others admitting them for Intellect, denied them for Sense. * Some again, according them in Sense, limited their admission to the external senses; while in these, few allowed them in all; smell, taste, and touch being usually supposed to require nothing vicarious of their objects. +

Opinions touching the Intelligible Species were divided into two hostile classes, according as the many maintained the intelligible species and the intellection to be two things really distinguished from each other, in nature and in time; while the few denied intelligible species as aught really different from, or existent before or after, intellection.§

Joannes Bacconius, (In i. Sent. Prolog. qu. 2, art.

2, § 5;)-Gotfredus, (Quodl. ix. qu. 19;)—Henricus

Gandavensis, (Quodl. iv. qu. 7, 8; Quodl. v. qu. 14.)

In the former class, however, opinions differed; some holding that the intellect had a peculiar species, as a peculiar operation, of its own; while others maintained, that, though it energised after its own fashion, it did this only in turning towards the phantasmata or species of internal sense, which thus served, in a sort, as vicarious objects to the higher as to the lower faculties of cognition.* According to the former opinion, (which was the one generally adopted, and of which Aquinas and Scotus were illustrious leaders), the species impressa is something superadded to the intellect, being a certain spiritual accident elaborated by the active intellect from the rude material of phantasms, and impressed in the passive intellect as its subject; and, while preceding the act of intellection in the order of time, is preserved in the faculty after the cessation of its act, ready to be

* See Gregorius Ariminensis, In i. Sent., Dist.

iii. qu. 2; In ii. Sent., Dist. vii. qu. 3. Cf. Dan dinus, De Corpore Animato, ff. 1153, 1981. For various theories, see Philippus a S. Trinitate, Summa Philosophica, Lugd. 1648, p. 581. [He mentions, as denying species in sense, Galen, Plotinus, and others; in intellect, Themistius and others; in both, Ockam, Biel, Durandus, and others. See also Toletus, In Arist. De Anima, L. ii. qu. 33; L. iii. qu. 21.-ED.]

This is partially done by F. Bona Spei, (Physica, Pars iv. Disp. vi. § 32; Disp. x. § 2,) who allows species in the sense of sight, while he agrees with the nominalists in rejecting them for the internal senses. On the other hand, they are maintained in both by Suarez, Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Tellez, Murcia, Poncius, Fromondus, and, in general, by the Thomists and Scotists. [The nominalist doctrine, however, as regards the internal senses, has been variously represented. See Toletus, In Arist. De Anima, Lib. ii. qu. 33; Dandinus, De Corpore Animato, f. 1153. -ED.]

See Arriaga, Curs. Phil., De Anima, Disp. iv.; Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia, De Anima, Disp. xii. Sect. 1. Cf. Vallesius, Controv. Medic. et Philos., L. ii. c. 81. Thus in those senses in which objective perception predominates, species were usually given; in those in which subjective sensation predominates, they were usually denied.

§ That species (intelligible) are only modifications of the mind itself, see Melanchthon, De Anima, [De Intellectu, p. 187, ed. Lugd. 1555]; Piccolomineus, De Mente Humana, L. iii. c. 7. Some of the Schoolmen held them to have no entity, and that intellectual cognition was only a

cording to the latter opinion, (of which Henry of Ghent and Joannes Bacconius were the original representatives), there is no species impressed in, no new quality superadded to, the passive intellect; the phantasms alone, as sublimated by the active intellect, and (by reference to the phantasy) under the name of species expressæ, being held sufficient to cause or to occasion intellection.+

As to the modes of the operations of the Active Intellect on the phantasms, in spiritualising the material, in denuding the singular of its individuating conditionsprocesses necessary, on either opinion, to assimilate the faculty and its object-as was to be expected, all is vague, and varying, and controversial. [This indeed is the case with the details of the theory in general, as regards both sensible and intelligible species: the following varieties of opinion may be cited as instances.]

Some held that the mind had the power within itself of suggesting or creating the species, when determined to this act by the external affection of the senses. Some held that the mind had innate

habit or certain relation to an object present. See Casmann, Psychol. Anthropol., p. 101. (Note in Author's Common-Place Book.)

*See Conimbricenses, In Arist. De Anima, pp. 429, 430.-ED.

See above, p. 954, note ↑.

