and B resemble each other, in so far as both contain the common character b. If then, B, to which belong the characters b d e, is associated with A, to which belong the characters b a c, in that case a c are associated with b [B?], and these consequently, taken together, are all parts of the same total representation."-There seems to be here so egregious a petitio principii, that I am almost doubtful whethen I correctly apprehend the purport of the argument.-No doubt, "if B is associated with A," all will follow as stated. For after one representation has, in virtue of their similarity, been associated with, and has suggested another; they become associated anew as parts of the total representation which that original suggestion caused; and may, of course, subsequently re-suggest each other, simply on the principle of Redintegration, and apart from their similarity altogether. But the question here to be answered is" How do the similar representations B and A become associated or mutually suggestive ?-on the hypothesis, always, that they have not been previously associated, as mentally coexistent; -and the reasoning violates the hypothesis.

Mr Maass goes on:-"Further, the Similarity of two representations could not, in itself, be any reason of their association. For Similarity is an objective relation, subsisting between them; but from this there follows not in the least their subjective inter-dependence in imagination." (Versuch, &c., § 20.)-Here again, I can hardly think that I understand aright. Is it intended to be said,—that we know, or can know aught of objective Similarity in things, except through our subjective consciousness, or feeling, of the partial sameness of certain subjective movements determined by them in us?—that representations are in themselves aught but subjective modifications, and that the consciousness or feeling of them, and their identity or difference, are not also purely subjective?

On the statements of Hoffbauer, who manifestly, and of Biunde, who professedly, adopts the preceding reasoning from Maass, it is unnecessary to make any observation. They are as follows:-" We call things," says the former, "reciprocally similar when certain attributes are common to them. The [common] attribute which is found in one of these must therefore also be met with in the others. In the representation of the object A, which resembles another object, B, there

is involved the representation of the common attribute, found also in B, and this is likewise contained in a total representation along with B." (Naturlehre, &c., Br. 23.)" Were there," says the latter, "in similar (and analogous) representations no coexistence, the representations, as Maass rightly observes, would be without any internal bond of connection, and no conceivable reason could be any longer assigned, why a representation should awaken its co-similars and not rather any other representation." (Versuch, &c, § 70.)

The other attempt at such a reduction is by the late Mr Mill, in his ingenious "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Hu man Mind;" who thus, after Hobbes and Hartley, enounces what I have called the law of Redintegration as the general law of association, with its causes: "Our ideas spring up or exist, in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies." He adds:-" The causes of strength in association seem all to be resolvable into two; the vividness of the associated feelings and the frequency of the association." (i. pp. 56, 61. Again, treating of Hume's principles of associa tion, he thus endeavours to recall that of Resemblance to these causes:-"I believe it will be found that we are accustomed to see like things together. When we see a tree, we generally see more trees than one; when we see an ox, we generally see more oxen than one; a sheep, more sheep than one; a man, more men than one. From this observation, I think, we may refer resemblance to the law of frequency, of which it seems to form only a particular case." (i. p. 79.)-I confess my self unable to perceive the cogency of this reasoning, if I rightly apprehend its tenor. Admitting, "that we are accustomed to see like things together," (though are we not far more accustomed to things unlike together?); the following objections occur to this, as a ground on which to reduce the principle of similarity exclusively to the principle of accustomed mental concomitance.

10. It could only enable us to explain the mutuai #ggestion of those things which have actually been seen together. But there are innumerable cases of similars suggesting similars, in which the objects having never previously been wit nessed in conjunction, nor even mentally compared together, the fact of their association cannot be thus accounted for.

2o. Even in relation to things usually seen together, the pervading Similarity

* This argument may be illustrated by the remark of Hume (Treat. of Hum. Nat. B. i. P. i. s. 5),-Though resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation, it does not follow that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas. When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any one of them, but, by presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination from fixing on any single object.'-ED.

+ Of these laws the titles only have been found among the Author's papers: the further account of them, if ever written, has been lost. It is probable, however, that the Author finally intended to include them under the Law of Similars; for which reason they have not been numbered as xi. and xii.-ED.

