[References omitted, and to be supplied from pp. 294, 386, &c.] progress of this reduction the analogy ceases;—it is actually reversed. For whilst the laws of Gravitation were only slowly developed by the labours of successive generations, and their application only gradually extended from the earth to the universe of matter; the not more obtrusive laws of Association, whose evolution modern philosophers fondly arrogated to themselves, are, after these have tried and tired themselves in the attempt, found already developed and applied, I may say, indeed, even generalized into unity,at a single jet, by a single philosopher of antiquity, who, for this-but not alone for this stands the Copernicus and Kepler and Newton of the intellectual world. THE doctrine of, what is most fami| facts or fact, laws or law. But in the liarly styled, the Association of Ideas, would be an interesting subject for historical inquiry. The importance of this principle has, in later times, been fully recognised, sometimes, perhaps, exaggerated; but to the older philosophers, and to the schoolmen in particular, the Excitatio Specierum afforded, likewise, a peculiar object of interest and speculation. Poncius, for example, pronounces it 66 ex difficilioribus naturæ arcanis ;" and Oviedo," maximum totius philosophiæ sacramentum, nunquam ab aliquo satis explicandum." Joseph Scaliger informs us, that touching two things especially, his proud and subtle father professed curiosity and ignorance ;-the cause of reminiscence and the cause of gravity. Association and Gravitation, indeed, present, in themselves, a striking parallel; in the history of their exposition, a striking contrast. Each (as observed by Hume) is a species of Attraction; and the effects which, in the mental world, are referred to the one, are not less multiform, extraordinary, and important, than those which, in the material, are referred to the other. The causes of both are equally occult; the speculation of these causes equally unphilosophical; and each is to be reduced to science only by observing its effects, and carrying up its phænomena into universal The singular circumstances of this inverted history have not, however, found a competent historian; ;-nay, the circumstances themselves have yet to be signalised and verified. Some attempts have indeed been made under the name of Histories of the Association of Ideas: but comparing what has been, with what ought to be, accomplished; these, at best, are only fragmentary contributions by writers, unaware of the real authors, of even the most remarkable movements, and compensating their omissions, or their meagre and inaccurate notices of important matters, by tedious excursions on others of no interest or difficulty. These inade quate attempts have been also limited to Germany; and, in Germany, to the treatises of three authors; for the historical notices on this doctrine, found in the works of other German psychologists, are wholly borrowed from them. I refer to the "Geschichte” of Hissmann (1777); to the "Paralipomena" and "Beytræge" of Maass (1787, 1792); and to the "Vestigia" of Goerenz, (1791). In England, indeed, we have a chapter in Mr Coleridge's "Biographia Literaria," entitled, "On the law of Association-its history traced from Aristotle to Hartley;" but this, in so far as it is of any value, is a plagiarism, and a blundering plagiarism, from Maass; the whole chapter exhibiting, in fact, more mistakes than paragraphs. We may judge of Mr Coleridge's competence to speak of Aristotle, the great philosopher of ancient times, when we find him referring to the De Anima for his speculations on the associative principle; opposing the De Memoria and Parva Naturalia as distinct works; and attributing to Aquinas, what belongs exclusively and notoriously to the Stagirite. We may judge of his competence to speak of Descartes, the great philosopher of modern times, when telling us, that Idea, in the Cartesian philosophy, denotes merely a configuration of the brain; the term, he adds, being first extended by Locke, to denote the immediate object of the mind's attention or consciousness. But, in truth, it might be broadly asserted, that every statement in regard to the history of this doctrine hazarded by British philosophers, to say nothing of others, is more or less erroneous.