21 from Pleuronia to itself. For this rea- | animals known to us, man alone is en- § 10. After other observations, which it is not necessary to adduce, Aristotle goes on to show, that Reminiscence-reminiscence intentional or proper,—is to a certain extent, a rational discursive procedure. ARISTOTLE. "That, in the same individual, the power of Memory and the power of Reminiscence stand in no mutual proportion, has been already stated. And, independently of the difference of their manifestation, in the order of time;* Reminiscence is distinguished from Memory in this, that of memory, many of the other animals are participant, whereas, it may be safely affirmed, that, of the THEMISTIUS. "Of the animals known to us, man alone is endowed with Reminiscence;' because to whom reminiscence is competent, to the same syllogism is competent. For as, in the act of syllogising, this [minor] proposition is connected with that [major]; so in the act of reminiscence we connect lesser [movements] with greater. But the power of syllogising implies the power of inquiry, [for we only syllogise as we inquire]; and the power of inquiry implies the power of deliberation, [for we only inquire as we deliberate.] [The power of reminiscence, therefore, * Reminiscence, chronologically considered. is both prior and posterior to Memory (in Aristotle's meaning of this term.) For reminis. cence starts from a Memory, which affords it a principle or point of departure; and it results in a Memory, as its end, this being a memory of the matter sought. common places of Logic, as universal principles or major propositions, by a process of investigation, and objective subsumption of the contained under the containing. Aristotle, though he assimilates, does not identify rational or logical subsumption, with voluntary, far less with spontaneous, suggestion. At most he only shews that reminis cence, qua intentional, as it involves an appli. cation of means to end, involves deliberation, which again involves discursion. This Aristotle also states in his History This discursion of Reminiscence the Latin commentators, in general, refer, not to the inorganic Intellect, not to Λόγος, Διάνοια, or Ratio proper, but to that Analogon Rationis or Particular Reason, possessed, in some measure, by the brutes; and which among other Arabian Aristotelians, Averroes introduced. as one of the internal senses, under the name of Cogitativa. "Ex quibus patet, (says Ja. vellus,) quod in reminiscendo, syllogizamus et discurrimus, non quidem per propositiones universales, id enim est proprium intellectus, sed per singulares. Discurrimus enim ab uno singulari memorato ad aliud memorando; et ideo fit a cogitativa quæ dicitur ratio parti. cularis apud commentatorem."-Now, if we discard the higher faculty of thought, and admit, exclusively, the lower, we have at once the scheme of Hobbes. It should be also noticed, that while Aristotle and his followers limit, and properly, the expression "mental dis course to the intentional process of reminis cence, Hobbes, borrowing the term, unwar. rantably extends it to the spontaneous train implies the power of deliberation]. But(); [and Themistius had previously man alone deliberates; man, therefore, stated, that] discursion is only the energy alone, is reminiscent. That Reminiscence, of intellect and imagination combined— consequently, is a function of the discur- οὐδεν ἕτερον ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια ἡ τοῦ μετὰ φαν sive intellect, (διανοιας,) is demonstrated; τασίας ἐνέργεια.” for deliberation is an act of intellect, NOTE D.*** OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF MENTAL REPRODUCTION, SUGGESTION, OR ASSOCIATION. § I.-Laws of Mental Succession, as General.—(A.) Not of Reproduction proper, uniform.—(B.) Of Reproduction proper, not uniform : as possible; as actual; as direct, Abstract or Primary law of Repetition; as indirect,-Abstract or Primary law of Redintegration, Concrete or Secondary law of Preference. $ II.-Laws of Mental Succession, as Special. Of Reproduction:—(A.) Abstract or Primary,-modes of the laws of Repetition and Redintegration, one or both ;—(B) Concrete or Secondary,-modes of the law of Preference. [References omitted, and to be supplied from pp. 294, 386, &c.] § 1.