3.-PETRARCH, De Contemptu Mundi, Dial. i., Opera, ed. Basilea 1581, pp. 334, 335, has conscientia, [but in a moral sense for conscience.]

4.-KECKERMANN.-Opera, t. i. pp. 342, 731, 798. He says there is a practical and a speculative consciousness. See also his Organi Aristotelis Analysis, pp. 103, 158, 159. 5.-DESCARTES was the first to give currency to the word in his definition of thought as everything of which we are conscious, i.e. equivalent to consciousness. [Princ. P. i. § 9. Cogitationis nomine intelligo illa omnia quæ nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est.']

Conscience (French and English)—

Used as convertible with 'pensée' by DE LA FORGE, Traité de l'Esprit, p. 14. Je vous dirai donc que je prens ici la Pensée pour cette perception, conscience, ou connoissance intérieure que chacun de nous ressent immédiatement par soi même, quand il s'aperçoit de ce qu'il fait ou de ce qui se passe en lui.']

On French Conscience,' see foot-note in COSTE'S Translation of Locke's Essay, B. ii. ch. 27, § 9, [p. 264, 5th ed. 1755.]

HOOKER, Eccles. Polity, ii. 7. § 2, speaks of the 'conscience of their own ignorance' as in the 'simpler sort.'

II. ATTENTION.

[Attention is recognised as a special faculty by]

some

1.-PHILOPONUS.-In Arist. De Anima, p. 167 [Lat. Transl., Lugd. 1544; Sign. V., Gr. ed. Venet. 1535], where is noticed at length the opinion of recent interpreters,' with whom he agrees touching TO TрOσEKTIKOV (μÉрos), which, in their view, includes both Consciousness and Attention-if not Reflection. [See above, p. 942 a.-ED.]

2.-MICHAEL EPHESIUS (or EUSTRATIUS). In Arist. Eth. Nic. L. ix. c. 9 (f. 160 b, ed. Gr. 1536; p. 388, ed. Feliciani, 1542.)

3.By MICHAEL PSELLUS, προσοχὴ 13 De Omnifaria Doctrina, § 46. Пpoσoxǹ dé mentioned as a middle faculty of mind. ἐστι καθ ̓ ἣν προσέχομεν τοῖς ἔργοις οἷς πράττομεν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις οἷς λέγομεν.

Mr Stewart (Elem. i. c. 2-Coll. Works, vol. ii. p. 122) thinks that no psychologist

has treated of Attention as a separate faculty. But see Wolf, Condillac, Canzius (Meditationes, 709), Bonnet, Contzen, among modern philosophers, and of ancient as above. [Compare Lectures on Metaphysies, vol. i. p. 235-6.-ED.]

On Attention as faculty of directing and concentrating Consciousness, see De Raei, Clavis Philosophiæ Naturalis, p. 273 (where Scaliger, Aristotle, and Descartes); Fries, Anthropologie, i. p. 83 sq.; Kant, Anthropologie, [§ 3 sq.; and Menschenkunde, ed. Starke, p. 53.-ED.]

On Attention in general, see St Augustin (in Duhamel, p. 488).* He notices well

*The passage of St Augustin is from the De Musica, L. vi. c. 5. 'Et ne longum faciam, videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones, sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod

sentire dicitur.

Cum autem ab

eisdem suis operationibus aliquid patitur, a seip

sa patitur, non a corpore; sed plane cum se accommodat corpori: et ideo apud se ipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est. Conversa ergo a Domino suo ad servum suum, necessario deficit: conversa item a servo suo ad Dominum suum, necessario proficit, et præbet eidem servo facillimam vitam, et propterea minime operosam et negotiosam, ad quam propter summam quietem nulla detorqueatur attentio; sicut est affectio corporis quæ sanitas dicitur: nulla quippe attentione nostra opus habet, non quia nihil tunc agit anima in corpore, sed quia nihil facilius agit. Nam in omnibus operibus nostris tanto quidquam attentius, quanto difficilius operamur. Quoted by Duhamel, De Corpore Animato, Lib. i. cap. 2.-ED. 30

Hieronymus, Adv. Jovin. ii. 9. Quod mens videat et mens audiat, et quod nec audire quidpiam nec videre possimus, nisi sensus in ea quæ cernimus et audimus fuerit intentus, vetus quoque sententia est.' Plinius, Hist. Nat., L. xi. c. 54. Animo autem videmus, animo cernimus: oculi, ceu vasa quædam, visibilem ejus partem accipiunt atque transmittunt, &c.' | Cicero, Acad. Quæst. iv. c. 10. 'Mens ipsa quæ sensuum fons est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea quibus (Quoted in Mazure, Etudes,

movetur.'

&c. i. p. 77.)

Laromiguière makes Attention a power of intellect. Cousin reprehends this (De Biran, Nouv. Consid., préf., p. xxix.) and makes it a power of will.

