that the "enormous sea-racers," as Dr. Boynton styles them, could be overtaken, not only by our finest wood frigates, like the Orlando, Ariadne, and Galatea, but also by most of our iron-clad ships. What their fate would be in either case, we need not attempt to describe. Dr. Boynton says they are not intended "to fight the British navy,” and these facts show that they are not "fleet enough to avoid a conflict" with our ships; the conclusion is obvious that they cannot play the part for which they were designed.

The Wampanoag is, as we have said, an exception as respects speed, and a few additional remarks are required respecting this, the most successful vessel of her class. Everything in her design has been made to give way to the provision of space and weight for the propelling apparatus. Her hold is, to an unusually large extent, taken up with engines and boilers; the coal has, in consequence, to be carried on the lower deck instead of in the hold, thus inconveniencing the crew; the weight of the engines, &c., is so great, that the ship's carrying power has been seriously reduced, her coal supply, armament, &c., having suffered; and she has the unusual number of four funnels, nearly all other war ships having at most two. Perhaps these facts will be better understood if we give a few figures. The total weight of the ship and her lading is, in round numbers, 4400 tons; her hull weighs at least 2000 tons, and the remaining 2400 tons go into weight for engines, boilers, masts, rigging, guns, equipment, stores, and provisions. More than one-half of this weight (1250 tons) put into propelling apparatus alone; and yet these heavy engines are not capable of developing greater power than engines by English makers-such as Penn or Maudslay-weighing at least 400 tons less, would develope. From this it will be seen that about seventeen per cent. of the Wampanoag's total carrying power has been sacrificed to the adoption of the type of engines which the American Bureau of Steam Engineering have designed; and to this fact must be attributed her failure in nearly every other particular except that of steaming capability. Both American and English scientific journals have joined in this opinion, and the former assert that the weight of coal intended to be carried has been cut down, that the equipment has been reduced greatly, and the sail-power almost sacrificed, in order to carry these unnecessarily heavy engines.

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Most of the other cruisers appear to be defective in their enginepower in proportion to the weight of the engines, but in them the sacrifices made are not so great as in the Wampanoag. Still, as their speeds under steam are so low, we should be warranted in condemning them on that account, even if they had not failed in other most im

portant respects-notably in sail-power and coal-supply. These two features are, as we have seen, closely connected; but it must be added here, that the rate of consumption of the American engines is much higher than-perhaps nearly twice as great as-that of the most improved engines made in this country. Hence the 700 tons of coal which some of these ships are said to carry, would not last longer than, say, 500 tons would in the same ship if she had English engines. This is most important. With respect to the sailing capabilities of these ships, reports are far from satisfactory-at least, to Americans. Their spread of canvas is, in fact, far from "enormous;" their propellers do not lift, and cause a heavy drag when the ships are sailing; and so far are they from having "the utmost speed attainable by vessels under sail," that some of them are stated by American journals to be incapable of tacking without the aid of steam. The Army and Navy Journal, for example, says of this class, "the vessels which of all others should be of the highest efficiency under canvas are the least efficient under sail of any ever built for the navy. They cannot even tack without the use of steam." All these statements go to prove that in these respects, as well as in speed under steam, the cruisers have fallen far below what was intended, and that they could not keep the sea for any length of time. As respects their armaments, nothing very definite is stated in the published accounts, but the original intention of carrying a few 9-inch guns seems to have been carried out. The real cause of their failure is, we think, to be found in the inferiority of their engines; but it must be stated that if lighter and more powerful engines were put into them, their hulls would soon be shaken to pieces, unless constantly repaired, for they are lightly built of wood, and have already shown signs of weakness. They can never play their intended rôle, since they are not able to outstrip armoured ships, or to overhaul mail steamers; and while they would probably do some damage to our mercantile marine in case of war, their career would probably be shorter, and they would probably cause less havoc, than the irregular fleet of steam privateers which we should be able to equip. Those of them at present in commission are employed as cruisers for the protection of the commercial marine of the United States, just as the unarmoured ships of our own navy are employed; and there is every reason to believe that although these ships were designed for very different and special services, they are little more efficient as war ships than many of our recent wood sloops, such as the Danae and Blanche. These facts are likely to prove satisfactory to English readers, who have from time to time heard of the progress made in America with these im

proved Alabamas, but may not have become acquainted with the results of their trials.a

Next, let us glance at our side of the picture, and see what has been done to compete with the Americans, remembering that at the time when the Admiralty began to move in this matter it was known that a number of swift cruisers had been commenced in the States, and were being pressed on with all possible rapidity. At that time there seemed every prospect that these vessels would be successful; and we have shown that it was mainly in consequence of the defective engines that they did not succeed; so that there was then no reason whatever to anticipate their failure. Under the impulse of such considerations as these, involving as they did the future safety of our mercantile marine, the Admiralty ordered one ship, the Inconstant; and after a considerable interval, about two years ago, two smaller vessels, the Volage and Active, for the same service. In moving thus slowly the Admiralty were, of course, acting consistently to their traditional policy. When screw line-of-battle ships were introduced, they waited till the French had begun the Napoleon before they ordered the Agamemnon; when iron-clads came into vogue, La Gloire was almost finished before the Warrior was commenced; and in this case the Wampanoag class were well advanced before the Inconstant was laid down. Consistency in such a policy has, however, little merit; and had it not been for the failure of the American cruisers, we might have occupied a vastly different position relatively to them than we now do. There is no doubt that when once we had fixed the type, the numbers of our swift cruisers could have been rapidly multiplied in the numerous ship-building yards of this country; but we might have had to pay a terrible price for such delay.

