ON CONSCIOUSNESS.

On Obscure Ideas before Leibnitz, see sophie und ihre Geschichte,' v. p. 145 sq.);-Sulzer, Verm. Schriften, i. pp. 99 Feuerbach, Darstellung, &c., Anmerk., pp. sq., 109 (ed. 1808);-Boerhaave, De Morb. 217, 224, ed. 1837. [Feuerbach refers to Nerv. t. ii. p. 360 sq.;-Maass, Versuch, the Pythagorean saying, nav yàp Tò paió&c., § 24, p. 65 sq. (ed. 1797);-Kant, pevov è§ àpavŵv òpeíλei ovvíoταobaι Anthrop., § 5;-Fries, N. Kritik, i. §§ 23, &s yàp Tà Tŷs λé§ews σтoixeîα oùк elol 30; Anthrop., § 24, ed. 1820 (§ 20, ed. | λέξεις, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα 1837);-Jacob, Erkl. des Grundr. der Emp. ovк čσTI σwμатa (v. Sext. Emp., Adv. Phys. Psych., § 49;-Schwab, Ueb. d. dunkeln L. ii. §§ 250, 253, pp. 674, 675, ed. 1718), Vorstellungen (Stuttgart, 1813);- Mei- and to Cudworth's Dissertation on the ners, Untersuchungen, &c., i. pp. 56, 57; Plastic Nature, Intell. Syst. B. i. ch. iii. -Graevell, Der Mensch, pp. 73, 135;- sect. 37, subs. 17. 'It is certain that our Schulze, Phil. Wissenschaften, i. p. 16-17; human souls themselves are not always Anthropologie, § 61;-Denzinger, Instit. conscious of whatever they have in them. Log. §260, t. i. p. 226 (ed. 1824);-Beneke, Lehrb. d. Psych., § 96 sq. p. 72 (ed. 1833); Psych. Skizzen, i. p. 353-360;-Hibbert, Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions, P. iv. ch. 5, p. 284 sq. (2d edition); -Cardaillac, Etudes Elément. de Phil., t. ii. p. 124 sq. (See Damiron, Ess. sur P'Hist. de Phil., Supplément, p. 460 sq.) ;H. Schmid, Versuch, &c., pp. 23, 232 sq.; Damiron, Cours, &c., i. p. 190 (ed. 1834); Géruzez, N. Cours de Phil., p. 67;Biunde, Versuch, &c., i. p. 345 sq.;Reinhold, Theorie d. mensch. Erkenntniss u. Metaph., i. p. 279 sq.

Negative: Locke, Essay, B. ii. ch. i. § 10; Condillac, Sur l'Orig. des Connoiss. Hum., Sect. ii. c. 1. § 4-13 (On him see Merian in Hissmann's 'Magazin,' t. vi. p. 199);-Merian, Ueber die Apperzeption (Hissmann's Magazin,' i. p. 155 sq.);Tiedemann, Untersuchungen, i. p. 40 sq.; Psychologie (1804), p. 28-29;-Galluppi, Elementi di Filosofia, i. § 105 (ed. 1837); -Stewart, Elements, [Part i. ch. ii.-Coll. Works, vol. ii. p. 120 sq.]

We have all experience of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as also that we often continue a long series of bodily motions by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation.'-ED.] Arnauld (Oeuvres, t. xl. p. 173) attacks the hypothesis of thoughts of which we are not conscious, as held by That the Stahlians held Malebranche. obscure perceptions, see Camerarius, De Unione An. cum Corp., in Bilfinger, De Harm. Praestab., p. 273.

That Descartes denied Obscure Ideas, see Leibnitz, Principia Philosophiæ, (Monadologie) §§ 14, 20-23, and Canz, Psychologia, p. 820. Compare Descartes himself, Resp. ad Medit. iv. p. 158 (ed. 1658):-' Quod autem nihil in mente, quatenus est res cogitans, esse possit, cujus non sit conscia, per se notum mihi videtur, quia nihil in illa sic spectata esse intelligimus quod non sit cogitatio, vel a cogitatione dependens, alioqui enim ad mentem, quatenus est res cogitans, non pertineret; nec ulla potest in nobis esse cogitatio, cujus, eodem illo momento quo in nobis est, conscii non simus.