See on this point Zabarella, De Rebus Naturalibus, p. 1008.

species, which were merely excited by the impression of the outward object.*

Some held, with St Austin, in regard to intelligible species, that we know everything in the divine intellect, rationibus æternis, like Malebranche.+

Some held that the Active Intellect did not exist.

The Nominalists in general held the Active and Passive Intellects to be only the same power in two different relations. Indeed, after Scotus and St Austin, they allowed the various faculties to be neither really distinct from the soul nor from each other, but all to be only the same indivisible principle operating differently only as operating in different respects. §

Some held the substantial distinction of the Active and Passive Intellects; and of these, some held that the Active Intellect is a substance distinct from the human mind, and that it is one and the same in all men, and not different from God; while others maintained the unity of the passive or possible intellect really separate from the mind of the individual, but assisting it and conjoined by the images in the phantasy: from these images, illuminated by its light, they held that the intellect receives the intelligible species,

* Avicenna and other Arabians, Albertus Magnus in some degree. See Genuensis, Elementa Metaphysica (Venet. 1748), Pars ii. pp. 143, 144. † Genuensis, 1. c. [who cites St Thomas, Summa, Pars i. Qu. 84, art. 5. But see below, Note P.-ED.]

Durandus, Isaacus Narbonensis, and others.

[See Conimbricenses, In De Anima, p. 417.-ED.]

§ See St Augustin, De Trinitate, L. x. c. 11.

Hæc tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitæ, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiæ sunt, sed una substantia.' Cf. Pseudo-Augustin, De Spiritu et Anima, c. 13. 'Dicitur anima, dum vegetat; spiritus, dum contemplatur; sensus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; dum intelligit, mens; dum discernit, ratio; dum recordatur, memoria; dum consentit, voluntas. Ista tamen non differunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus; quoniam omnia ista una anima est: proprietates quidem diversa, sed essentia una.' The same view is maintained by Scotus, In ii. Sent., Dist. xvi. qu. 1; and, among the Nominalists, by Ockam, In ii. Sent. qu. 24; Gregorius Ariminensis, In ii. Sent., Dist. xvi. qu. 3; Biel, In ii. Sent., Dist. xvi. qu. 1. Other authorities are also quoted by F. Bone Spei, Physica, Pars iv. Disp. iii. § 4.--ED.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Priscianus Lydus, also Avicenna, Avempace, and Marinus, a Greek mentioned by Philoponus. (These three last however did not identify it with God.)- Cajetanus and Zabarella. [See Conimbricenses, In De Anima, p. 417; Genuensis, Elem. Metaph., ii. p. 145.-ED.]

| by which 'consignatus,' it obtains a knowledge of things.*

Some held that species were not the natural effluxions from the objects, but the supernatural production of some higher power.†

Questions without number were agitated concerning the nature of the species: whether immediately or mediately produced; whether substance or accident, or between both; whether possessing real or only representative existence; whether themselves the objects or only the conditions of perception; whether formally or really different from their objects; whether those of the sense were material or spiritual; whether material in subjecto and spiritual in modo; whether virtual or formal in their similitude; whether divisible objectively or subjectively; whether they multiply themselves in the external medium; whether proper to the cognitive faculties, or common also to those of will, &c., &c.

The doctrine, however, of Intentional Species continued, notwithstanding its manifest incongruities, to be the dominant and orthodox opinion in the schools of philosophy until after the middle of the seventeenth century, when it sunk under the new spirit of inquiry which at that period had been excited in all the departments of human knowledge. It was chiefly to the arguments of Hobbes, Gassendi, Berigard, and Descartes, that we owe the final refutation of this doctrine; and the theory was perhaps the more easily abandoned, that the new hypothesis of a subjective representation in our perception of material objects, which was then introduced by the last of these philosophers, afforded, as it seemed, à more intelligible explanation of the great problem in regard to the origin of our knowledge of an external world. Traces of the ancient theory may still be found in some of the philosophical speculations of a later age, but from the period of Des

* Averroes, apud Conimbricenses, In De Anima, p. 107. A similar view was held by Themistius, De Anima, Lib. i. cont. 60; Lib. iii. cont. 20. [ff. 70, 90, ed. Ald.] Simplicius, not very different; see Simpl. In De Anima, Lib. iii. cont. 2. [L. 62, ed. Ald.] On these, compare Cardan, De Animarum Immortalitate, Opera, Lugd. 1663, vol. ii. p. 505, who notices some differences of detail between them. [See also Zabarella, De Rebus Naturalibus, p. 962.-ED.]