-Priestley, for example, assigns to Locke the honour of having first observed the fact To be added to my friend Professor Ferrier's "Plagiarisms of 8. T. Coleridge;" in Blackwood's Magazine, March 1840. This paper is remarkable for the sagacity which tracks, through the "Hercynian brakes" of philosophy and poetry, the footsteps of the literary reaver; whose ignorance of French alone freed France from contribution. Cole. ridge's systematic plagiarism is, perhaps, the most remarkable on record,-taking all the circumstances into account, the foremost of which, certainly, is the natural ability of the culprit. But sooth to say, Coleridge had in him more of the ivy than of the oak,was better able to clothe than to crea e. The publication of his literary Table-Talk, &c., shows that he was in the habit of speaking, as his Biographia, &c., show that he was in the habit of writing, the opinions of others, -as his own. of Association, (Hartley's Theory by P. Intr. p. xxv.); and Hume, as we have seen, arrogates to himself the glory of first generalising its laws.* (Hum. Und. sect. iii.)-Mr Stewart, but at second hand, says, that “something like an attempt to enumerate the laws of Association is to be found in Aristotle."--Sir James Mackintosh, again, founding on his own research, affirms that Aristotle and his disciples, among whom Vives is specified, confine the application of the law of association "exclusively to the phonomena of recollection, without any glimpse of a more general operation, extending to all the connections of thought and feeling :" while the enouncement of a general theory of Association, thus denied to the genius of Aristotle, is, all, and more than all, accorded to the sagacity of Hobbes. The truth, however, is, that in his whole doctrine upon this subject, name and thing, Hobbes is simply a silent follower of the Stagirite; inferior to his master in the comprehension and accuracy of his general views; and not superior, even on the special points selected, either to Aristotle or to Vives.† (Dissertations, &c. Note I.) * Among his other dreaming errors, Coleridge charges Hume with plagiarising from Aquinas (who, by the way, herein only repeats Aristotle) his whole doctrine of Association. But Coleridge charging plagiarism! "Quis tulerit Gracchum, de seditione querentem?" See my ingenious friend, Mr Burton's excel. lent Biography of David Hume, lately pub. lished. + Let it not be supposed, that, in these observations, I would insinuate aught like a charge of plagiarism, against The Philosopher of Malmesbury; or that, though disinclined to many of his opinions, I am a lukewarm admirer of his philosophical talent. It is an egregious error to consider Hobbes as an unlearned man; or, as one, who wove only what he span and grew. Among English,— among modern philosophers, he towers a shrewd and intrepid, an original and independent thinker. But these qualities are exhibited, not so much in the discovery of new materials, as in the new elaboration of old. He is essentially an eclectic. But he chooses and rejects freely; illustrating the principles he adopts with admirable ingenuity, and carrying them out with unshrinking consistency to their most startling results. This is more especially true of his psychology; which is original rather for what it omits, than for what it contains. It is, in substance, an Aristotelic doctrine, retrenched, not to say mutilated. Of the writings of the Stagirite himself, Hobbes was even a zealous student; of which his "Briefe of the Art of 1 But, that Aristotle's merits in regard to the theory of Association have not, as yet, been fully recognised by philosophers, is not to be marvelled at; when we consider the extra brevity and occasional corruption of the treatise in which his doctrine on that subject is contained, and when it is known that the editors, translators, and expositors of that treatise have all misapprehended its theory of Association in the most important points. Without, therefore, attempting aught like a history of this doctrine, for which, the materials I have collected, it is, at present, impossible to employ; I shall confine myself to the principal object of such a history-endeavour to render justice to the great author of that theory; by translating, from his treatise on Memory and Reminiscence, all that has any bearing on the subject; at the same time, restoring the text from its corruptions, and illustrating its veritable import. I shall likewise translate what, (but only what,) of any moment, is to be found in the relative commentary of Themistius; because this, both in itself and in reference to Aristotle, is, on the matter in question, a valuable, though wholly neglected, monument of ancient philosophy;-because, from the rarity of its one edition, it is Rhetorique" is only one of many proofs that could be shown: and though he occasionally abuses the schoolmen