that such or such a thing is not good ware, because there is no place in his wareroom that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philosophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the spirit of a reformer in philosophy, and who had a force of genius sufficient to shake the Aristotelian fabric in many parts, but insufficient to erect anything more solid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philosophical divisions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His divisions always consisted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other, as if one should divide England into Middlesex and what is not Middlesex. It is evident that these two members comprehend all England; for the Logicians observe, that a term along with its contradictory comprehend all things. In the same manner, we may divide what is not Middlesex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by divisions and subdivisions that are absolutely complete. This example may serve to give an idea of the spirit of Ramean divisions, which were in no small reputation about two hundred years ago.

Aristotle was not ignorant of this kind of division. But he used it only as a touchstone to prove by induction the perfection of some other division, which indeed is the best use that can be made of it. When applied to the common purpose of division, it is both inelegant and burdensome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless subdivisions, there is still a negative term left behind, which shews that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until some more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divisions, I beg leave to propose one more simple than that of Ramus. It is this-When you meet with a division of any subject imperfectly comprehended, add to the last member an et cætera. That this et cætera makes the division complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expressed or not, until clear and positive proof be brought that the division is complete without it. And this same et cætera shall be the repository of all members that may in any future time shew a good and valid right to a property in the subject.†

There is nothing new whatever in Ramus's

Dichotomy by contradiction. It was, in particular, a favourite with Plato. Among others, see

Ammonius on the Categories, f. 26, a. ed. Ald. 1546.

H.

Is this protestation to add and eke" serious or in joke?-H.

Section III.

ON DISTINCTIONS.

Having said so much of logical divisions, we shall next make some remarks upon distinctions.

Since the philosophy of Aristotle fell into disrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery to inveigh against metaphysical distinctions. Indeed the abuse of them, in the scholastic ages, seems to justify a general prejudice against them; and shallow thinkers and writers have good reason to be jealous of distinctions, because they make sad work when applied to their flimsy compositions. But every man of true judgment, while he condemns distinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, must perceive, that indiscriminately to decry distinctions, is to renounce all pretensions to just reasoning: for, as false reasoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different, so, without distinguishing such things, it is impossible to avoid error or detect sophistry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Aristotle, can neither stamp a real value upon distinctions of base metal, nor hinder the currency of those that have intrinsic value. Some distinctions are verbal, others are real. The first kind distinguish the various meanings of a word, whether proper or metaphorical. Distinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often absurd when translated into another language. Real distinctions are equally good in all languages, and suffer no hurt by translation. They distinguish the different species contained under some general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Aristotle's distinctions are verbal merely, and therefore more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language, than for a philosophical treatise. At least, they ought never to have been translated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not justify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign idioms into it without necessity or use, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The distinctions in the end of the categories of the four words, prius, simul, motus, and habere, are all verbal.*

The modes or species of Prius, according to Aristotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another-first, in point of time; secondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in point of order; and so forth. The modes

* These distinctions are all founded on the analo. gies of real existence, and are all equally valid in other languages as in Greek.-H.

More accurately: One thing is prior to another

you must take the genus which is immediately above its place in the category, and the specific difference by which it is distinguished from other species of the same genus. These two make a perfect definition. This I take to be the substance of Aristotle's system, and probably the system of the Pythagorean school, before Aristotle, concerning definition.

But, notwithstanding the specious appearance of this system, it has its defects. Not to repeat what was before said of the imperfection of the division of things into ten categories, the subdivisions of each category are no less imperfect. Aristotle has given some subdivisions of a few of them; and, as far as he goes, his followers pretty unanimously take the same road. But, when they attempt to go farther, they take very different roads. It is evident, that, if the series of each category could be completed, and the division of things into categories could be made perfect, still the highest genus in each category could not be defined, because it is not a species; nor could individuals be defined, because they have no specific difference.+ There are also many species of things, whose specific difference cannot be expressed in language, even when it is evident to sense, or to the understanding. Thus, green, red, and blue, are very distinct species of colour; but who can express in words wherein green differs from red or blue ?+

Without borrowing light from the ancient system, we may perceive that every definition must consist of words that need no definition; and that to define the common words of a language that have no ambiguity is trifling, if it could be done; the only use of a definition being to give a clear and adequate conception of themeaning of a word. The logicians indeed distinguish between the definition of a word and the definition of a thing; considering the former as the mean office of a lexicographer, but the last as the grand work of a philosopher. But what they have said about the definition of a thing, if it has a meaning, is beyond my comprehension. All the rules of definition agree to the definition of a word: and if they mean, by the definition of a thing, the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of anything that exists, this is impossible, and is the vain boast of men unconscious of the weakness of human understanding.§

* See above, p. 686, note.-H.

+This, of course, is stated by Aristotle himself and other logicians: and it does not affect his doctrine of Definition, but marks the necessary limits of Definition in general.-H.

Hence it was expressly stated by the old logicians -Omnis intuitiva notitia est definitio.-H.

