but that impropriety in the use of terms is an expedient either to cover an absurdity where it really is, or to make that appear absurd which is not so in reality. I grant, then, that an effect uncaused is a contradiction, and that an event uncaused is an absurdity. The question that remains is whether a volition, undetermined by motives, is an event uncaused. This I deny. The cause of the volition is the man that willed it. This Mr Crombie grants in several places of his Essay-that the man is the efficient cause of all his volitions. Is it not strange, then, that, almost in every page, he should affirm that a volition, undetermined by motives, is an effect uncaused? Is an efficient cause no cause? or are two causes necessary to every event ?* Motives, he thinks, are not the efficient but the physical cause of volitions, as gravity is of the descent of a stone. Then, fair dealing would have made him qualify the absurdity, and, say that it is absurd that a volition should be without a physical cause; but to have pleaded the absurdity thus qualified, would have been a manifest petitio principii. I can see nothing in a physical cause but a constant conjunction with the effect. Mr Crombie calls it a necessary connection; but this no man sees in physical causes; and, if every event must have a physical cause, then every event must have been repeated in conjunction with its cause from eternity, for it could have no constant conjunction when first produced. argument against Necessity; and thinks it XXI. [The following Letter to Dr Gregory is quoted by Mr Stewart in his "Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical and Moral Science." The date is not given; and the original is not now extant among the letters of Reid in the hands of Dr Gregory's family.-H.] The merit of what you are pleased to call my philosophy, lies, I think, chiefly, in having called in question the common theory of ideas, or images of things in the mind, being the only objects of thought; a theory founded on natural prejudices, and so universally received as to be interwoven with the structure of the language. Yet, were I to give you a detail of what led me to call in question this theory, after I had long held it as self-evident and unquestionable, you would think, as I do, that there was much of chance in the matter. The discovery was the birth of time, not of genius; and Berkeley and Hume did more to bring it to light than the man that hit upon it. I think there is hardly anything that can be called mine in the philosophy of the mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice. I must, therefore, beg of you most earnestly to make no contrast in my favour to the disparagement of my predecessors in the same pursuits. can truly say of them, and shall always avow, what you are pleased to say of me, that, but for the assistance I have received from their writings, I never could have wrote or thought what I have done. The most shocking consequences of the system of necessity are avowed by this author without shame. Moral evil is nothing| but as it tends to produce natural evil. A man truely enlightened, ought to have no remorse for the blackest crimes. I think he might have added that the villain has reason to glory in his crimes, as he suffers for them without his fault, and for the common good. Among the arts of this author, the following are often put in practice :1. To supply the defect of argument by abuse. 2. What he thinks a consequence of the system of Liberty he imputes to his adversaries as their opinion, though they deny it. 3. What is urged as a conse. quence of Necessity, he considers as imputing an opinion to those who hold Necessity, and thinks it answer that they hold no such Liberty and Necessity, there are extant, Remarks opinion. 4. What is said to invalidate an argument for Necessity, he considers as an This is no removal of the difficulty. Is the man determined to volition, and to a certain kind of voli. tion, or is he not? If the former, necessitation is not avoided; if the latter, the admitted absurdity emerges. The schemes of Liberty and of Necessity are contradictory of each other: they consequently exclude any intermediate theory; and one or other ust be true. Yet the possibility of neither can be ceived; for each equally involves what is incomnsible, if not what is absurd. But of this again, I Besides the preceding papers on the question of at considerable length by Reid, on three sets of Objec tions made by a distinguished natural philosopher to Dr Gregory's Essay, in the years 1796, 1789, and 1790. These Remarks, though of much interest, have been omitted: for they could not adequately be understood apart from the relative Objections; and these it was deemed improper to publish posthu mously, after their author had expressly refused to allow them to be printed during his life.