when in his way, he was neither ignorant of, nor unindebted to, their writings. There is, however, another philosopher whose relation to Hobbes has never been observed, but whose influence, if not on the general character of his specula tion, at least on the adoption of several of his more peculiar opinions, appears to me almost demonstrable. I mean the Frenchman Berigardus, (Beauregard ;) who, when Hobbes visited Pisa, in 1637, was in the meridian of his academic reputation, and who, in his great work, the "Circulus Pisanus," first published in 1643, takes, or rather makes, an occasion to speak of the English philosopher, then known only by his recent work "De Cive," in terms manifestly the suggestion of per. sonal regard. The counter alternative will hardly be maintained,-that it was Hobbes who privately acted upon Berigard. I may be permitted to take this opportunity of acknowledging for myself the obligation which Sir William Molesworth has conferred upon all who take an interest in philosophical pursuits, by his recent edition of the collected works of this illustrious thinker;-an undertaking in which he has not only done honour to himself, but taken off a reproach which has long weighed heavily upon our country. accessible to few even of those otherwise competent to read it;-but, above all, because we herein discover the origin of those misconceptions, which, bequeathed by the first, have been inherited by the last, of Aristotle's interpreters. In other respects, I shall neglect no subsidia within reach; and my Aristotelic collection is tolerably full, more complete, indeed, than that extant in any public library in this country. Though statements may therefore sometimes appear sweeping, the reader should not believe that I hazard them without an adequate foundation.* 10.-Of commentators on the De Memoria I have the following. The Greek Paraphrase of Themistius which dates from the fourth cen tury.-The only edition is that of Aldus in 1534.-The Greek commentary of Michael Ephesius, in points of difficulty seldom more than a transcript of Themistius, is of a comparatively recent, but uncertain, date. If Allatius (De Psellis, § 32.) be right in his plausible conjecture, and the Scholiast and the Ex-Emperor Michael Ducas, who died Archbishop of Ephesus, be the same, it will not ascend higher than the latter part of the eleventh century. Of this, also, there is only one edition-the Aldine, of 1527-I am well acquainted with the scholastic commentaries of Averroes, (+1206,) Albertus Magnus, (†1280,) and Aquinas, (+1274.)-Subsequent to the revival of letters, I have the expositions ofFaber Stapulensis, 1500,-Leonicus, 1520,Javellus, 1540,-Schegkius, 1546,-Labittus (in MS.), 1553,-Gesner, c. 1560, but only printed 1586,-Simonius, 1566,-Crippa, 1567,-the Coimbra Jesuits, 1600,-Pacius, 1600,-Havenreuter, 1600.-Of these the commentary of Leonicus is of especial moment; not for any original merit of its own, but as the principal medium through which the views of the Greek expositors, on the Parva Naturalia, were propagated in the west.-To these are to be added illustrations of this treatise occasionally met with in psychological writings of the Aristotelic school; of which it is only necessary to notice one-the remarkable work "De Anima" of Vives, 1538.-The Paraphrase of the Greek Monk, Theodorus Metochita, († 1332,) has escaped me. 2o. Of versions, some of which have the authority of MSS., I have those of Leonicus, Schegkius, Vatablus, Perionius, Labittus, Simonius, Crippa, and the anonymous version extant in the Venice editions of the combined works of Aristotle and Averroes. That of Alcyonius I have not seen. Taylor's English translation is mere rubbish. 3o. In regard to the text itself, besides Bekker's admirable recension, with the variations of six MSS, in the edition of the Berlin Academy, I shall compare, when requisite, the Camotio Aldine, Erasmian, Morellian, Simo - Asia, in qua regnabat Antiochus: ex nomine Ciceronis venit in recordationem Lactantius, qui fuit ejus imitator; et ex hoc de chalcoformulis æneis excusus, vel primus, vel de graphia [cogitamus,] nam ejus liber dicitur primis." (De Anima, 1. ii. c. De Mem. et By Memory ( μvhμn, rò μmpoviútiv,)' of that constitution of our mind, whereAristotle, in his treatise on that subject, by each mental movement is determined does not simply denote the conservative power of mind. mere retention. He there employs it, proximately to designate the faculty of reproduction, in so far as that is direct and immediate-simple remembrance or recollection; while, to the process of mediate or indirect reproduction of something heretofore in memory, but which we cannot now call up, except through the intervention of something else, he gives the name of Reminiscence, (ἡ ἀνάμν σις.) Rem) * It is necessary to say a word in regard to the Aristotelic employment of the term motion or movement, (zivness,) in a psychological relation It has been generally either misBut though the term Reminiscence be taken or inadequately understood.