-General Laws of Mental Succession. A-As not of Reproduction proper. Human Consciousness being realised, (see Note H,) only under the two conditions of contrast and continuity in time, is necessarily astricted to a ceaseless variation of state; and its variations (called likewise more or less adequately mental modifications, modes, states, movements, thoughts, activities, passivities, &c.,) are thus successive, and uninterruptedly successive. The two highest laws of thought are, therefore, i. The Law of SUCCESSION:- That we are only conscious, as conscious of succession; and ii. The Law of VARIATION:- Th we are only conscious of succession, di conscious of successive variation. But these successive variations do not follow on each other in a row, as isolated phænomena, related only as before and after on the thread of time; nor is their manifestation determined always by causes, external to the series itself, although this be frequently the case. On the contrary, the train, though ever changing, is ever continuous; cach antecedent movement running into each consequent; and, abstracting from the intervention of foreign influences, each antecedent standing to each consequent as its cause. Thought is thus evolved, not only in a chronological, but in a causal | together (qua) in the mind. It is consesequence; and another of its Laws is, quently also improper to say of such therefore, terms, that they are associated or mutually suggestive. Not the former, for this supposes that they can be dissociated; not the latter, for this supposes them not to be given as necessary reciprocals. Such are whole and parts, means and end, cause and effect, reason and consequent, substance and accident, like and unlike, great and small, parent and child, husband and wife, &c. &c. iii.-The Law of DEPENDENCE or DETERMINED CONSECUTION :-That every consequent modification in the mental train is the effect of that immediately antecedent. iv.-Thoughts are dependent on each other, only as they stand together as the relative parts of the same common whole. This may be called the Law of RELATIVITY OF INTEGRATION. To this head, I may simply notice, though I cannot now explain, are to be referred those compulsory relatives, imposed upon thought by that great, but as But this whole is of two kinds. It is either an objective (necessary and essential) unity, constituted by, and intrinsic to, the thoughts themselves; or it is a subjective (contingent and accidental) unity, extrin-yet undeveloped, law of our intellectual sic to themselves, and imposed on them being, which I have elsewhere denomiby the mind-the mind in general. In nated the Law of the CONDITIONED:the former case, a certain thought being That all positive thought lies between two given, it necessarily, of, and along with extremes, neither of which we can conceive itself, evolves a certain one, exclusive, as possible, and yet, as mutual contradicother; in the latter, a certain thought tories, the one or the other we must recogbeing given, it only moves the mind, nise as necessary. From this impotence according to definite subjective laws, to of intellect, we are unable to think aught pass on to this or that of a certain plu- as absolute. Even absolute relativity is rality of others. In the one instance, unthinkable. But to this I merely allude, there is a determination to an individual that I may shew to what head such comconsequent; in the other, only a determi-pulsory connections are to be referred. nation to a class of consequents, the preference of this or that class, of this or that individual under it, being regulated by circumstances, external to the nature of the antecedent thought itself. The former constitutes what may be called the logical or objective; the latter, what may be called the psychological or subjective train of thought. The logical consecution is shewn in those thoughts, which, though denoted by a single and separate expression, implicitly contain a second; which second, the process of thinking explicates but does not determine to succeed. Such are all relatives. The conception of the one term of a relation necessarily implies that of the other; it being of the very nature of a relative, to be thinkable, only through the conjunct thought of its correlative. For a relation is, in truth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation, necessarily involves the thought of its two terms, so is it, with equal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either. It is therefore improper to say, that the thought of one relative follows, or is consequent on, the thought of the other, if thereby be denoted a succession in time; since the thought of both is, in truth, already given in the thought of each. Aristotle expressly says of relatives, that they are things which exist See, however, p. 743, n. *, p. 599 n. *. Local consecution is thus governed by : V. -The Law of INTRINSIC or OBJECTIVE RELATIVITY:-That one relative term being thought, there is virtually thought also its correlative. General Laws of Mental Succession. B-As of Reproduction proper. The other kind of dependence, the psyschological consecution, is that which subsists between two thoughts, the one of which preceding, entails the sequence of the other, not necessarily, or in virtue of its own intrinsic relativity, but of a certain extrinsic relativity, of a contingent imposition and indefinite obtrusive force, which