cumstances; and has, as an academical foundation, become possessed of some conspicuous advantages. Its local situation, in the neighbourhood of an industrious city, and at some distance from the capital; by which it is not exposed to the dissipation arising from a number of amusements; nor too remote from the topics of speculation, suggested by the progress of philosophy, and the interesting business of society. The state of its revenue, sufficient, with economy, in the management of the society, to promote useful improvements; but not so large as to be productive of idleness, and the luxury of learned indolence. Its institutions and government, by which no sort of monopoly is created in favour of particular sects, or particular branches of science; but persons of all persuasions are at liberty to follow that course of study which they find suited to their various pursuits and prospects. Lastly, Its moderate discipline, endeavouring to regulate the behaviour of the students by a regard to interest and reputation, more than by authority; and substituting the anxious watchfulness of a parent, in place of the troublesome and vexatious interpositions of a prying and, perhaps, unpopular magistrate.

· ADDITIONS.

Infirmary. The medical school in this University was long retarded by the want of an infirmary at Glasgow. But that obstacle is now completely removed. In the year 1790, a voluntary subscription was opened, for the purpose of erecting and

*Not by Reid. -- H

supporting an infirmary, in this place, for the western districts of Scotland. This scheme met with the most liberal encouragement, from the charitable and well-disposed in the city of Glasgov, and in the adjoining counties, and was, in particular, much promoted by the activity and influence of the members of the University. In the year 1791, upon the petition of the subscribers, a royal charter was obtained from the Crown, together with a grant of the site of the Archbishop's castle and garden, for the purpose of erecting the buildings. During the years 1792 and 1793, the buildings were erected, according to a most eautiful design given by the late Robert Adam, Esq., architect, at an expense of about £8000; and it is believed, that, in point of situation, good air, abundance of water, and convenient accommodation for the patients, this infirmary is not excelled by any other establishment of the same kind in Britain. The infirmary was opened for the reception of patients on the 8th Decemher 1794; and since that time, the beneficial and salutary effects of it have been so much felt that it is now considered as a public benefit and blessing to this part of the country. Among other advantages, the number of medical students is greatly increased since it was opened; and there is every reason to believe, that this institution will contribute, in a great degree, to the further extension and improvement of the medical school in this University.

P. 732, b: The Rev. Dr Walton's first donation was anno 1767, and his second anno 1788. P. 736, a, l. 8: After Scotland, add, "to which is now added a course of lectures on English law."

Such an analysis and classification is how. ever in itself certainly one of the most interesting and important problems of philosophy; and it is one in which much remains to be accomplished. Principles of cognition, which now stand as ultimate, may, I think, be reduced to simpler elements; and some which are now viewed as direct and positive, may be shown to be merely indirect and negative; their cogency depending not on the immediate necessity of thinking them-for if carried unconditionally out they are themselves incogitable-but in the impossibility of thinking something to which they are directly opposed, and from which they are the immediate recoils. An exposition of the axiom That positive thought lies in the limitation or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes, neither of which, as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet of which, as contradictories, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, be recognised as ne. cessary; the exposition of this great but unenounced axiom would show that some of the most illustrious principles are only its subordi. nate modifications, as applied to certain primary notions, intuitions, data, forms, or categories of intelligence, as Existence, Quantity, (protensive, Time-extensive, Space. intensive, Degree) Quality, &c. Such modifications, for example, are the principles of Cause and Effect, Substance and Phænomenon, &c.

I may here also observe, that though the pri mary truths of fact, and the primary truths of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of Reid) form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of consciousness;

there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that I am unable to agree with Mr Stewart. See his Elements, vol. ii., ch. 1, and bis Account of Reid, supra, p. 27 b,

in regard to their authority as warrant: and criteria of truth. Nor can this assumption of the existence of some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, be re fused by any. For even those philosophers who profess to derive all our knowledge from experience, and who admit no universal truths of intelligence but such as are generalized from individual truths of fact-even these philosophers are forced virtually to acknowledge, at the root of the several acts of observation from which their generalization starts, some law or principle to which they can appeal as guaranteeing the procedure, should the validity of these primordial acts themselves be called in question. This acknowledgment is, among others, made even by Locke; and on such fundamental guarantee of induction he even bestows the name of Common Sense. (See below, in Testimonies, No. 51.)

Limiting, therefore, our consideration to the question of authority; how, it is asked, do these primary propositions-these cognitions at first hand-these fundamental facts, feelings, beliefs, certify us of their own veracity? To this the only possible answer is that as elements of our mental constitution-as the essential conditions of our knowledge-they must by us be accepted as true. To suppose their falsehood, is to suppose that we are created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims of delusion; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie. But such a supposition, if gratuitous, is manifestly illegitimate. For, on the contrary, the data of our original consciousness must, it is evident, in the first instance, be presumed true. It is only if proved false, that their authority can, in consequence of that proof, be, in the second instance, disallowed. Speaking, therefore, generally, to argue from common sense, is simply to show, that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of some original datum of consciousness; but as every original datum of consciousness tion in question, as dependent on such a is to be presumed true, that the proposiprinciple, must be admitted.

But that such an argument is competent and conclusive, must be more articulately shown.

Here, however, at the outset, it is pro. per to take a distinction, (to which in the foot-notes I have once and again adverted,) the neglect of which has been productive of considerable error and confusion. It is the distinction between the data or deliverances of consciousness considered sim