Πρόσεξις, συντονία ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ κατα· paleiv. Definitiones Platonicæ.

III.-REFLECTION.

Mr Stewart (Dissertation, Note YColl. Works, vol. i. p. 556: compare Essays, Parti. Ess. i. ch. 1-Coll. Works, vol. v. p. 56) says that 'Mr Locke seems to have considered the use of the word reflection as peculiar to himself;' and does not himself know that it is common to the whole School philosophy.t

1.-ST AUGUSTIN (in De la Forge, De l'Esprit, préf., p. xiv.; who himself uses 'réflexion,' préf., p. xi.) This passage of St Augustin probably suggested to Leibnitz

Vives says:-'Et ut necessarium est ad cernendum, ut sit oculus apertus; ita et intelligentiæ, ad intelligendum, necessaria est attentio, seu adversio quædam animi, quod Græcis dicitur προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. Hæc est veluti mentis quædam apertio, ad recipiendum quod offertur.' -ED.

We have the scholastic dictum-' Reflexiva cogitatio facile est deflexiva'-pointing at the difficulty of turning inwards upon self.-Keckermann, Opera, t. i. p. 406.—[Compare Lectures on Metaphysics, i. p. 234.-ED.]

his acute rejoinder to the argument against innate principles-nisi intellectus ipse."*

2.-DUNS SCOTUS, Super Universalibus Porphyrii, qu. iii., where our knowledge is said to be either from sense or from reflection, just as Locke. ['Ad tertium dico quod illa propositio Aristotelis, nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, vera est de eo quod est primum intelligibile, quod est scilicet quod quid est rei materialis, non autem de omnibus per se intelligibilibus; quia multa per se intelligun tur, non quia speciem faciunt in sensu, sed per reflexionem intellectus.']+

3.-Durandus, In Sent. L. ii. Disp. iii. qu. 6. § 21, says that Reflection on the operations of our minds affords certain knowledge, and that it is experimental.

4.-J. C. SCALIGER, De Subtilitate, Exerc. cccvii. § 2. ['Intellectus noster non intelligit se per speciem sicuti cetera entia materialia, sed per reflexionem,' &c.] See also §§ 18, 28; and Exerc. ccxcviii. § 14.

5.-MELANCHTHON, De Anima, ed. Lugd. 1555, p. 183. ['Intellectus est potentia cognoscens, judicans, et ratiocinans,.. habens et actum reflexum quo suas actiones cernit et judicat, et errata emendare potest.']

6. FRACASTORIUS, De Intellectione, L. ii., Opera, f. 137. 'Reflectente se intellectu super conceptus factos.'

7.-GUL. CAMERARIUS, Select. Disp. Philos. (Paris, 1630), p. 27, discusses the question whether entia rationis-relationes rationis are made by a direct or by a reflex act of the intellect. That made by a reflex act held by the Thomists.

*The passage of Augustin is from the spuri treatise, De Spiritu et Anima, c. 32: Mens e cui nihil seipsa præsentius est, quadam interi non simulata, sed vera præsentia, videt se in ** Nihil enim tam novit mens quam id quod

præsto est; nee menti quidquam magis pra est, quam ipsa sibi. Nam cognoscit se vives. se meminisse, se intelligere, se velle, cogita“, scire, judicare. Hæc omnia novit in se, nec i ginatur, quasi extra se illa aliquo sensu corp tetigerit, sicut corporalia quæque tanguntur. quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut aliquid sese putet; quidquid ei de se reman hoc solum ipsa est. Nihil enim tam in me est, quam ipsa mens; nec quidquam sic men cognoscit, quemadmodum mens, &c.'-Cf. 1* Trinitate, L. x. c. 8.—ED.

By the Scotists the act of intellect was ** garded as threefold-rectus, reflexus, and collaturus, See Constantius (a Sarnano), Tract. de Secundis Intentionibus, ad calcem Scoti Operum, p. 452, and Castanæus, Distinctiones Philosophica, Lugd. Bat. 1651, pp. 11, 151.

* Compare Goclenius, Adversaria ad Scaligeri Exercitationes (1594), p. 192.

8.-BERNARDUS, Thes. Plat., vv. Intellectus, Conversio, Circulus.

9.-JORDANUS BRUNUS, De Imaginum Signorum et Idearum Compositione, Dedicatio, p. iv. [See above, p. 938 a.-ED.] 10.PHILIPPUS MOCENICUs, Contemplationes Philosophica (1581), has the word in all its forms, passim.

11.-KECKERMANN, Systema Physicum, L. iv. cc. 3, 5 (Opera, ed. 1614, t. i. pp. 1600, 1612.)