-There are also omitted, as of minor importance, two other papers on the same question; the one containing, "Remarks on the Objections to Dr Gregory's Essay," which were printed in the appendix to that Essay; the other," Remarks" on a pamphlet entitled " Illus trations of Liberty and Necessity, in Answer to Dr Gregory," published in 1795.-H,' D.-LETTER TO THE REV. ARCHIBALD ALISON. The following letter was addressed, by Dr Reid, to the Rev. Archibald Alison, (LL.B., Prebendary of Sarum, &c.,) on receiving a copy of his "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste”—a work of great ingenuity and elegance, and the first systematic attempt to explain the emotions of sublimity and beauty on the principles of association. It was originally published in 1790. It is, perhaps, needless to remind the reader that Mr Alison was brother-in-law of Dr Gregory.-H. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF Taste. DEAR SIR,-I received your very obliging letter of Jan. 10, with two copies of your book, about the middle of last week, I expected a meeting of Faculty, to which I might present the book, and return you the thanks of the society along with my own; but we have had no meeting since I received it. In the meantime, I have read it with avidity and with much pleasure; and cannot longer forbear to return you my cordial thanks for this mark of your regard, and for the handsome compliment you make me in the book. I think your principles are just, and that you have sufficiently justified them by a great variety of illustrations, of which many appear new to me, and important in themselves, as well as pertinent to the purpose for which they are adduced. That your doctrine concerning the sublime and beautiful in objects of sense coincides, in a great degree, with that of the Platonic school, and with Shaftesbury and Akenside among the moderns, I think may justly be said. They believed intellectual beauties to be the highest order, compared with which the terrestrial hardly deserve the name. They taught beauty and good to be one and the same thing. But both Plato and those two, his admirers, handle the subject of beauty rather with the enthusiasm of poets or lovers, than with the cool temper of philosophers. And it is difficult to determine what allowance is to be made, in what they have said, for the hyperbolical language of enthusiasm. The other two you mention, Dr Hutche son and Mr Spence, though both admirers of Plato, do not appear to me either to have perceived this doctrine in him, or to have discovered it themselves. The first places beauty in uniformity and variety, which, when they are perceived, immediately affect that internal sense which he calls the sense of beauty. The other makes colour, form, expression, and grace to be the four ingredients of beauty in the female part of our species, without being aware that the beauty of colour, form, and grace is nothing but expression, as well as what he calls by that name. On these grounds, I am proud to think that I first, in clear and explicit terms, and in the cool blood of a philosopher, maintained that all the beauty and sublimity of objects of sense is derived from the expression they exhibit of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty. But in this I may deceive myself, and cannot claim to be held an impartial judge. Though I don't expect to live to see the second part of your work, I have no hesitation in advising you to prosecute it; being persuaded that criticism is reducible to principles of philosophy, which may be more fully unfolded than they have been, and which will always be found friendly to the best interests of mankind, as well as to manly and rational entertainment. Mrs Reid desires to present her best respects to Mrs Alison, to which I beg you to add mine, and to believe me to be your much obliged and faithful servant, Glasgow College, 3d Feb. 1790. THO. REID. E.-LETTER TO PROFESSOR ROBISON. There has been given above, (p. 63,) a letter by Dr Reid, in 1784, recording a remarkable conversation between Sir Isaac Newton and Professor James Gregory, relative to Sir Isaac's descent from the family of Newton of Newton, in the county of East Lothian. Some years thereafter, Mr Barron, a relation of Sir Isaac, seems to have instituted inquiries in regard to the Scottish genealogy of the philosopher; in con sequence of which, the late Professor Robison of Edinburgh, aware, probably, of the letter to Dr Gregory, was induced to apply to Dr Reid for a more particular account of the conversation in question. The following is Reid's answer, as published in Sir David Brewster's "Life of Sir Isaac Newton."