Section VII.

ON SYLLOGISMS THAT DO NOT BELONG TO FIGURE AND MODE,

Aristotle gives some observations upon imperfect syllogisms; such as the Enthymeme, in which one of the premises is not expressed, but understood;* Induction, wherein we collect an universal from a full enumeration of particulars; and Example, which is an imperfect induction. The Logicians have copied Aristotle, upon these kinds of reasoning, without any considerable improvement. But, to compensate the modal syllogisms, which they have laid aside, they have given rules for several kinds of syllogism, of which Aristotle takes no notice. These may be reduced to two classes.

The first class comprehends the syllogisms into which any exclusive, restrictive,† exceptive, or reduplicative+ proposition enters. Such propositions are by some called Exponible, by others Imperfectly [or Secondarily] Modal. The rules given with regard to these are obvious, from a just interpretation of the propositions.

The second class is that of Hypothetical syllogisms, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical proposition for one or both premises. Most Logicians give the name of hypothetical to all complex propositions which have more terms than one subject and one predicate. I use the word in this large sense, and mean, by hypothetical syllogisms, all those in which either of the premises consists of more terms than two. How many various kinds there may be of such syllogisms, has never been ascertained. The Logicians have given names to some; such as the copulative, the conditional, (by some called hypothetical,) and the disjunctive.

Such syllogisms cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules peculiar to itself. Logicians have given rules for some kinds; but there are many that have not so much as the name.

The Dilemma is considered by most Logicians as a species of the disjunctive syllogism.§ A remarkable property of this kind

This is the vulgar opinion regarding Aristotle's Enthymeme, but, as I have shewn, not the correct. See Edinburgh Review, vol. Ivii. p. 221, sq.-H.

Reduplicative, and Specificative, are two species of Restrictive propositions.-H.

This abusive employment of the term Hypotheti cal, is not sanctioned by the best Logicians, nor even by the greater number. Hypothetical and Conditional ought to be used as convertible terms. See Edin. burgh Review, vol. Ivii. p. 219.-H.

This is hardly accurate. The greater number of Logicians consider it as an hypothetical (conditional) ellogism; but, in fact, it is both hypothetical and

is, that it may sometimes be happily retorted: it is, it seems, like a hand-grenade, which, by dextrous management, may be thrown back, so as to spend its force upon the assailant.* We shall conclude this tedious account of syllogisms with a dilemma mentioned by Aulus Gellius, and from him by many Logicians, as insoluble in any other way.†

Euathlus, a rich young man, desirous of learning the art of pleading, applied to Protagoras, a celebrated sophist, to instruct him, promising a great sum of money as his reward; one half of which was paid down ; the other half he bound himself to pay as soon as he should plead a cause before the judges, and gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt scholar; but, after he had made good progress, he was in no haste to plead causes. The master, conceiving that he intended by this means to shift off his second payment, took, as he thought, a sure method to get the better of his delay. He sued Euathlus before the judges; and, having opened his cause at the bar, he pleaded to this purpose :-'O most foolish young man, do you not see that, in any event, I must gain my point ?-for, if the judges give sentence for me, you must pay by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is fulfilled, and you have no plea left for your delay, after having pleaded and gained a cause.' To which Euathlus answered :-O most wise master, I might have avoided the force of your argument, by not pleading my own cause. But, giv ing up this advantage, do you not see that, whatever sentence the judges pass, I am safe? If they give sentence for me, I am acquitted by their sentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by my pleading a cause, and losing it.' The judges, thinking the arguments unanswerable on both sides, put off the cause to a long day."+

disjunctive, and ought, therefore, to be styled the Hypothetico-Disjunctive Syllogism.-H.

*We must not confound the Dilemma, or Hypoth etico- Disjunctive Syllogism, and the Sophism called the Dilemma.-H.

Is this not an erratum for "any way ?"-H. This story is, by the Greek authors, generally told of the Rhetorician Corax (Crow) and his pupil Tisias. The puzzled judges, in lieu of a decision on the case, ai grily pronounced of plaintiff and defend. ant-Kazoo xogaxes xxxòv wór (plaguy egg of a plaguy crow!) Hence the proverb.-H.