-Hissmann properly and principally applied to this supposes that Aristotle means by it some local motion, akin to the vibrations of certain nerintentional process of recovery, and which vous fibres, or the flow of certain nervous it is the purpose of the present treatise to spirits, by which so many ancient and modern consider; he extends it also to the obtru- physiologists have pretended to explain the sion of thoughts on our remembrance, phænomena of thought. Maass and Goerenz through the course of spontaneous sugges- reject, for the Stagirite, this mechanical hytion, of which, however, he has here occa-pothesis; but, unacquainted with the general sion only to speak incidentally. This is enough to prepare the reader for the Aristotelic extract which follows; and this, though divided, for the sake of illustration, into segments, ought, in the first instance, to be read continuously and by itself. analogy of Aristotle's language, they have not established their rejection on its broad and proper basis. Change or Mutatim, (μeraboλǹ.)according to Aristotle, is a genus containing under it four (or six) species;-each species affecting a subject pertaining to a different category.1o. If in Substance, (xarà ri ri or rode,) it is § 1. Aristotle here enounces the one generation and destruction, (ybviois. Çlogà,) proximate cause or condition of Reminis--20. if in Quantity, (xarà ri words,) it is the determined consecution of thought on thought. (And, be it observed, that I shall here employ the term thought in its widest signification, for every conscious mode of mind.) cence. -- ARISTOTLE. augmentation and diminution, (aïžnois. Célois :) it is variation, (anλolwois ;)—4°. if in Place, 3. if in Quality, (κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οι πάθος,) (narà To Tou, or Térov.) it is local motion, gà.) (Metaph, xii. 2.) Now Aristotle, sometimes makes motion convertible with change, and thus a genus "Reminiscences take place,* in virtue (as in Phys. III. 1. ;)—sometimes he makes it containing under it the same four species,-- nian, Sylburgian, Casaubonian, Pacian and Duvallian editions; but above all, the quotations in Themistius, and the phous in Michael Ephe sius. When not otherwise stated in the notes, the text of Bekker is that from which the translation will be made. "Oblivio imperfecta," (says Vives,) " in. stauratione, indiget, ut vestigatione, et quasi gradibus, ad id veniatur quod quærimus: ut ab annulo in aurifabrum; ex hoc in monile regina: hinc in bellum quod gesserit vir ejus; a bello in duces; a ducibus ad eorum progenitores aut liberos; hinc ad disciplinas quibus studebant ;-in quo nulla est ad sistendum meta. Gradus hi per omnia argumentorum genera late sese diffundunt:-a causa ad effectum; ab hoc ad instrumentum ; e parte ad totum; ab isto ad locum; a loco ad personam; a persona ad priora ejus et posteriora; ad contraria; ad similia;-in quo discursu non est finis-Et sunt transitus quidam longissimi-immo saltus. Ut ex Scipione venio in cogitationem potentiæ Turcica, propter victorias ejus de a subgenus to change, containing under it only the last three species, (as in Metaph. XI. 11, 12. Phys. V. 1. 2.-VII. 3. De Anima, I. 3. -in which last the species of motion are called four, increase and diminution being counted as two.) Now, by the generic term motion, or movement, Aristotle, in its psychological applica tion, simply means to denote change in quality, or the species variation,—the nature of which he more than once expounds, (Gen. et Corr. I. 4. text 23. Phys. VIL. 2.); and variation, to accommodate a more ancient to a more modern nomenclature, may be fairly translated by the more familiar expression-modification. In this, Aristotle only follows the example of Plato; who, in the Timæus and Parmenides, constituting two species of simple motion, lation and variation (rò Qigioba, and tò ààà00urban) commonly employs the generic term for the latter species, in designating the mental modes. As a psychological substitute for these terms, Aristotle also very commonly employs affection or passion (xábos). These three terms, then, Aristotle uses in. NOTE D.