Quamobrem non

On the question generally, see the following authorities, in addition to those above referred to. Walch, Lexikon, i. p. 2034-5; Cæsar, De Animi et Obscur- dubito quin mens, statim atque infantis arum Ídearum Natura (Lipsia, 1789) corpore infusa est, incipiat cogitare, siomnino;-Ancillon, Mélanges, t. i. p. 40-mulque sibi suæ cogitationis conscia sit, 41;-Hennings, Von Geistern und Geistersehern (Leipzig, 1780) p. 3-5;-Feuerbach, Darstellung Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibnitz'schen Philosophie, §§ 6,7,p. 54 sq.

etsi postea ejus rei non recordetur, quia species istarum cogitationum memoriæ non inhærent.'

NOTE I.

ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERMS

CONSCIOUSNESS, ATTENTION, AND REFLECTION.

§ 1.-Extracts explanatory of Sir W. Hamilton's view of the distinction between Con sciousness, Attention, and Reflection, with special reference to the opinions of Reid and Stewart.

§ II.-Historical Notices of the use of the terms Consciousness, Attention, and Reflection.

[References. From I. P. 232 a, 239 b, 346 b, 347 b; from Supplementary Disser tations, 756 b, 775 b.]

[N.B. From the reference at p. 231 b, it appears that the Author had originally intended to include the history of Consciousness in Note H. Subsequently, however, he seems to have transferred it to Note I.-ED.]

(2.) From Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 236, 237.

"Taking, however, Attention and Reflection for acts of the same faculty, and supposing, with Mr Stewart, that reflection is properly attention directed to the phænomena of mind-observation, attention directed to the phænomena of matter; the main question comes to be considered, Is attention a faculty different from consciousness, as Reid and Stewart maintain?* ... Dr Reid has rightly said that attention is a voluntary act. This remark might have led him to the observation, that attention is not a separate faculty, or a faculty of intelligence at all, but merely an act of will or desire, subordinate to a certain law of intelligence. This law is, that the greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is the intensity with which it is able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct will be the information it obtains of the several objects. This law is expressed in the old adage,

(3.) From Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 247, 248.

"I think Reid and Stewart incorrect in asserting that attention is only a voluntary act, meaning by the expression voluntary, an act of free will. I am far from maintaining, as Brown and others do, that all will is desire; but still I am persuaded that we are frequently determined to an act of attention, as to many other acts, independently of our free and deliberate volition. Nor is it, I conceive, possible to hold that, though immediately determined to an act of attention by desire, it is only by the permission of our will that this is done; consequently, that every act of attention is still under the control of our volition. This I cannot maintain. Let us take an example:-When occupied with other matters, a person may speak to us, or the clock may strike, without our having any consciousness of the sound; but it is wholly impossible for us to remain in this state of unconsciousness intentionally and with will. We cannot determinately refuse to hear by voluntarily withholding our attention; and we can no more open our eyes, and, by an act of will, avert our mind from all perception of sight, than we can, by an act of will, cease to live. We may close our ears or shut our eyes, as we may commit suicide; but we cannot, with our organs unobstructed, wholly refuse our attention at will. It, therefore, appears to me the more correct doctrine to hold that there is no consciousness without attention,- without concen

'Pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus.' Such being the law, it follows that, when our interest in any particular object is excited, and when we wish to obtain all the knowledge concerning it in our power, it behoves us to limit our consideration to that object, to the exclusion of others. This is done by an act of volition or desire, which is called attention. But to view attention as a special act of intelligence, and to distinguish it from consci-tration, but that attention is of three deousness, is utterly inept. Consciousness may be compared to a telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes in accommodating the focus to the object; and we might, with equal justice, distinguish, in the eye, the adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of vision, as, in the mind, distinguish attention from consciousness as separate faculties. Not, however, that they are to be accounted the same. Attention is consciousness and something more. It is consciousness voluntarily applied, under its law of limitations, to some determinate object; it is consciousness concentrated."

Psych. Emp., § 257; Canz, Medit., § 841 (who makes Reflection twofold-external and internal); Destutt Tracy, Elémens d'Idéologie, t. i. pp. 81, 234, 442; Ancillon, Essais Philos., t. ii. p. 184.

* For Reid, see above, p. 239. For Stewart, see Collected Works, vol. ii. p. 134.-ED.

+ Cf. Steeb, Ueber den Menschen, ii. 673; Fries,

grees or kinds. The first, a mere vital and irresistible act; the second, an act determined by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by our will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate volition. An act of attention,-that is, an act of concentration,- seems thus necessary to every exertion of consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is requisite to every exercise of vision. We have formerly noticed, that discrimination is a condition of consciousness; and a discrimination is only possible by a concentrative act, or act of attention. This, however, which corresponds to the lowest degree, to the mere vital or automatic act of attention, has been refused the name; and attention, in contradistinction to this mere automatic contraction, given to the two other degrees, of which, however, Reid only recognises the third.