At present, as we have said, we possess three swift unarmoured cruisers, which, without flattery to our national pride, may be considered as fully capable of playing the part for which the American ships were designed. In the design of the first of these, the Inconstant, the Admiralty were undoubtedly influenced by the wish to produce a vessel which in every respect should equal, if not surpass, the best of the American cruisers. The largest of these ships was of more than 3700 tons burden; the Inconstant was made of more than

• The views expressed above receive striking confirmation by the following extract from the Times of December 13: "It is stated that the Secretary of the (United States) Navy, in his forthcoming report, will recommend. . . . . the sale of all the old and worthless vessels of the Isherwood (Wampanoag) class, and the construction of some new and more serviceable ships."

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4000 tons. The American ship was to carry nine-inch guns; the Inconstant was supplied with a battery of the same calibre. The estimated speed of the Wampanoag class was fifteen knots, so was that of the Inconstant; but means were employed which rendered it probable that the latter would exceed that speed on the measured mile, and she has since done so. It was intended that the American cruisers should be efficient under sail; the Inconstant was supplied with sail-power equalling that of our latest wood frigates, which had earned the highest praise for their sailing performances. Measures were also taken to secure a large coal supply, and to embody all the other features on which both English and American authorities were agreed as essential to efficiency in this special class. while there were these similarities, there were also many important differences in the designs of the Inconstant and the Wampanoag. Experience with our longest and swiftest wood frigates had shown us that a wooden hull could not sustain efficiently the great strains which the powerful engines intended to be put into the Incon stant would cause; hence it was determined to construct the ship of iron. "Eut iron ships rapidly become foul," says the reader, "and foulness means a great falling off in speed; surely this could not have been overlooked?" It has not been, and the freedom from fouling of a coppered ship has been combined with the strength of an iron ship, by covering the iron hull with wood planking, and then nailing on the copper sheathing outside the wood. This plan has been carried out also in our other two cruisers, the Volage and Active; so that all those ships can keep the sea for long periods without any decrease in speed being caused by foulness of bottom, and their hulls are not at all likely to be weakened and strained, as those of the American ships have been.

Another most important difference between the Inconstant's design and that of the Wampanoag is, that in our ship the screw propeller can be lifted out of the water when the ship is under sail; so that there is no hindrance whatever to her progress. The want of this feature in the American cruisers has been the subject of much faultfinding, and in them the drag caused by the propeller is increased considerably by the fine pitch of the screw, which stands almost directly across the ship's path, and with its four blades causes great loss of speed under sail. In our other two ships care has been taken also to avoid this fault.

A few words will suffice respecting the actual performances and qualities of our first cruiser, which has now been completed at Portsmouth, and tried on the measured mile and at sea. Her speed on

the measured mile was a little over sixteen and a half knots—that is to say, was rather more than a knot and a half above her estimated speed. In this respect, therefore, she is all that can be desired. As to her sailing capability it is not as yet possible to speak with great authority, as no sufficient accounts of her recent trials at sea have been published; but the "enormous" spread of canvas that she actually has, will doubtless give her-if not, as Dr. Boynton says, "the utmost speed attainable by vessels under sail"—yet a very high speed; and she easily out-sailed all the iron-clads in the squadron during the Autumn cruise. Her resemblance in sailpower to ships that have succeeded so well, places her satisfactory performance under sail almost beyond doubt; and it is interesting to know that she proves very handy and steady as well as speedy. With respect to her armament, the only fear is that she is too powerful, for she has a battery of nine inch twelve-ton guns, throwing as heavy a broadside as the iron-clad frigate Bellerophon, and would blow any unarmoured ship belonging to our own or any other navy almost "out of the water." Her coal supply is, as it was intended to be, excellent, and, in proportion to her rate of consumption, is very large-in fact, quite out of proportion to that of her American rivals. In all these respects, therefore, she does not fall much short of the beau idéal of a swift cruiser. Speedy under sail or steam; capable of keeping the sea for a long period, and of economising her fuel; able to overhaul nearly every vessel afloat; more than a match for any unarmoured ship; and "fleet enough to avoid a conflict" with any iron-clad, the Inconstant is a vessel which reflects credit upon her designers, and is a valuable addition to our navy.

Although not strictly connected with the subject with which we have been dealing, it may be interesting to call attention to the contrast between the Inconstant and the Bellerophon-the one a typical unarmoured ship, and the other a typical iron-clad-as a very good idea will thus be gained of the sacrifices that must be made in order to reach the extremely high speed of the cruiser. The Inconstant is more than thirty feet longer, yet six feet narrower, than the Bellerophon; so that alongside the trim, sharp cruiser, the iron-clad looks dumpy and unhandsome. Although so much shorter, the Bellerophon weighs altogether about one-third as much again as the Inconstant—a difference of nearly 2000 tons existing, of which more than one-half is put into protective armour. The two ships have engines of the same nominal power and have almost identical armaments; so that we may roughly say that 2000 tons of carrying-power is the price paid in VOL. IV., N. S. 1870.