dered, but still inaccurately, as an imme- | object of an intuitive, but only as the rediate cognition.* The latter of these as mote object of a representative, cognilimited in its application to certain facul- tion. ties, and now in fact wholly exploded, may be thrown out of account.

8.-External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phaenomena of the Non-Ego or Matter-if there be any intuitive apprehension allowed of the Non-Ego at all. Internal Perception or Self-Consciousness is the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phaenomena of the Ego or Mind.

9.-Imagination or Phantasy, in its most extensive meaning, is the faculty represen tative of the phaenomena both of the external and internal worlds.

act.

13. A representative object, considered irrespectively of what it represents, and simply as a mode of the conscious subject, is an intuitive or presentative object. For it is known in itself, as a mental mode, actually existing now and here.*

Propositions 10-13 may illustrate a passage in Aristotle's treatise on Memory and Reminiscence (c. 1), which has been often curiously misunderstood by his expositors; and as it, in return, serves to illustrate the doctrine here stated, I translate it :--

'Of what part of the soul memory is a function, is manifest ;-of that, to wit, of which imagination or phantasy is a function. [And imagination had been already shown to be a function of the common sense.]

'And here a doubt may be started-Whether the affection [or mental modification] being present, the reality absent, that which is not present can be remembered [or, in general, known.]

For it is manifest that we must conceive the affection, determined in the soul or its proximate bodily organ, through sense, to be, as it were, a sort of portrait, of which we say that memory is the habit [or retention]. For the movement excited [to employ the simile of Plato] stamps, as it were, a kind of impression of the total process of perception [on the soul or its organ], after the manner of one who applies a signet to wax.

10. A representation considered as an object is logically, not really, different from a representation considered as an Here object and act are merely the same indivisible mode of mind viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a (mediate) object represented, it is a representative object; considered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating the representation, it is a representative act. A representative object being viewed as posterior in the order of nature, but not of time, to the representative act, is viewed as a product; and the representative act being viewed as prior in the order of nature, though not of time, to the representative object, is viewed as a producing process. (v. I. P. 305 a.) The same may be said of Image and Imagination. (Prop. 21, and p. 813, a b, and note.) 11. A thing to be known in itself must be known as actually existing (Pr. 1.) and it cannot be known as actually existing unless it be known as existing in its When and its Where. But the When and Where of an object are immediately cognisable by the subject, only if the When be now (i. e. at the same moment with the cognitive act,) and the Where be here, (i. e. within the sphere of the cognitive faculty); therefore a presentative or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object present to the cipient [or conscious]. In these circumstances, mind, both in time and in space.

12. E converso-whatever is known, but not as actually existing now and here, is known not in itself, as the presentative

Finally it may be required to mark whether the object-object and the subject-object be immediately known as present, or only as represented. In this case we must resort, on the former alternative to the epithet presentative or intuitire; on the latter, to those of represented, mediate, remote, primary, principal, &c.

This observation has reference to Reid, See sequel of this note, § ii., and note C. § ii. A, 4.

'But if such be the circumstances of memory, -Is remembrance [a cognition] of this af fection, or of that from which it is produced? For if, of the latter, we can have no remembrance [or cognition] of things absent; if of the former, how, as percipient [or conscious of this [present affection], can we have a remem. brance [or cognition] of that of which we are not percipient [or conscious] - -the absent [reality]-Again -supposing there to be a resembling something, such as an impression or picture, in the mind; the perception [or consciousness] of this-Why should it be the remembrance [or cognition] of another thing, and not of this something itself?-for in the act of remembrance we contemplate this mental affection, and of this [alone] are we per

how is a remembrance [or cognition] possible of what is not present? For if so, it would seem that what is not present might, in like manner, be seen and heard.

'Or is this possible, and what actually occurs? And thus-As in a portrait the thing painted is an animal and a representation (n) [of an animal], one and the

previously given in Presentation-it is Representative. See Note C. § i.