"Attention, then, is to consciousness,

Anthropologie, i. 83; and Schulze, Ueber die what the contraction of the pupil is to

menschliche Erkenntniss, p. 65.

sight; or to the eye of the mind, what the

microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye. The faculty of attention is not, therefore, a special faculty, but merely consciousness acting under the law of limitation to which it is subjected. But, whatever be its relations to the special faculties, attention doubles all their efficiency, and affords them a power of which they would otherwise be destitute. It is, in fact, as we are at present constituted, the primary condition of their activity."

[The following translation from the Commentary of Philoponus on the De Anima, (L. iii. c. 2,) has been found among the Author's papers. This passage is noticed in Discussions, p. 51, Lectures on Metaphysics, i. p. 201, as "the first indication in the history of philosophy, of that false analysis which has raised Attention into a separate faculty."-Ed.]

"But the more recent interpreters, standing not in awe of the frown of Alexander, not listening to Plutarchus, and even repelling Aristotle himself, have devised a new interpretation. They say that it is the function of the attentive part (Tov ПроσеKтIKой μÉрous) of the rational soul to take cognisance of the energies of sense. For, according to them, the rational soul not only comprehends the faculties of intelligence (vous), thought (diavola), opinion (dóga), will (Bouλnois), and election (poaipedis), they also thrust into it another sixth faculty, which they call that of Attention. The attention, they say, assists in all that goes on in man. It is that which pronounces I understand, I think, I opine, I resent, I desire. The attentive function of the rational soul, in fact, pervades in all the powers without exception -the rational, the irrational, and the vegetative. If then, they proceed, the attentive faculty be thus thorough-going, why not let it accompany the sensations and pronounce of them, I see, I hear, &c. for to do this is the peculiar office of what is recognisant of the several energies. If, therefore, it be the attention which pronounces this, attention will be the power which takes note of the energies of sense. For it behoves that what takes note of all should itself be indivisible and one; seeing also at the same time that the subject of all these operations, Man, is one. if this faculty took cognisance of these objects, that faculty of those others, it would be, as he himself [Aristotle] elsewhere says, as if you perceived that, I this. That, therefore, must be one to which the attentive function appertains ;

For,

for this function is conversant with the

faculties-both the cognitive and the vital
[practical ?].* In so far as it is conversant
with the cognitive energies it is called
Attention. Hence, when we would cor
rect a person whose mind is wandering
from any intellectual occupation, we cali
out to him, Attend! When, on the other
hand, it has to do with the life [and moral
action?] it is called Conscience (σvveidos,
not σúvodos). Hence in the tragedy,
[Men. How now? What illness quells thee!
Orest.]-Intelligence! for I am conscious of my
dreadful deed.'†

Attention is therefore that which is cog-
nisant of our sensitive energies. And Plu
tarchus (they say) falsely attributed this
function to opinion (dóga). For what is
cognisant of the operations of all the
But opinion
faculties behoves to be one.
does not take cognisance of the energies
of intelligence (vous). For opinion does
not say I intelligise (èvónoa), or even i
reason (dievońony); for although it may
say I opine, I am indignant, it is unable
to contemplate the energies of the higher
faculties."-[Sign. O. v., ed. Venet. 1535

§ II.-Historical notices of the use of the
terms Consciousness, Attention, Rela
tion.

[Nothing appears to have been written on this subject, except what has been already published in the Lectures on Mete physics, vol. i. pp. 196, 201, and pp. 234, 235. The following references have been found among the Author's papers.—ED.]

Συναίσθησις-συναισθάνομαι.

along with.
1°. Sympathy, fellow-feeling, to feel

Plutarch, Solon, Opera, i. p. 88 (ed
1599).

[De Adul. et Amici Discr.], ii. p. 63, Clemens Alex., Strom. L. i. p. 282 (ed

1688); L. ii. p. 383. 2°. Having a common knowledge with others.

Plutarch, Agis et Cleon, Opera, i. 892

[De Adul. et Amici Discr.], ii. 54. 3°. To feel as a bodily affection-a

* By vital ((wrik@v) Philoponus means appe-
tent. See Introduction.
[Προοίμιον, 1. 3 κ
τῶν δὲ ὀρεκτικῶν καὶ ζωτικῶν ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ
Ovμós, dè émiovμía.—ED.]

Euripides, Orest., 395:-
ΜΕΝ. Τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσα

νόσος ;
OP. Η ξύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δείν' εἰργασ
μένος.-ED.