-H. DEAR SIR,-I am very glad to learn, by yours of April 4, that a Mr Barron, a near relation of Sir Isaac Newton, is anxious to inquire into the descent of that great man, as the family cannot trace it farther, with any certainty, than his grandfather. I therefore, as you desire, send you a precise account of all I know; and am glad to have this opportunity, before I die, of putting this information in hands that will make the proper use of it, if it shall be found of any use. Several years before I left Aberdeen, (which I did in 1764,) Mr Douglas of Fechel, the father of Sylvester Douglas, now a barrister at London, told me, that, having been lately at Edinburgh, he was often in company of Mr Hepburn of Keith, a gentleman with whom I had some acquaintance, by his lodging a night at my house at New Machar, when he was in the rebel army in 1745. That Mr Hepburn told him, that he had heard Mr James Gregory, Professor of Mathematics, Edinburgh, say, that, being one day in familiar conversation with Sir Isaac Newton at London, Sir Isaac saidGregory, I believe you don't know that I am a Scotchman."-" Pray, how is that?" said Gregory. Sir Isaac said, he was informed that his grandfather (or great-grandfather) was a gentleman of East (or West) Lothian; that he went to London with King James I. at his accession to the crown of England; and that he attended the court, in expectation, as many others did, until he spent his fortune, by which means his family was reduced to low circumstances. At the time this was told me, Mr Gregory was dead, otherwise I should have had his own testimony; for he was my mother's brother. I likewise thought at that time, that it had been certainly known that Sir Isaac had been descended from an old English family, as I think is said in his eloge before the Academy of Sciences at Paris; and therefore I never mentioned what I had heard for many years, believing that there must be some mistake in it. Some years after I came to Glasgow, I mentioned, (I believe for the first time,) what I had heard to have been said by Mr Hepburn, to Mr Cross, late sheriff of this county, whom you will remember. Mr Cross was moved by this account, and immediately said—“ I know Mr Hepburn very well, and I know he was intimate with Mr Gregory. I shall write him this same night, to know whether he heard Mr Gregory say so or not." After some reflection, he added "I know that Mr Keith, the ambassador, was also an intimate acquaintance of Mr Gregory, and, as he is at present in Edinburgh, I shall likewise write to him this night." The next time I waited on Mr Cross, he told me that he had wrote both to Mr Hepburn and Mr Keith, and had an answer from both; and that both of them testified that they had several times heard Mr James Gregory say, that Sir Isaac Newton told him what is above expressed, but that neither they nor Mr Gregory, as far as they knew, ever made any farther inquiry into the matter. This appeared very strange both to Mr Cross and me; and he said he would reproach them for their indifference, and would make inquiry as soon as he was able. He lived but a short time after this; and, in the last conversation I had with him upon the subject, he said, that all he had yet learned was, that there was a Sir John Newton of Newton in one of the counties of Lothian, (but I have forgot which,) some of whose children were yet alive; that they reported that their father, Sir John, had a letter from Sir Isaac Newton, desiring to know the state of his family; what children he had, particularly what sons; and in what way they were. The old knight never returned an answer to this letter, thinking, probably, that Sir Isaac was some upstart, who wanted to claim a relation to his worshipful house. This omission the children regretted, conceiving that Sir Isaac might have had a view of doing something for their benefit. I After this, I mentioned occasionally in conversation what I knew, hoping that these facts might lead to some more certain discovery; but I found more coldness about the matter than I thought it deserved. wrote an account of it to Dr Gregory, your colleague, that he might impart it to any member of the Antiquarian Society who he judged might have had the curiosity to trace the matter farther. In the year 1787, my colleague, Mr Patrick Wilson, Professor of Astronomy, having been in London, told me, on his return, that he had met accidentally with a James Hutton, Esq. of Pimlico, Westminster, a near relation of Sir Isaac Newton, to whom he mentioned what he had heard from me with respect to Sir Isaac's descent, and that I wished much to know something decisive on the subject. Mr Hutton said, if I pleased to write to him, he would give me all the information he could give. I wrote him, accordingly, and had a very polite answer, dated at Bath, 25th December 1787, which is now before me. He says, "I shall be glad, when I return to London, if I can find, in some old notes of my mother, any thing that may fix the certainty of Sir Isaac's descent. If he spoke so to Mr James Gregory, it is most certain he spoke truth. But Sir Isaac's grandfather, not his great-grandfather, must be the person who came from Scotland with King James I. If I find any thing to the purpose, I will take care it shall reach you.' This is all I know of the matter; and for the facts above mentioned, I pledge my veracity. I am much obliged to you, dear Sir, for the kind expressions of your affection and esteem, which, I assure you, are mutual on my part; and I sincerely sympathise with you on your