The following historical notices concerning the Law of Contrast are extracted from the author's Common-Place Book. The views of Stiedenroth have been mainly followed in the fragmentary remarks printed in the text.-ED. The Law of Contrast has been reduced

1. To Frequency, or Frequency and Vividness, by Mr James Mill. [Analysis, &c. i. p. 80. A dwarf suggests the idea of a giant. How? We call a dwarf a dwarf, because he departs from a certain standard. We call a giant a giant, because he departs from the same standard. This is a case, therefore, of resemblance-that is, of frequency. Pain is said to make us think of pleasure; and this is considered a case of association by contrast. There is no doubt that pain makes us think of relief from it; because they have been conjoined, and the great vividness of the sensations makes the association strong. Relief from pain is a species of pleasure; and one pleasure leads to think of another, from the resemblance. This is a compound case, therefore, of vividness

1°, All contrast is of things contained under a common notion. Qualities are contrasted only as they are similar. A good horse and a bad syllogism have no contrast. Virtue and vice agree as moral attributes; great and little agree as quantities, and as extraordinary deflections from ordinary quantity. Even existence and non-existence are not opposed as of different genera, but only as species of

and frequency. All other cases of contrast, I believe, may be expounded in a similar manner.']

2. To Resemblance under a higher notion, by Stiedenroth. [Psychologie, p. 92. Doch ist es merkwuerdig, dass die Erinnerung mehr von der widrigen Seite des Contrastes nach der entgegengesetzten geht, als umgekehrt, obgleich auch dieser Gang sich allerdings findet. Wie wird sich diese ganze Erscheinung mit der Aehnlichkeit vergleichen? Vor allen Dingen darf nicht vergessen werden, dass es keinen Contrast giebt, ausgenommen unter demselben hoeheren Begriff. Eine reiche Gegend und Geistesarmuth bildeh an und fuer sich keinen Contrast. Die contrastirenden Vorstellungen sind also immer theilweise einerlei; sie sind Gegensaetze unter demselben hoeheren Begriff, und zwar Gegensaetze, die, wenn gleich concret, dennoch durch Contradiction schlechthin gedacht werden. Nun ist der Begriff und seine Verneinung zugleich, und dieses Verhaeltniss wurde daher frueher zu den naechsten psychologisch aehnlichen gezaehlt. Wird daher ein Begriff vorausgesetzt, so involvirt eine besondere Fassung unter ihm zugleich mit dem Hauptbegriff in dieser Fassung, d. h. mit dem Begriff, der die Fassung des Besonderen vorzugsweise bestimmt, den Gegensatz. Daher wird begreiflich seyn, wie Contraste an einander erinnern koennen, und wie sich dieses Verhaeltniss der Aehnlichkeit keineswegs entzieht.'] So Alexander Aphrodisiensis (in Top. i. 18) makes contrariety equivalent to similarity, inasmuch as contraries, &c., have common attributes.

3. To a mixture of Causation and Resemblance, by Hume. [Essay on the Association of Ideas. 'Contrast or contrariety is also a connection among ideas; but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance. When two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other that is, [is] the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence.']

4. To Simultaneity and Interest of Understanding or Feeling, by Schulze. [Anthropologie, § 72, p. 156, 3d. ed. 1826. 'Die Folge der Bilder in der Einbildungskraft nach dem so genannten Gesetze des Contrastes ist, in den meisten Faellen, eine durch den Einfluss des forschenden Verstandes oder des Hanges des Herzens zu gewissen Gefuehlen auf jene Folge nach dem Gesetze der Gleichzeitigkeit bestimmte Verbindung. Sie entsteht naemlich hauptsaechlich dadurch, dass man Dinge vermittelst der Vergleichung mit ihrem Gegentheile aufzuklaeren, von unangenehmen Gefuehlen aber durch die Vorstellung erheiternder Gegenstaende sich zu befreien sucht.']

existense-positive existence and negs tive existence. Conspecies thus (as wilf and dog) may be associated either as eimilars or as contraries - similars as opposed to animals of other genera-contraries, as opposed to each other. [Contraries are thus united under a higher

notion.

But 2°, Affirmation of any quality involves the negation of its contradictorythe affirmation of goodness is virtually the negation of badness; and many terms for the contradictory qualities are only nega tions and affirmations-just, unjust finite, infinite-partial, impartial. Hence logical contradictory opposition is even a stronger association than logical contrariety, because only between two.

3, Contrast is a relation-the knowledge of contraries is one. So in passive feeling-pain-pleasure.

4°, Consciousness is only of the distinguishable. Ergo, contrast most clearly, distinguished must heighten conscious

ness.

N.B.-Consciousness is activity of mind rising above a certain degree or intension. Where it is dissipated-divided-falling under this degree, there is unconsciousness. Unconsciousness is not equal to inactivity of mind, but to [that which is below] this degree of activity.