CHAPTER V.

ACCOUNT OF THE REMAINING BOOKS OF THE

ORGANON.

Section I.

OF THE LAST ANALYTICS.

IN the First Analytics, syllogisms are considered in respect of their form; they are now to be considered in respect of their matter. The form lies in the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion; and, where such a connection is wanting, they are said to be informal, or vicious in point of form.

But, where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter-that is, in the propositions of which they are composed, which may be true or false, probable or improbable.

When the premises are certain, and the conclusion drawn from them in due form, this is demonstration, and produces science. Such syllogisms are called apodictical, and are handled in the two books of the Last Analytics. When the premises are not certain, but probable only, such syllogisms are called dialectical; and of them he treats in the eight books of the Topics. But there are some syllogisms which seem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really so; as, a face may seem beautiful which is but painted. These being apt to deceive, and produce a false opinion, are called sophistical; and they are the subject of the book concerning Sophisms.

To return to the Last Analytics, which treat of demonstration and of science: We shall not pretend to abridge those books, for Aristotle's writings do not admit of abridgement; no man, in fewer words, can say what he says; and he is not often guilty of repetition. We shall only give some of his capital conclusions, omitting his long reasonings and nice distinctions, of which his genius was wonderfully productive.

All demonstration must be built upon principles already known, and these upon others of the same kind; until we come at last to first principles, which neither can be demonstrated, nor need to be, being evident of themselves.

We cannot demonstrate things in a circle, supporting the conclusion by the premises, and the premises by the conclusion. Nor can there be an infinite number of middle terms between the first principle and the conclusion.

* In Demonstration, the preinises must not only be true and certain, but necessarily so.-H.

In all demonstration, the first principles, the conclusion, and all the intermediate propositions, must be necessary, general, and eternal truths; for, of things fortuitous, contingent, or mutable, or of individual things, there is no demonstration.

Some demonstrations prove only, that the thing is thus affected; others prove, why it is thus affected. The former may be drawn from a remote cause, or from an effect; but the latter must be drawn from an immediate cause, and are the most perfect.

The first figure is best adapted to demonstration, because it affords conclusions universally affirmative; and this figure is commonly used by the mathematicians.

The demonstration of an affirmative proposition is preferable to that of a negative; the demonstration of an universal to that of a particular; and direct demonstration to that ad absurdum.

The principles are more certain than the conclusion.

There cannot be opinion and science of the same thing at the same time.

In the second book, we are taught, that the questions that may be put with regard to any thing are four : 1. Whether the thing be thus affected. 2. Why it is thus affected. 3. Whether it exists. 4. What it is.

The last of these questions, Aristotle, in good Greek, calls the What is it of a thing. The schoolmen, in very barbarous Latin, called this the quiddity of a thing. This quiddity, he proves by many arguments, cannot be demonstrated, but must be fixed by a definition. This gives occasion to treat of definition, and how a right definition should be formed. As an example, he gives a definition of the number three, and defines it to be the first odd number.

In this book he treats also of the four kinds of causes-efficient, material, formal, and final.

Another thing treated of in this book is, the manner in which we acquire first principles, which are the foundation of all demonstration. These are not innate, because we may be, for a great part of life, ignorant of them: nor can they be deduced demonstratively from any antecedent know. ledge, otherwise they would not be first principles. Therefore he concludes, that first principles are got by induction, from the informations of sense. The senses give us informations of individual things, and from these by induction we draw general conclusions; for it is a maxim with Aristotle, That there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in some sense.† * The natural order of the four questions, and as they are commonly enounced, is :-An sit-Quid sit -Quale sit-Cur sit.-H.