12.-GOCLENIUS, Lexicon Philosophicum (Lat.), ed. Francof. 1613, v. Reflexus. 'Reflecti, 1°, Proprie est vel rursus seu iterum flecti, vel retro flecti. 2°, Translate est revocari, reprimi, sedari, cui opponitur incitari. Sic Cicero usurpavit, vide Nizolium. 3°, Tralatitium etiam est, quod Physici Reflexionem intellectui tribuunt. Reflexio enim intellectus eis est, cum, postquam intellectus concepit rem aliquam, rursus concipit se concepisse eam, et considerat ac metitur, qua certitudine et modo illam cognoverit, et, si opus fuerit, iterum atque iterum convertit se seu revertitur ad se et ad actus suos. (Hoc dicunt Scholastici reflecti supra actus ipsos reflexos.) Quod argumento est, intellectum esse divinum et immaterialem. Breviter, Reflexio intellectus est intima actio, qua recognoscit tum seipsum, tum suos actus et suas species.

'Itaque Reflecti metaphorice etiam tribuitur motui mentis, quo mens quasi in se redit. Aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, (id est, similitudinem acceptam in intellectu de re intellecta, quam verba exteriora significant,) quod intellectus facit dum supra opus suum reflectitur: This passage is commented on by Wolf, Psych.

Emp. § 257; Wolf wrong.

13.-D. BUCHANAN, Hist. An. Hum. (Paris, 1637), pp. 114, 250 that reflection necessarily of an inorganic faculty. 14.-DESCARTES (in Gruyer, Essais Philosophiques, t. iv. p. 118). [Epist. P. ii. ep. 6.-ED.]

-

15. GASSENDI, Physica, Sect. iii., Memb. Post., L. ix. c. 3 (Opera, Leyden, 1658, t. ii. p. 451): ‘Ad secundam vero operationem praesertim spectat ipsa intellectus ad suam operationem attentio, redexiove illa supra actionem propriam, qua se intelligere intelligit, cogitatve se cogitare.'

16.DUHAMEL, Philosophia Burgundiæ, t. i. pp. 617, 621, 651, 652, 655, (4th ed. Lond. 1685.)

The origin of the word Reflection may perhaps be traced to Aristotle's comparison of a straight and spiral or crooked

line-De Anima, L. iii. c. 4, text 10: compared with Averroes, in locum (Aristotelis Opera, Venetiis, 1560, t. vii. p. 108), and Ant. Andreas, Quæst. Metaph., L. vii. qu. 13.

Ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς ἑαυτό– τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν-τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιOTρévaι. [Used by] Plotinus, Enn. v. L. iii. c. 1, 8, et alibi; Proclus, Institut. Theol. [cc. 15, 32, 33, 42, 43, et alibi]; Philoponus, In Arist. De Anima, Sign, A. iv. ;* compare Sign. B. v., ed. Venet. 1535; Simplicius, In Arist. De Anima, f. 52, ed. Ald. 1527.+

PHRASES:-Plotinus, Enn. i. L. iv. c. 10—'H àvtíλnyis čoikev elvai kal yíyveolaı, ἀνακάμπτοντος τοῦ νοήματος, καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον àπwobévtos máλiv, K. T. X. St Augustin, De Immortalitate Animæ, c. 4 (Opera, ed. Benedict., t. i. p. 390), Intentionem in ante cogitata reflectere.' Balde, Lyrica, L. i. Ode 22,- Mira potentiæ Figura mens in se reflexa. Ficinus (in Bernardi Thes. Plat., v. Circulus),—' Animadversio mentis in seipsam.'

* Οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γιγ νώσκει, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται· οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν ἑαυτὴν ἡ χεὶρ, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν σωμάτων. Αλλ ̓ οὐδὲ αἱ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις, καίτοι ἀσώματοι οὖσαι, ἑαυτὰς ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὄψις ἢ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἡ αἴσθησις, οὐδὲ ζητεῖ ποίας ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἀλλ ̓ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν ζητῶν. Ἡ μέντοι ψυχὴ ἡ λογικὴ αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν γινώσκει· αὕτη γοῦν ἐστὶν ἡ ζητοῦσα, αὕτη ἡ ζητουμένη, αὕτη ἡ εὑρίσκουσα, αὕτη ἡ εὑρισκομένη, ἡ γινώσκουσα καὶ γινωσκομένη· ἀσώματος ἄρα ἐναργῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

-ED.

† Τὸ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀνθρώπου μοι μόνον ἴδιον εἶναι δοκεῖ λογικῆς γὰρ ζωῆς ἔργον τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρεπτικόν. Καὶ δείκνυται διὰ τοῦδε καὶ μέχρι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡμῶν τὸ λογικὸν διήκον· εἴγε καὶ αἴσθησις ἡ ἀνθρωπεία ἑαυ τῆς ἀντιληπτική· γιγνώσκει γάρ πως ἑαυτὸ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, ὅτε αἰσθανόμενον ἑαυτὸ γνωρίζει· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπιστρέφον πρὸς

ἑαυτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὄν and then he shews that this is a power higher than a bodily faculty, and therefore separable from body; for the particles of body, lying each without the other, cannot be converged (σvvvevoɩ) on self.