inclines them, though perhaps unequally, to call each other into consciousness, and which, when not counteracted by a stronger influence, inevitably operates its end. The terms (chronological) suggestion, association, succession, are properly applied to this dependence alone; for under it, exclusively, have the thoughts a before and after, in the order of time, or in themselves any separate and irrespective existence. Psychological consecution is equivalent to Reproduction. [I may parenthetically observe, that the power of reproduction (into consciousness,) supposes a power of retention (out of consciousness.) To this tion affords the ground, why, for example, conservative power I confine exclusively the term Memory; with this, however, we have at present nothing to do.] There are three subjective unities, wholes or identities, each of which affords a ground of chronological succession, and reciprocal suggestion, to the several thoughts which they comprehend in one. In other words, Reproduction has three sources. These are:-1° the unity of thoughts, differing in time and modification, in a co-identity of SUBJECT;-20 the unity of thoughts, differing in time, in a co-identity of MODIFICATION;-3o the unity of thoughts, differing in modification, in a co-identity of TIME. Of these, the first affords a common principle of the possibility of association, or mutual suggestion for all our mental movements, however different in their character as modifications, however remote in the times of their occurrence; for all, even the most heterogeneous and most distant, are reproducible, co-suggestible, or associable, as, and only as, phænomena of the same unity of consciousness-affections of the same indivisible Ego. There thus further emerges : vi.—The Law of ASSOCIABILITY or POSSIBLE CO-SUGGESTION:-All thoughts of the same mental subject are associable, or capable of suggesting each other. But the unity of subject, the fundamental condition of the associability of thought in general, affords no reason why this particular thought should, de facto, recall or suggest that. We require, therefore, besides a law of possible, a law or laws of actual reproduction. Two such are afforded in the two other unities-those of Modification and of Time. And now let us, for the sake of subsequent reference, pause a moment to state the following symbolic illustration :A B C A' an object determining a mental modification of a certain complement and character, to-day, this presentation tends to call up the representation of the same modification determined by that object, yesterday. Or suppose, as in our symbols, the three As to typify the same thought, determined at three different times, be the determining movement of a presentation or a representation. On the second occasion, A' will suggest the representation of A. This, it will not be denied, that it can do; for, on the possibility hereof, depends the possibility of simple remembrance. The total thought, after this suggestion, will be A'+A; and on the third occasion, A" may suggest A' and A; both on this principle, and on that other which we are immediately to consider, of co-identity in time. We have thus, as a first general law of actual Reproduction, Suggestion, or Association : vii. The Law of REPETITION, or of DIRECT REMEMBRANCE:- Thoughts coidentical in modification, but differing in time, tend to suggest each other. The law which I here call that of Repetition, seems to be the principle of remembrance referred to by Aristotle, in saying, that "the movements [which and by which, we recollect] are, in these cases, sometimes THE SAME," &c. (See above, p. 900 a.) If this be correct, Aristotle has here again made a step a-head of subsequent philosophers; for, if I be not mistaken, we must recur to Repetition as an ultimate principle of reproduction, and not rest satisfied, as has been done, with that of Redintegration alone. But of this anon. The unity of time affords the ground, why thoughts, different in their character as mental modes, but having once been proximately coexistent, (including under coexistence immediate consecution,) as the parts of some total thought, and a totality of thought is determined even by a unity of time; do, when recalled into consciousness, tend immediately to suggest each other, as co-constituents of that former whole, and mediately, that whole itself. Thus, let (A, B, C, D, E, F,) be supposed a complement of such concom mitant thoughts. If A be recalled into consciousness, A will tend to reawaken B, B to reawaken C, and so on, until the whole formerly coexistent series has been reinstated-or the mind diverted by This being understood, we proceed :- some stronger movement, on some other Of these two unities that of modifica-' train. We have thus as a second general Here the same letter, repeated in perpendicular order, is