Whether Aristotle admitted the virtual or po tential existence of any a priori or native judg

To prove that this division is complete, Aristotle reasons thus: Whatever is attributed to a subject, it must either be, that the subject can be reciprocally attributed to it, or that it cannot. If the subject and attribute can be reciprocated, the attribute either declares what the subject is, and then it is a definition; or it does not declare what the subject is, and then it is a property. If the attribute cannot be reciprocated, it must be something contained in the definition, or not. If it be contained in the definition of the subject, it must be the genus of the subject, or its specific difference; for the definition consists of these two. If it be not contained in the definition of the subject, it must be an accident.

[The instruments by which we may supply ourselves with] the furniture proper to fit a man for arguing dialectically may be reduced to these four heads: I. [To make choice of] probable propositions of all sorts, which may on occasion be assumed in an argument. 2. [To take] distinc. tions of words which are nearly of the same signification. 3. [To mark the] distinctions of things which are not so far asunder but that they may be taken for one and the same. 4. [To consider] similitudes.

The second and the five following books are taken up in enumerating the topics or heads of argument that may be used in questions about the genus, the definition, the properties, and the accidents of a thing; and occasionally he introduces the topics for proving things to be the same or different, and the topics for proving one thing to be better or worse than another.

In this enumeration of topics, Aristotle has shewn more the fertility of his genius

ments, or whether he held that all principles are actually generalizations by induction from expe. ience, is a vexala quæstio among his followers; and exts may be produced on both sides of nearly equal Light.-H.

than the accuracy of method. The writers of logic seem to be of this opinion; for I know none of them that has followed him closely upon this subject. They have considered the topics of argumentation as reducible to certain axioms. For instance, when the question is about the genus of a thing, it must be determined by some axiom about genus and species; when it is about a definition, it must be determined by some axiom relating to definition, and things defined; and so of other questions. They have therefore reduced the doctrine of the topics to certain axioms or canons, and disposed these axioms in order under certain heads.

This method seems to be more commod. ious and elegant than that of Aristotle. Yet it must be acknowledged that Aristotle has furnished the materials from which all the logicians have borrowed their doctrine of topics; and even Cicero, Quintilian, and other rhetorical writers, have been much indebted to the topics of Aristotle.

He was the first, as far as I know, who made an attempt of this kind; and in this he acted up to the magnanimity of his own genius, and that of ancient philosophy. Every subject of human thought had been reduced to ten categories; everything that can be attributed to any subject, to five predicables; he attempted to reduce all the forms of reasoning to fixed rules of figure and mode, and to reduce all the topics of argumentation under certain heads; and by that means to collect, as it were, into one store, all that can be said on one side or the other of every question, and to provide a grand arsenal, from which all future combatants might be furnished with arms, offensive and defensive, in every cause, so as to leave no room to future generations to invent anything new.

The last book of the Topics is a code of the laws according to which a syllogist ical disputation ought to be managed, both on the part of the assailant and defendant. From which it is evident, that this philosopher trained his disciples to contend, not for truth merely, but for victory.*

*The implication here is unfounded, and could easily be shewn to be unjust.-I may notice that there is nothing in regard to which, notions cruder, narrower, or more erroneous prevail, than in regard to Disputation, its nature, its objects, and its ends; nay, I make bold to say, that by no academical degeneracy has the intellectual vigour of youth lost more, than through the desuetude into which, during these latter ages, Disputation, as a regular and daily invention of printing, when universities could vinexercise in our universities, has fallen. Before the dicate their necessity as organs of publication, Exer cise, nd Disputation in particular, was still recog nised as their grand instrument of education; whereas now, when books are but a drug, our professors tod often content themselves with reciting in their classrooms, what can, with equal profit and far more con. venience, be read at home I cannot, of course, here adduce my reasons, historical and psychologi

Section III.

OF THE BOOK CONCERNING SOPHISMS.

A syllogism which leads to a false conclusion must be vicious, either in matter or form; for, from true principles, nothing but truth can be justly deduced. If the matter be faulty-that is, if either of the premises be false, that premise must be denied by the defendant. If the form be faulty, some rule of syllogism is transgressed; and it is the part of the defendant to shew what general or special rule it is that is transgressed; so that, if he be an able logician, he will be impregnable in the defence of truth, and may resist all the attacks of the sophist. But, as there are syllogisms which may seem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really so, as a piece of money may seem to be good coin when it is adulterate, such fallacious syllogisms are considered in this treatise, in order to make a defendant more expert in the use of his defensive weapons.