↑ Buccaferreus made heaven the cause of species; Suessanus, God. See Berigard, Cireulus Pisanus (1661), p. 656. [The opinions of Suessanus and Buccaferreus are examined at some length by Zabarella, De Rebus Naturalibus, p. 833.-ED.]

cartes we may confidently affirm that the hypothesis of a representative perception where the immediate object was something different from the mind--had been almost universally superseded by the representative hypothesis, in which the vicarious object was held only for a modifica tion of the mind itself.* The nomenclature of the ancient theory was not, however, abandoned along with the reality; and many even of the followers of Descartes continued to employ the terms species, image, &c., when the acceptation in which they had been originally employed had become obsolete.t

*On the ambiguity in the Cartesian use of the term idea, see above, p. 273. On the subordinate question, whether the mental modification has any existence apart from the act of consciousness, the opinion of Descartes was variously interpreted by his followers. See Discussions, p. 74. Some exceptions may also be noted in those philoso

phers, such as Newton and Clarke, who main

tained the hypothesis of images in the brain. See

above, p. 273, and Discussions, p. 80.-ED.

↑ De la Forge occurs first to my recollection; but the following passage from Chauvin, who flourished not long posterior to Descartes, may supply the place of other references. 'Sunt ta men inter Recentiores philosophos non pauci qui retinent nomenclationes speciei impressæ et expressæ. Illis autem species impressa nihil aliud est, quam motus aliquis ab objectis mediate, vel

immediate, exterioribus corporis partibus impressus, indeque per nervos ad cerebrum transmissus; vel certa fibrarum cerebri commotio, ex spirituum animalium, in cerebro decurrentium, agitatione procedens: quæ, cum nullam habeant cum rebus objectis naturæ similitudinem, nulla alia de causa earum habentur repræsentamina, quam quod ipsorum occasione mens res sibi faciat præsentes, easdemque in ideis suis exinde nascentibus contempletur. Expressa verc species nihil aliud quicquam est, præter eam animi notionem, quæ ad speciei impressæ presentiam exprimitur, cujusque attentione et intuitu res ipsa cognoscitur.' Lexicon Rationale, sive Thesaurus Philosophicus, v. Species Intelligibilis.

and the organ a species wholly diverse in nature from itself and previous to the act of sensitive perception-this is disproved on the principle that a plurality of causes is not to be postulated without necessity. For there is no necessity to warrant the hypothesis of such species; it being impossible to assign any manifest and sufficient reason for its adoption. Such a reason must proceed, either on the ground of experience, or of some self-evident principle a priori. Not the former

for as the advocates of this theory admit, that Species are not themselves perceived, we have consequently no possible experience of their existence, as a fact. Not the latter for the principle that the mover and the moved must coexist in reciprocal propinquity, is incompetent to legitimate the assumption. For," &c. -the demonstration I must omit. Ockam, In Sent. L. ii. qu. 18 F.; Biel, In Sent. L. ii. dist. iii. qu. 2 E. Compare also Durandus, In Sent. L. ii. dist. iii. qu. 6, $ 15.

2. "That in the outer sense, either organ or faculty, there is impressed a Species previous to the sensitive act and necessary for its causation, is disproved, like the foregoing assumption, on the score of its gratuity. For to determine such an act in the organ of the external sense, there is required alone the material object and the unimpeded sensitive power." Ockam, Biel, ll. cc.; Durandus 1. c. § 21.

3. "Moreover, if such Species were admitted as a concause with the sensitive power in producing the act of sensitive perception, it would be a natural cause. Suppose then that by God it were preserved in the sense, the object represented by it being annihilated. On this hypothesis, the Species would, along with the power, continue to cause the act of sensitive perception, seeing that it remains unchanged either in its existence or in its nature. But the act of sensitive perception is an intuitive cognition, and there would thus naturally be determined an inwhich is impossible." Ockam, Biel, ll. cc.* tuitive cognition of a non-existent object;

*It should have been added-there would thus also be rendered problematical the existence of an external world; but Idealism, as such a consequence, was not yet developed.-It ought, however, to have been shewn, that the hypothesis of Species in sensible perception is in truth a negation of a true intuitive, or immediate, apprehension of external things. But the same objection might have been brought against Ockam's own doctrine of perception; nor did this escape the observation of another acute nominalist and