Compared together, these two cognitions afford the following similarities and differences.

A. Compared by reference to their simplicity or complexity, as Acts.

22.-Though both as really considered, (re, non ratione), are equally one and indivisible; still as logically considered, (ratione, non re,) an Intuitive cognition is simple, being merely intuitive; a Representative, complex, as both representative and intuitive of the representation.

B. Compared by reference to the number of their Objects.

23-In a Presentative knowledge there can only be a single object, and the term object is here therefore univocal.-In a Representative knowledge two different things are viewed as objects, and the term object, therefore, becomes equivocal; the secondary object within, being numerically different from the primary object without, the sphere of consciousness, which it represents.

C. Compared by reference to the relativity of their Objects, known in conscious

ness.

24. In a presentative cognition, the object known in consciousness, being relative only to the conscious subject, may, by contrast, be considered as absolute or irrespective. In a representative cognition, the object known in consciousness, being, besides the necessary reference to the subject, relative to, as vicarious of, an object unknown to consciousness, must, in every point of view, be viewed as relative or respective. Thus, it is on all hands admitted, that in Self consciousness the object is subjective and absolute; and, that in Imagination, under every form, it is subjective and relative. In regard to external Perception, opinions differ. For, on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, it is objective and absolute; on the doctrine of the Absolute Idealists, subjective and absolute; on the doctrine of the Cosmothetic Idealists, subjective and relative. See Note C. § i.

D. Compared by reference to the character of the existential Judgments they involve.

25-The judgment involved in an Intuitive apprehension is assertory; for the fact of the intuition being dependent on the fact of the present existence of the object, the existence of the object is unconditionally enounced as actual.-The judgment involved in a Representative appre

hension is problematic; for here the fact of the representation not being dependent on the present existence of the object represented, the existence of that object can be only modally affirmed as possible.

E. Compared by reference to their character as Cognitions.

26.-Representative knowledge is admitted on all hands to be exclusively subjective or ideal; for its proximate object is, on every theory, in or of the mind, while its remote object, in itself, and, except in and through the proximate object, is unknown.-Presentative knowledge is, on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, partly subjective and ideal, partly objective and real; inasmuch as its sole object may be a phaenomenon either of self or of not-self: while, on the doctrine of the Idealists (whether Absolute or Cosmothetic) it is always subjective or ideal; consciousness, on their hypothesis, being cognisant only of mind and its contents.

F. Compared in respect of their Selfsufficiency or Dependence.

27.-a.-In one respect, Representative knowledge is not self-sufficient, in as much as every representative cognition of an object supposes a previous presentative apprehension of that same object. This is even true of the representation of an imaginary or merely possible object; for though the object, of which we are conscious in such an act, be a mere figment of the phantasy, and, as a now represented whole, was never previously presented to our observation; still that whole is nothing but an assemblage of parts, of which, in different combinations, we have had an intuitive cognition.-Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, self-sufficient, being wholly independent on Representative for its objects.

28. b. Representative knowledge, in another respect, is not self-sufficient. For in as much as all representation is only the repetition, simple or modified, of what was once intuitively apprehended; Representative is dependent on Presentative knowledge, as (with the mind) the concause and condition of its possibility.- Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is in this respect independent of Representative; for with our intuitive cognitions, commences all our knowledge.

29.-c. In a third respect Representative knowledge is not self-sufficient; for it is only deserving of the name of knowledge in so far as it is conformable with the intuitions which it represents.-Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, all-sufficient; for in the

OF PRESENTATIVE AND

last resort it is the sole vehicle, the exclu-
sive criterion and guarantee of truth.

30.-d. In a fourth respect, Representative knowledge is not self-sufficient, being wholly dependent upon Intuitive; for the object represented is only known through an intuition of the subject representing. Representative knowledge always, therefore, involves presentative, as its condition. Intuitive knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this respect, all-sufficient, being wholly independent of representative, which it, consequently, excludes. Thus in different points of view Representative knowledge contains and is contained in, Presentative, (Pr. 15.)