[xii. The Law of COADJACENCY.] Cause and Effect-Whole and Parts Substance and Attribute-Sign and Signified.*

B-Secondary; modes of the Law of
Preference.

Under the laws of possibility, one thought being associated with a plurality, and each of that plurality being therefore suggestible, it suggests one in preference to another, according to two laws.

1°, By relation to itself, the one most strictly associated with itself.

2°, By relation to the mind, the thought most easily suggestible.

That there must be two laws is shown,

* From p. 899, n.*, it seems probable that the Author intended to include these relations, the titles of which are given in his papers, under the general head of Coadjacency. This law has accordingly been supplied. In reference to this classification, it should be observed that, though Cause and Effect, Whole and Parts, &c., when considered generally as relative notions, fall under the Law of Relativity or Integration (see above, p. 911), yet when considered specially as regards the suggestion of this particular effect by this particular cause, &c., they are instances of association proper, and may be fitly considered in this place. See p. 900, n. t.-ED.

because two associated thoughts do net suggest each other with equal force. B may be very strongly associated with A. but A very slightly associated with R This twofold, 1 in order of time, 2 in order of interest.

[Under the Erst head, that of suggestion by relation to the thought suggesting, may be stated the following special laws:

xiii.—The Law of IMMEDIACY.]

Of two thoughts, if the one be immediately, the other mediately connected [with a third], the first will be suggested [by the third in preference to the second).

[xiv.-The Law of HOMOGENEITY.] A thought will suggest another of the same order [in preference to one of a diferent order].

Thus, a smell will suggest a smell, sight a sight, an imagination an imagination [in preference to a thought of a different class].*

[Under the second head, that of suggestion by relation to the mind, may be stated as a special law.

xv.-The Law of FACILITY.]

A thought easier to suggest will be roused in preference to a more difficult one. The easier are

a.-Those more clearly, strongly impressed, than the reverse.+ [Such are ideas] more undistractedly, attentively, [received]; in youth, in the morning; [assisted by] novelty, wonder, passion, &c. [See above, p. 896, n. *] Hence, also, sights are more easily suggested than smells, imaginations than thoughts, &c

b. Those more recent, than older (cæteris paribus).§

c.-Those more frequently repeated (cæteris paribus). I

d. Those which stand more isolated from foreign and thwarting thoughts.¶

e. Those which are more connected with homogeneous and assisting thoughts.* f. Those more interesting to (1.) na

* Fries, Neue Kritik (1807), p. 110. Schmid, Metaphysik der inneren Natur, p. 243.

+ Ueberwasser, [Anweisungen zum regelmessigen Studium der Empirischen Psychologie, 1787), p. 122. Cf. Biunde, Empir. Psychol. i. p. 228; Baumgarten, Metaph., § 422.

Fracastorius, f. 123 D. [Turrius, sive de Intellectione, Fracastorii Opera, Venet. 1584.—En] § Ueberwasser, p. 125. Cf. Biunde, p. 330. Baumgarten, § 422.

Ueberwasser, p. 126, Brown, Lecture xxxvil p. 236, ed. 1830. Cf. Biunde, p. 331. ¶ Ueberwasser, p. 130. Cf. Biunde, p. 334. ** Ueberwasser, p. 132. Cf. Biunde, p. 335.

tural cognitive powers, talents; (2.) acquired habits of cognition, studies; (3.) temporary line of occupation.

g.-Those more in harmony with affective dispositions, (1.) natural; (2.) habitual; (3.) temporary.

Editor has been able to put together from the papers apparently intended for the completion of Note D. *** Another exposition of the Author's views on Association, more finished in writing, though less developed in thought, will be found in the Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect.

§ I.-On the Correlation of Colour with Extension and Figure in visual Perception and Imagination.

There may be here mooted four questions, in reference to both cognitions. In reference to the former, we may ask, Can there be seen-

1°, Extension without colour?
2°, Figure without colour?
3°, Colour without extension?

4°, Colour without figure? The same questions, if the response be negative in regard to vision, may be fur

ther asked in regard to imagination; but if the answer be affirmative in the former case, multo magis must it be affirmative in the latter.

The first question (Can we see, can we imagine, Extension apart from Colour?) must, I think, be at once negatived in reference to both. For there is no actual, no conceivable, object of vision which is not coloured. Which is thus demonstrated-Physically speaking, Colour is coextensive with Light. As a genus containing under it, as species, the various modifications of light, it excludes, of