nourable part here in England, altogether incon sistent with the character he bore of envoy from the late and present emperors; two princes under the strictest ties of gratitude to the queen, espe cially the latter, who had then the title of king of Spain. Count Gallas, about the end of August, 1711, with the utmost privacy, dispatched an Italian, one of his clerks, to Franckfort, where the earl of Peterborough was then expected. This man was instructed to pass for a Spaniard, and in, sinuate himself into the earl's service; which he accordingly did, and gave constant information to the last emperor's secretary at Franckfort, of all he could gather up in his lordship's family, as well as copies of several letters he had transcribed. It was likewise discovered that Gallas had, in his dispatches to the present emperor, then in Spain, represented the queen and her ministers as not to be confided in: "That when her majesty had dismissed the earl of Sunderland, she promised tó proceed no farther in the change of her servants; yet soon after turned them all out, and thereby ruined the publick credit, as well as abandoned Spain: that the present ministers wanted the abilities and good dispositions of the former; were persons of ill designs, and enemies to the.common cause, and he (Gallas) could not trust them." In his letters to count Zinzendorf, he said, "That Mr. secretary St. John complained of the house of Austria's backwardness, only to make the king of Spain odious to England, and the people here de sirous of a peace, although it were ever so bad ; to prevent which, count Gallas drew up a memorial which he intended to give the queen, and transmitted

transmitted a draught of it to Zinzendorf for his advice and approbation. This memorial, among other great promises to encourage the continuance of the war, proposed the detaching of a good body of troops from Hungary, to serve in Italy or Spain, as the queen should think fit.

Zinzendorf thought this too bold a step, without consulting the emperor: to which Gallas replied, "That his design was only to engage the queen to go on with the war: that Zinzendorf knew how earnestly the English and Dutch had pressed to have these troops from Hungary; and therefore they ought to be promised, in order to quiet those two nations; after which, several ways might be. found to elude that promise; and in the mean time, the great point would be gained, of bringing the English to declare for continuing the war: that the emperor might afterwards excuse himself, by the apprehension of a war in Hungary, or of that between the Turks and Muscovites. That if these excuses should be at an end, a detachment of one or two regiments might be sent, and the rest deferred by pretending want of money; by which the queen would probably be brought to maintain some part of those troops, and perhaps the whole body." He added, "That this way of management was very common among the allies;" and gave for an example, the forces which the Dutch had promised for the service of Spain, but were never sent; with several other instances of the same kind, which, he said, might be produced.

Her majesty, who had long suspected that count Gallas was engaged in these and the like practices, having at last received authentick proofs of

this whole intrigue, from original letters, and the voluntary confession of those who were principally concerned in carrying it on, thought it necessary to show her resentment, by refusing the count any more access to her person or her court.

Although the queen, as it has been already observed, was resolved to open the conferences upon the general preliminaries; yet she thought it would very much forward the peace, to know what were the utmost concessions which France would make to the several allies, but especially to the States General, and the duke of Savoy. Therefore, while her majesty was pressing the former to agree to a general treaty, the abbé Gualtier was sent to France, with a memorial, to desire that the most christian king would explain himself upon those preliminaries, particularly with relation to Savoy and Holland, whose satisfaction the queen had most at heart; as well from her friendship to both these powers, as because, if she might engage to them, that their just pretensions would be allowed, few difficulties would remain, of any moment, to retard the general peace.

The French answer to this memorial contained several schemes and proposals for the satisfaction of each ally, coming up very near to what her majesty and her ministers thought reasonable. The greatest difficulties seemed to be about the elector of Bavaria, for whose interests France appeared to be as much concerned, as the queen was for those of the duke of Savoy. However, those were judged not very hard to be surmounted.

The

The States having at length agreed to a general treaty, the following particulars were concerted between her majesty and that republick:

"That the congress should be held at Utrecht. "That the opening of the congress should be upon the 12th of January, N.S. 1711-12.

"That, for avoiding all inconveniences of cere mony, the ministers of the queen and States, during the treaty, should only have the characters of plenipotentiaries, and not take that of ambassadors, till the day on which the peace should be signed.

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Lastly, The queen and States insisted, that the ministers of the duke of Anjou, and the late electors of Bavaria and Cologne, should not appear at the congress, until the points relating to their masters were adjusted; and were firmly resolved not to send their passports for the ministers of France, till the most christian king declared, that the absence of the forementioned ministers should not delay the progress of the negotiation."

Pursuant to the three former articles, her ma、 jesty wrote circular letters to all the allies engaged with her in the present war; and France had notice, "That, as soon as the king declared his compliance with the last article, the blank passports should be filled up with the names of the mareschal d'Uxelles, the abbé de Polignac, and mons. Mesnager, who were appointed plenipotentiaries for that crown."

From what I have hitherto deduced, the reader sees the plan which the queen thought the most effectual for advancing a peace. As the confe

rences

rences were to begin upon the general preliminaries, the queen was to be empowered by France, to offer separately to the allies, what might be reasonable for each to accept; and her own interests being previously settled, she was to act as a general mediator; a figure that became her best, from the part she had in the war, and more useful to the great end at which she aimed, of giving a safe and honourable peace to Europe.

Besides, it was absolutely necessary for the interests of Britain, that the queen should be at the head of the negotiation; without which, her majesty could find no expedient to redress the injuries her kingdoms were sure to suffer by the Barrier-treaty. In order to settle this point with the States, the ministers here had a conference with mons. Buys, a few days before the parliament met. He was told, "How necessary it was, by a previous concert between the emperor, the queen, and the States, to prevent any difference which might arise in the course of the treaty at Utrecht: that under pretence of a barrier for the States-General, as their security against France, infinite prejudice might arise to the trade of Britain in the Spanish Netherlands; for, by the fifteenth article of the Barrier-treaty, in consequence of what was stipulated by that of Munster, the queen was brought to engage that commerce shall not be rendered more easy, in point of duties, by the sea ports of Flanders, than it is by the river Scheld, and by the canals on the side of the Seven Provinces; which, as things now stood, was very unjust; for, while the towns in Flanders were in the hands of France or Spain,

the