**] the common sense, OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION. THEMISTIUS. "What, then, is Reminiscence, has been shewn-it is the renovation of Memory. How this is brought to bear is also manifest." Having quoted the preceding text, he proceeds:-" For as in a chain, painful or pleasurable, one of appetency, differently to denote both the activities and to arise, as the sequel of a certain the passivities of mind; and (De Anima ii. 5 other."* §6) he explains "how the same [mental phænomenon, in different points of view,] is variously styled affection, or movement, or Further, "Sensitive passion, or energy." perception (he says) consists in a certain movement and affection, for it seems to be a See (De An. ii 5. § 2. kind of variation." "The phantasm, also Phys. vii. 3. § 12.). the object represented in imagination, is an affection-a movement of the common sense." (De Mem. 1. § 8.-De Ins. 2. §§ 16, 17, 20.)— But as "there is no intelligence possible ex. cept by relation to a phantasm," (De An. iii. 8. §§ 5. 8. 9. § 4. De Mem. i. § 8;) and as me mory is, along with phantasy, a function of 66 we remember our intel. lections only secondarily and accidentally, through our remembrance of the relative (De Mem. 1. §§ 8, 11)-These phantasms." intro-sensitive movements thus proximately constituting our whole suggestive series of thought.-To these movements are to be re"Pleasures and Pains ferred our Feelings. are movements caused by a sensible objectare variations of the sensitive part of the soul," (Phys. vii. 4, § 10;) while, in regard to the Appetencies,-(the desires, emotions, and affections proper, "of which pain and pleasure are the concomitants,")-there is no room for question. (Eth. Nic. ii. 4. Magn. Mor. i. 13.) It is thus, in the first place, manifest, that in employing the term movement, in this, as in his other psychological treatises, Aristotle never dreamt of insinuating any mechanical hypothesis, by which to explain the phæno. mena of thought and suggestion; and, in the second, that he here and elsewhere employs it, as a general word, by which to denote all the various modifications of the conscious mind. Under this last, a word in reference to Sir James Mackintosh. "What," (says Sir James,) "Mr Coleridge has not told us is, that the Stagirite confines the application of this law exclusively to the phænomena of recollection, without any glimpse of a more general operation extending to all connections of thought and feeling." And he adds, that the illustrations" of Ludovicus Vives, as quoted by Mr Coleridge, extend no farther."—(L. c.) This, I must be pardoned in saying, is altogether erroneous. In the third place, in regard to Vives, though Sir James be right, in so far as he limits his assertion to "Vives, as quoted by Mr Coleridge;" yet as Coleridge only quotes the scraps which he chanced to find in Maass, it is proper to state that any negative presumption founded upon these would be erroneous; for in other passages, the Spanish Aristotelian extends the principle of associa tion "to all the connections of thought and Quando etiam cum voce, aut feeling."-Thus:-" Ad aspectum loci, de eo venit in mentem quod in loco scimus evenisse, aut situm esse. sono aliquo quippiam contingit lætum, eodem sono audito, delectamur; si triste, tristamur. Quod in brutis quoque est annotare; quæ, si rursum, ad eundem sonum facile ac libenter quo sono vocata, gratum aliquid accipiunt, accurrunt; sin cædantur, sonitum eundem Eundem in modum, de sapore, de deinceps reformidant, ex plagarum recordatione.odore. Puer, quum Valentiæ febri laborarem, et, depravato gustu, cerasa edissem, multis post annis, quoties id pomum gustabam, toties, non solum de febri memineram, sed habere mihi illam videbam." (L. 1) I am unable to find in elevate not only above Vives, but above ArisHobbes (whom Sir James Mackintosh would totle) any passage which shews that he had taken so comprehensive a view of the influ. ence of the associative principle as the Span In the first place-Sir James is wrong, in In the second place, he is wrong, in saying, philosopher.-On the other hand, the reader may compare Cartesii, Epist. i. 36, and Locke, Essay ii. 33, § 7. • By ἤδε μετὰ τήνδε,—by μεθ' ἑτέραν ἐκείνη, and the like, Aristotle here and in the sequel, (see n. t, p. 894, b, &c.) denotes the following of this determinate mode of consciousness of some one upon some other, or, as Hobbes any thing to any thing." upon that other, and not merely the following expresses it, of " This the commentators have strangely overlooked, and in consequence thereof, as we shall see, (§ 5,) sadly perverted Aristotle's doctrine." |