afflicting state of health, which makes you consider yourself as out of the world, and despair of seeing me any more. I have been long out of the world by deafness and extreme old age. I hope, however, if we should not meet again in this world, that we shall meet and renew our acquaintance in another. In the meantime, I am, with great esteem, dear Sir, yours affectionately, Glasgow College, 12th April 1792. THO. REID. F-LETTER TO DAVID HUME. The following is in answer to the letter of Hume, given by Mr Stewart in his Account of Reid, (supra, p. 7, sq.) It is recently published, from the Hume papers, by Mr Burton, in his very able life of the philosopher; and, though out of chronological order, (by the reprinting of a leaf,) it is here inserted -H. IN REFERENCE TO HIS OWN INQUIRY, King's College, [Aberdeen,] SIR, On Monday last, Mr John Farquhar brought me your letter of February 25th, enclosed in one from Dr Blair. I thought myself very happy in having the means of obtaining at second hand, through the friendship of Dr Blair, your opinion of my performance: and you have been pleased to communicate it directly in so polite and friendly a manner, as merits great acknowledgments on my part. Your keeping a watchful eye over my style, with a view to be of use to me, is an instance of candour and generosity to an antagonist, which would affect me very sensibly, although I had no personal concern in it, and I shall always be proud to show so amiable an example. Your judgment of the style, indeed, gives me great consolation, as I was very diffident of myself in regard to English, and have been indebted to Drs Campbell and Gerard for many corrections of that kind. In attempting to throw some new light Kant makes a similar acknowledgment. "By Hume," he says, "I was first startled out of my dogmatic slumber." Thus Hume (as elsewhere stated) is author, in a sort, of all our subsequent philosophy. For out of Reid and Kant, mediately or immediately, all our subsequent philosophy is upon those abstruse subjects, I wish to preserve the due mean betwixt confidence and despair. But whether I have any success in this attempt or not, I shall always avow myself your disciple in metaphysics. I have learned more from your writings in this kind, than from all others put together. Your system appears to me not only coherent in all its parts, but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received among philosophers; principles which I never thought of calling in question, until the conclusions you draw from them in the Treatise of Human Nature made me suspect them. If these principles are solid, your system must stand; and whether they are or not, can better be judged after you have brought to light the whole system that grows out of them, than when the greater part of it was wrapped up in clouds and darkness. I agree with you, therefore, that if this system shall ever be demolished, you have a just claim to a great share of the praise, both because you have made it a distinct and determined mark to be aimed at, and have furnished proper artillery for the purpose.* evolved; and the doctrines of Kant and Reid are both avowedly recoils from the annihilating scepticism of Hume-both attempts to find for philosophy deeper foundations than those which he had so thoroughly subverted.-H. When you have seen the whole of my performance, I shall take it as a very great favour to have your opinion upon it, from which I make no doubt of receiving light, whether I receive correction or no. Your friendly adversaries Drs Campbell and Gerard, as well as Dr Gregory, return their compliments to you respectfully. A little philosophical society here, of which all the three are members, is much indebted to you for its entertainment. Your company would, although we are all good Christians, be The following should have been inserted in the correspondence with Kames. Kames's objection to Dr Adam Smith's theory of Sympathy as the sole fonndation of our moral judgments, which appeared in the third edition of the "Essays on Morality," were, previously to publication, communicated to Dr Reid, who thus expresses his opinion on the subject : "I have always thought Dr S's system of sympathy wrong. It is indeed only a refinement of the selfish system; and I think your arguments against it are solid. But you have smitten with a friendly hand, which does not break the head; and your compliment to the author I highly approve of.”—From Letter of 30th October 1778. In this judgment of Smith, Reid and Kant are at one. The latter condemns the Ethic of Sympathy as a Eudæmonism, or rather Hedonism.-H. In Hutton's Mathematical Dictionary, 1795, in the article, David Gregory, there are given, "Some farther particulars of the families of Gregory and Anderson, communicated by Dr Thomas Reid," &c., probably written in the year of publication, or the preceding. As these notices contain nothing of any moment which does not appear in the foregoing correspondence, it has been deemed unnecessary to reprint them.-H. |