And here the author, with his usual magnanimity, attempts to bring all the Fallacies that can enter into a syllogism under thirteen heads; of which sir lie in the diction or language, and seven not in the diction.

The Fallacies in diction are, 1. When an ambiguous word is taken at one time in one sense, and at another time in another. 2. When an ambiguous phrase is taken in the same manner. 3. and 4. are ambiguities in syntax; when words are conjoined in syntax that ought to be disjoined, or disjoined when they ought to be conjoined. 5. is an ambiguity in prosody, accent, or pronunciation. 6. An ambiguity arising from some figure of speech.

When a sophism of any of these kinds is translated into another language, or even rendered into unambiguous expressions in the same language, the fallacy is evident, and the syllogism appears to have four terms. The seven fallacies which are said not to be in the diction, but in the thing [the thought], have their proper names in Greek and in Latin, by which they are distinguished. Without minding their names, we shall give a brief account of their nature.

1. The first is, Taking an accidental conjunction of things for a natural or necessary

cal, shewing the superior utility of Disputation as an exercise, and the superior utility of Exercise in gen. eral as a mean of intellectual developement; but I am tempted to quote, in favour of the principle, the testimony of a great philosopher, and great scholar :"Tacitis meditationibus magis proficere nos, quam altercationibus, verum non est. Etenim sicuti lapidum collisione ignis; ita ex disceptationibus elicitur veritas. Quin egomet mecum sæpe, diu, multum meditatus-sed incassum ; nisi pugnem, infeliciter cadet mihi. A Magistro plus excitamur; at Adver. sarius, sua vel pertinacia, vel sapientia, mihi duplex magister est."-H.

connection: as, when from an accident we infer a property; when from an example we infer a rule; when from a single act we infer a habit.

2. Taking that absolutely which ought to be taken comparatively, or with a certain limitation. The construction of language often leads into this fallacy; for, in all languages it is common to use absolute terms to signify things that carry in them some secret comparison; or, to use unlimited terms, to signify what from its nature must be limited.

3. Taking that for the cause of a thing which is only an occasion, or concomitant.

4. Begging the question. This is done when the thing to be proved, or something equivalent, is assumed in the premises.

5. Mistaking the question. When the conclusion of the syllogism is not the thing that ought to be proved, but something else that is mistaken for it.

6. When that which is not a consequence is mistaken for a consequence; as if, because all Africans are black, it were taken for granted that all blacks are Africans.

7. The last fallacy lies in propositions that are complex and imply two affirma tions, whereof one may be true, and the other false; so that, whether you grant the proposition or deny it, you are entangled; as when it is affirmed that such a man has left off playing the fool. If it be granted, it implies that he did play the fool forme ly; if it be denied, it implies, or seems to imply, that he plays the fool still.

In this enumeration, we ought, in justice to Aristotle, to expect only the fallacies incident to categorical syllogisms. And I do not find that the Logicians have made any additions to it when taken in this view, although they have given some other falla cies that are incident to syllogisms of the hypothetical [non-categorical] kind, particularly the fallacy of an incomplete enumeration in disjunctive syllogisms and dilemmas.

The different species of sophisms above mentioned are not so precisely defined by Aristotle, or by subsequent Logicians, but that they allow of great latitude in the application; and it is often dubious under what particular species a sophistical syllogism ought to be classed. We even find the same example brought under one specics by one author, and under another species by another. Nay, what is more strange, Aristotle himself employs a long chapter in proving, by a particular induction, that all the seven may be brought under that which we have called mistaking the question, and which is commonly called ignoratio elenchi. And, indeed, the proof of this is easy, without that laborious detail which Aristotle uses for the purpose; for if you lop off from the conclusion of a sophistical syllogism all