By a real, in contrast to a verbal or nominal definition, the logicians do not intend "the giving an adequate conception of the nature and essence of a

The works of God are all imperfectly known by us. We see their outside, or perhaps we discover some of their qualities and relations, by observation and experiment, assisted by reasoning: but we can give no definition of the meanest of them which comprehends its real essence. It is justly observed by Locke, that nominal essences only, which are the creatures of our own minds, are perfectly comprehended by us, or can be properly defined; and even of these there are many too simple in their nature to admit of definition. When we cannot give precision to our notions by a definition, we must endeavour to do it by attentive reflection upon them, by observing minutely their agreements and differences, and especially by a right understanding of the powers of our own minds by which such notions are formed.

The principles laid down by Locke, with regard to definition, and with regard to the abuse of words, carry conviction along with them and I take them to be one of the mos important improvements made in logic, since the days of Aristotle; not so much because they enlarge our knowledge, as because they make us sensible of our ignorance, and shew that a great part of what speculative men have admired as profound philosophy, is only a darkening of knowledge by words without understanding.†

Section V.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF SPEECH.

The few hints contained in the beginning of the book concerning Interpretation relating to the structure of speech, have been left out in treatises of logic, as belonging rather to grammar; yet I apprehend this is a rich field of philosophical speculation. Language being the express image of human

thing"-that is, of a thing considered in itself, and apart from the conceptions of it already possessed. By verbal definition, is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a word; by real, the more accurate determination of the contents of a notion. The one clears up the relation of words to notions; the other of notions to things. The substitution of notional for real would, perhaps, remove the ambiguity. But, if we retain the term real, the aim of a verbal definition being to specify the thought denoted by the word, such definition ought to be called notional, on the principle on which the definition of a notion is called real; for this definition is the exposition of what things are comprehended in a thought.-H.

* Locke gives the title Nominal Essence to the abstract notion marked out by a general term; and Real Essence to that (probably unknown) constitution, whereby a thing is as it is. On this definition as the Nominal Essence comprehends all that is conceived it must, of course, comprehend all that can be defined. The Nominal Essence of Locke is, in fact, only a new name for the Logical Essence of other philosophers.-H.

† See above, p. 690, b, note *.-See also, a para. graph here oMITTED, at the end of this treatise.-H.

thought, the analysis of the one must correspond to that of the other. Nouns adjective and substantive, verbs active and passive, with their various moods, tenses, and persons, must be expressive of a like variety in the modes of thought. Things that are distinguished in all languages, such as substance and quality, action and passion, cause and effect, must be distinguished by the natural powers of the human mind. Tire philosophy of grammar, and that of the human understanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined.

The structure of language was pursued to a considerable extent by the ancient commentators upon this book of Aristotle. Their speculations upon this subject, which are neither the least ingenious nor the least useful part of the Peripatetic philosophy, were neglected for many ages, and lay buried in ancient manuscripts, or in books little known, till they were lately brought to light by the learned Mr Harris, in his "Hermes." The definitions given by Aristotle of a noun, of a verb, and of speech, will hardly bear examination. It is easy in practice to distinguish the various parts of speech; but very difficult, if at all possible, to give accurate definitions of them.

He observes justly, that, besides that kind of speech called a proposition, which is always either true or false, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false, such as a prayer or wish; to which we may add, a question, a command, a promise, a contract, and many others. These Aristotle pronounces to have nothing to do with his subject, and remits them to oratory or poetry; and so they have remained banished from the regions of philosophy to this day; yet I apprehend that an analysis of such speeches, and of the operations of mind which they express, would be of real use, and perhaps would discover how imperfect an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers of human understanding, when they reduce them to Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning.

Section VI.

ON PROPOSITIONS.

A Proposition, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence, it is easy to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the Fredicate, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the Subject; and these two are called the Terms of the proposition. Hence, likewise, it appears that propositions are either affirmatice or negative; and this is called their Quality. All affirmative propositions have the same quality, so likewise have all negative; but an affirmative and a negative are contrary in their quality.

When the subject of a proposition is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied either of the whole, or of a part. Hence propositions are distinguished into universal and particular. “All men are mortal," is an universal proposition; "Some men are learned," is a particular; and this is called the Quantity of the proposition. All universal propositions agree in quantity, as also all particular; while an universal and a particular are said to differ in quantity. A proposition is called indefinite when there is no mark either of universality or particularity annexed to the subject: thus," Man is of few days," is an indefinite proposition; but it must be understood either as universal or as particular, and therefore is not a third species, but, by interpretation, is brought under one of the other two."