G. Compared in reference to their intrinsic Completeness and Perfection. 31.-a.-In one respect Intuitive knowledge is complete and perfect, as irrespective of aught beyond the sphere of consciousness; while Representative knowledge is incomplete and imperfect, as relative to what transcends that sphere.

32.-b.—In another respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete and perfect, as affording the highest certainty of the highest determination of existence-the Actual-the Here and Now existent ;-Representative, incomplete and imperfect, as affording only an inferior assurance of certain inferior determinations of existence-the Past, the Future, the Possible -the not Here and not Now existent.

33.-c. In a third respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete and perfect, its object known being at once real, and known as real;-Representative knowledge, incomplete and imperfect, its known object being unreal, its real object unknown.

The precise distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, and the different meanings of the term Object, the want of which has involved our modern philosophy in great confusion, -I had long ago evolved from my own reflection, and before I was aware that a parallel distinction had been taken by the Schoolmen, under the name Intuitive and Abstract knowledge (cognitio Intuitiva et Abstractiva, or Visionis et Simplicis Intelligentiae.) Of these, the former they defined the knowledge of a thing present as it is present, (cognitio rei praesentis, ut praesens est); the latter-the knowledge of a thing not as it is present, (cognitio rei non ut praesens est.) distinction remounts, among the Latin This Schoolmen, to at least the middle of the eleventh century; for I find that both St,

[NOTE B.

Anselm and Hugo a Sancto Victore nothe Arabians; for Averroes, at the end tice it. It was certainly not borrowed from of the following century, seems unaware of it. In fact, it bears upon its front the indication of a Christian origin; for, as Scotus and Ariminensis notice, the term Intuitive was probably suggested by St Paul's expression, facie ad faciem,' as the intuitive, in this sense, the lower Greeks Vulgate has it, (1 Corinth. xiii. 12.) For sometimes employed the terms o Tixos, and autotinós-a sense unknown to the Lexicographers;-but they do not appear to have taken the counter distinction. The term abstract or abstractive was less fortunately chosen than its corquestion, as opposed to intuitive, in which relative; for besides the signification in case we look away from the existence of ployed in opposition to concrete, and, a concrete object; it was likewise emthough improperly, as a synonyme of unieach and every individual subject of inhe versal, in which case we look away from abstract as it was originally, is now exsion. As this last is the meaning in which clusively, employed, and as representative is, otherwise, a far preferable expression, it would manifestly be worse than idle to attempt its resuscitation in the former sense.

The propriety and importance of the dis-
tinction is unquestionable; but the School-
the doctrine of intentional species-wholly
men-at least the great majority who held
spoiled it in application; by calling the
representative perception they allowed of
external things, by the name of an in-
tuitive cognition, to say nothing of the
idle thesis which many of thera defended
intuitive apprehension of a distant, nay
-that by a miracle we could have an
even of a non-existent, object. This error,
of which I am soon to speak-the holding
I may notice, is the corollary of another
that external things, though known only
through species, are immediately known
in themselves, (see p..)

§ II.—The errors of Reid and other phi-
losophers, in reference to the distinction
of Presentative or Immediate and Re-
presentative or Mediate knowledge, and
of Object Proximate and Remote.

The preceding distinction is one which,
establish, in order to discriminate his own
for the Natural Realist, it is necessary to
of the Idealists, Cosmothetic and Abso-
peculiar doctrine of perception from those
lute, in their various modifications. This,
however, Reid unfortunately did not do;

B. In the second place, Reid maintains that in our cognitions there must be an object (real or imaginary) distinct from the operation of the mind conversant about it; for the act is one thing and the object of the act another. (I. P. 292 b, 305 a, also 298 b, 373 a, 374 b.)

This is erroneous-at least it is erroneously expressed. Take an imaginary object, and Reid's own instance-a centaur.