as the uncertain testimony of the naked eye is subordinate to the clearer testimony of the assisted vision, so should it be with natural knowledge in comparison with the witness of revelation. And if, on account of the imperfection of our thoughts as well as of our belief, the combined testimony of both leaves many lacunæ unfilled, yet these lacunæ are by no means contradictions. And even if Natural and Revealed Theology are now found in several respects to diverge from one another, yet a day is certainly coming when their union will be complete. Revelation and nature are developing towards one great goal at which they will coalesce. The perfecting of the one is that of the other. The fixed tendency of revelation to become nature, to make itself more and more a citizen on earth, in order to make earth the chosen place of divine revelation, this tendency is one day to be completely realized; the consummated kingdom of God will combine both elements—the highest degree of revelation and the highest development of nature.

It appears to me that the Holy Scriptures themselves explain very beautifully and profoundly the relation which natural and revealed religion bear to each other, and their close affinity in principle and purpose, in the story of the Wise Men from the East. They came to the Holy Land led by a supernatural revelation granted to them in connection with astronomy, the branch of natural learning which they pursued, a comforting indication that every earnest, honest search after light and truth leads to its discovery. The lower revelation, when rightly used, prepares for a higher one. Not the law of Moses alone, but also the heathen philosophy and investigation of nature, was a preparation for the clear light