intended to denote the same mental mode, brought into consciousness, represented, at different times. Here the different letters, in horizontal order, are supposed to designate the partial thoughts integrant of a total mental state, and therefore co-existent, or immediately consequent, at the moment of its actual realization. law of actual Reproduction, Suggestion, tion of interest (from whatever source,) or Association,— in which these stand to the individual mind. viii. The Law of REDINTEGRATION, of INDIRECT REMEMBRANCE, or of REMINISCENCE:- Thoughts once coidentical in time, are, however different as mental modes, again suggestive of each other, and that in the mutual order which they originally held. § II. Special Laws of Mental Succession. Those of Reproduction. Repetition and Redintegration. A.-Primary; modes of the laws of The first special law under this head is To this law of Redintegration can easily be reduced Aristotle's second and third suggestives "the movements [which and -The Law of SIMILARS:-Thingsby which, we recollect,] .. are some- thoughts resembling each other (be the retimes AT THE SAME TIME, Ssometimes semblance simple or analogical) are muPARTS OF THE SAME WHOLE, &c. (See tually suggestive. p. 900, a.) From Aristotle downwards, all who In general. Similarity has been lightly assumed, lightly laid down, as one of the ultimate principles of associations. Nothing, however, can be clearer than that resembling objects resembling mental modifications, being, to us, in their resembling points, identical; they must, on the principle of Repetition, call up each other. This, of course, refers principally to suggestion for the first time. Subsequently, Redintegration co-operates with Repetition; for now, the resembling objects have formed, together, parts of the same mental whole; and are, moreover, associated both as similar and as contrasted. Philosophers, in generalising the pha- | have written on Suggestion, whether innomena of reproduction, have, if our tentional or spontaneous, have recognizexception of Aristotle be not admitted, ed the association of similar objects. But of these two, exclusively regarded the whilst all have thus fairly acknowledged law of Redintegration. That of Repeti- the effect; none, I think, (if Aristotle he tion was, however, equally worthy of not a singular exception,) have sportheir consideration. For the excitation lated aright as to the cause. of the same by the same, differing in time, is not less marvellous, than the excitation of the different by the different, identical in time. It was a principle, too, equally indispensable, to explain the phænomena. For the attempts to reduce these to the law of Redintegration alone will not stand the test of criticism; since the reproduction of thought by thought, as disjoined in time; cannot be referred to the reproduction of thought by thought, as conjoined in time. Accordingly, we shall find in coming to detail, that some phænomena are saved by the law of Repetition alone, while others require a combination of two laws of Repetition and Redinte- It is, however, more important to prove, gration. that the law of Similarity cannot be reMovements thus suggest and are sug-duced to the law alone of Redintegragested, in proportion to the strictness of tion. This reduction has often been asthe dependency between that prior and this sumed; seldom a demonstration of it proposterior. But such general relation be-pounded. Discounting Wolf, who cantween two thoughts and on which are not properly be adduced, I recollect only founded the two Abstract or Primary four philosophers who have attempted laws of Repetition and Redintegration such probative reduction. As two of -is frequently crossed, is frequently these, however, are only repeaters of a superseded, by another, and that a particular relation, which determines the suggestion of a movement not warranted by any dependence on its antecedent. To complete the general laws of reproduction, we must therefore recognise a Secondary or Concrete principle-what may be styled, (under protest, for it is hardly deserving of the title Law) :— ix. The Law of PREFERENCE:Thoughts are suggested, not merely by force of the general subjective relation subsisting between themselves, they are also suggested, in proportion to the rela third, there are found, in reality, among them, only two independent arguments; and these, though both aiming at the same end, endeavour to accomplish it on different principles. The one is by Maass, (followed by Hoffbauer and Biunde;) the other by Mr James Mill. Of these, the former is as follows:"Similar representations," says Maass, "can only be associated, in as much as they, or their constituent characters, belong to the same total representation; and this, without exception, is the case with them. The two representations, A |