66

There are also singular propositions, which have not a general term, but an individual, for their subject; as, Alexander was a great conqueror." These are considered by Logicians as universal, because the subject being indivisible, the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole, and not of a part only. Thus, all propositions, with regard to quality, are either affirmative or negative; and, with regard to quantity, are universal or particular; and, taking in both quantity and quality, they are universal affirmatives, or universal negatives, or par ticular affirmatives or particular negatives. These four kinds, after the days of Aristotle, came to be named by the names of the four first vowels, A, E, I, O, according to the following distich :

Asserit A, negat E, sed universaliter ambæ ; Asserit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambo.f When the young Logician is thus far in

bis enumeration was never intended by logicians neral psychological analysis, but merely for a enumeration of those faculties, the laws of sere proposed to logic, as its object matter.-H.

apt to think there is no difficulty in analyzing any proposition, and shewing its subject and predicate, its quantity and quality; and, indeed, unless he can do this, he will be unable to apply the rules of logic to use. Yet he will find there are some difficulties

*The term indefinite ought to be discarded in this relation, and replaced by indesignate.-H.

The history of these and the other logical verses is curious, but, I may say, to Logicians unknown.-H.

in this analysis, which are overlooked by Aristotle altogether; and although they are sometimes touched, they are not removed by his followers.* For, 1. There are propositions in which it is difficult to find a subject and a predicate; as in these, "It rains," "It snows." 2. In some propositions, either term may be made the subject or the predicate, as you like best; as in this, "Virtue is the road to happiness." 3. The same example may serve to shew that it is sometimes difficult to say, whether a proposition be universal or particular. 4. The quality of some propositions is so dubious that Logicians have never been able to agree whether they be affirmative or negative; as in this proposition, "Whatever is insentient is not an animal." 5. As there is one class of propositions which have only two terms, viz., one subject and one predicate, which are called Categorical+ propositions, so there are many classes that have more than two terms. What Aristotle delivers in this book is applicable only to categorical propositions; and to them only the rules concerning the conversion of propositions, and concerning the figures and modes of syllogisms, are accommodated. The subsequent writers of logic have taken notice of some of the many classes of complex propositions, and have given rules adapted to them; but, finding this work endless, they have left us to manage the rest by the rules of common sense.

CHAPTER III.

ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST ANALYTICS.

Section I.

OF THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSITIONS.

IN attempting to give some account of the Analytics and of the Topics of Aristotle, ingenuity requires me to confess, that, though I have often purposed to read the whole with care, and to understand what is intelligible, yet my courage and patience always failed before I had done. Why should I throw away so much time and painful attention upon a thing of so little real use? If I had lived in those ages when the knowledge of Aristotle's Organon entitled a man to the highest rank in philosophy, ambition might have induced me to employ upon it some years of painful study; and less, I conceive, would not be sufficient. [?] Such reflections as these always got the better of my resolu

* The difficulties that follow admit of a very easy solution.-H.

I was the first, as far as I am aware, who ob served that the term xarnyagixos is, by Aristotle, used only in the sense of affirmative.-H.

tion, when the first ardour began to cool. All I can say is, that I have read some parts of the different books with care, some slightly, and some, perhaps, not at all. I have glanced over the whole often, and, when anything attracted my attention, have dipped into it till my appetite was satisfied. Of all reading, it is the most dry and the most painful, employing an infinite labour of demonstration, about things of the most abstract nature, delivered in a laconic style, and often, I think, with affected obscurity; and all to prove general propositions, which, when applied to particular instances, appear self-evident.*

There is probably but little in the Categories, or in the book of Interpretation, that Aristotle could claim as his own invention [?]; but the whole theory of syllogisms he claims as his own, and as the fruit of much time and labour. And indeed it is a stately fabric, a monument of a great genius, which we could wish to have been more usefully employed. There must be something, however, adapted to please the human understanding, or to flatter human pride, in a work which occupied men of speculation for more than a thousand years. These books are called Analytics, because the intention of them is to resolve all reasoning into its simple ingredients.

The first book of the First Analytics, consisting of forty-six chapters, may be divided into four parts; the first [A] treating of the conversion of propositions; the second, [B,] of the structure of syllogisms, in all the different figures and modes; the third, [C,] of the invention of a middle term; and the last, [D,] of the resolution of syllogisms. We shall give a brief account of each.

[A] To convert a proposition is to infer from it another proposition, whose subject is the predicate of the first, and whose predicate is the subject of the first. This is reduced by Aristotle to three rules:-1. An universal negative may be converted into an universal negative: thus, " No man is a quadruped;" therefore, " No quadruped is a man." 2. An universal affirmative can be converted only into a particular affirmative : thus, "All men are mortal;" therefore, "Some mortal beings are men." 3. A particular affirmative may be converted into a particular affirmative: as, "Some men are just ;" therefore, "Some just persons are men." When a proposition may be converted without changing its quantity, this is called simple conversion; but when the quantity is diminished, as in the universal affirmative, it is called conversion per accidens.

There is another kind of conversion *This is unjust. Aristotle attempts no proof of these general propositions,; he only shews that their denial involves a contradiction.-H.

† It might be added, "the quality remaining always the same."-H.