and iv. 2, p. 93. 'Mechanical= concatenation of mere efficient causes, which eo ipso is a necessary concatenation; as also a necessary concatenation is, so far as it is necessary, eo ipso a mechanical.' [The following extracts from Aquinas and his commentator Cajetanus appear to have been intended for the present Note. A portion of the latter has been translated in Discussions, p. 627.—ED.] AQUINAS. Summa totius Theologiæ, Pars Prima, Quæstio xxii., Articulus 4. Utrum providentia rebus provisis necessitatem imponat. "1°. Videtur quod divina providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat. Omnis enim effectus qui habet aliquam causam per se, quæ jam est vel fuit, ad quam de necessitate sequitur, provenit ex necessitate, ut Philosophus probat in sexto Metaphysicorum. Sed providentia Dei (cum sit æterna) præexistit, et ad eam sequitur effectus de necessitate: non enim potest divina providentia frustrari. Ergo providentia divina necessitatem rebus provisis imponit." (Having stated a second and third argument which might be advanced in favour of the affirmative, and one which had been employed in support of the negative, Aquinas proceeds to pronounce his own decision of the question, and to refute the three reasonings opposed to it. The passage to be quoted from his Commentator has exclusive reference to his answer to the first of these.) "Respondeo, dicendum, quod providentia divina quibusdam rebus necessitatem imponit, non autem omnibus, ut quidam crediderunt. Ad providentiam enim pertinet ordinare res in finem. Post bonitatem autem divinam, quæ est finis a rebus separatus, principale bonum in rebus ipsis existens est perfectio universi: quæ quidem non esset, si non omnes gradus essendi invenirentur in rebus. Unde ad divinam providentiam pertinet omnes gradus entium producere. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus præparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario evenirent; quibusdam vero causas contingentes, ut evenirent contingenter, secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.t *L. v. c. 3, ed. Bekker.-ED. "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod effectus divinæ providentia non solum est aliquid evenire quocunque modo, sed aliquid evenire, vel contingenter, vel necessario. Et ideo evenit infallibiliter et necessario, quod divina providentia disponit evenire infallibiliter et necessario: et evenit contingenter, quod divinæ providentiæ ratio habet, ut contingenter eveniat." CAJETANUS." In responsione ad primum, dubitatio occurrit valde ardua, et forte ab humano intellectu insolubilis. Ad cujus evidentiam, ut melius percipiatur in quo consistit dubitatio, advertendum est quod aliud est (1°) 'A contingenter evenire,' et aliud est (2°) A necessario evenire,' et aliud est (3°) ‘A infallibiliter seu inevitabiliter evenire;' tam primum enim quam secundum importat ordinem effectus ad causam in actu positam; illud quidem, quod sua causa habet potentiam ad utrumlibet; hoc vero, quod sua non potest deficere ab ipsius causalitate: sed tertium communius est utroque, quoniam et contingentia et necessaria sequuntur divinam providentiam positam in actu infallibiliter, seu inevitabiliter; et cum hoc illa sequuntur contingenter, et ista necessario. Ex his enim, quamvis quiescat intellectus, attendens ad responsionem in Litera positam circa salvationem contingentiæ, fluctuat tamen circa connexionem prædictæ infallibilitatis cum libero arbitrio, imo, ut rectius loquar, cum libero eventu ipsarum operationum, quas liberas dici mus, et similiter cum ambiguo eventu contingentium aliorum. "Cum enim in operatione libera sit considerare ipsam voluntatem, illius causam, et eventum, seu executionem ipsius nunc, ita quod non opposite; * quamvis difficile non sit salvare naturam talis causæ (scilicet libera) cum prædicta infallibilitate, eo quia hujusmodi infallibilitas nihil dat vel aufert causæ ad utrumlibet: sed [tamen] (cum ipsa stat, quod causa habeat potentiam indifferentem ad illud infallibile et ad ejus oppositum, et propter hoc, divina providentia non adimat contingentiam a rebus) verum salvare prædictam infalli the Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. v. of Providence, § 2—“ Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly: yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently." See also chap. iii. § 1. "Ita quod non opposite;" "so that there should be no inconsistency among them." There is per + Aquinas is here followed by the authors of haps, however, some omission. bilitatem cum indifferentia seu libertate executionis seu eventus-hoc opus, hic labor est. Si enim infallibile est, me diluculo primo futuro scribere; quamvis potentiam habeam ad utrumlibet, (id est, ad scribendum tunc, vel ad non scribendum tunc); attamen potentia ista atque libertas non exbit in actum negationis scribendi, sed affirmationis, sic quod inevitabile est quin affirmatio eveniat. Et si sic est, cum jam ab æterno divina providentia sit in actu determinata respectu omnium, et immutabilis et infallibilis, &c.-sequitur quod, de facto, omnia inevitabiliter eveniant, quamvis quædam contingenter, et quædam necessario. Notanter autem dixi, de facto, quia de possibili, absolute loquendo, potest Deus non determinare providentiam suam ad hæc, vel illa futura. Sed cum jam determinata est, repugnat immutabilitati efficaciæ, universalitati atque certitudini suæ, evitabilitas evenientium. Et si omnia inevitabiliter eveniunt de facto, ut quid consiliamur et conamur ad hæc magis quam illa prosequenda vel vitanda? Nil enim minus videtur ex hoc destrui pars moralis, omnisque conatus Ecclesiæ atque exhortatio ad bonum, quam ex negatione contingentiæ. Quamvis enim negatio evitabilitatis, et negatio contingentiæ non æquivaleant, ut jam patet ex dictis, quoad proposita tamen inconvenientia æqualiter videntur. Nullus enim consiliatur de inevitabili, nec aliquis conatur, aut hortatur, aut orat circa inevitabilia. "Ad hanc dubitationem nihil scriptum reperi in S. Thoma; quoniam nullibi eum movisse hanc recolo, sed semper studuit ad salvandam contingentiam. In aliis quoque Doctoribus nihil hactenus comperi ad quæstionem istam, nisi quæ communiter dicuntur de sensu composito et diviso-de necessitate consequentiæ et consequentis-de libertate electionis divinæ in æternitatedeque natura causarum ad utrumlibet in universo inventarum. Sed hæc omnia, ut ex dictis patet, intellectum non quietant; quoniam, ut jam dictum est, non de Deo secundum se considerato, sed secundum quod de facto est; et similiter non de ipsis naturis causarum aut rerum, nec de necessitate aut contingentia, sed de compossibilitate inevitabilium eventuum cum contingentia et libertate eorundem, est quæstio. Non enim satisfit quæsito, dicendo, quod actus eveniens est evitabilis et inevitabilis:-evitabilis quidem secundum se; inevitabilis vero secundum quod est provisus. Licet enim hoc sit verum, non tamen solvit nodum: quoniam actus eveniens de facto est jam provisus ab æterno, et esse provisum vincit conditiones ipsius secundum se; et consequenter actus eveniens est simplici ter (id est, omnibus consideratis) inevitabilis, et secundum quid (id est, solitarie sumptus) evitabilis; sicut projectio mercis tempore naufragii est simpliciter volita, (quia omnibus consideratis est volita,) et secundum quid est nolita, (quia secundum se projectio ipsa displicet.)-Nihil quoque ad propositum facit dicere, quod esse provisum nihil ponit in actu eveniente; in hoc enim exemplo manifeste apparet nihil ad rem referre, an ponat vel non ponat. Esse namque volitum, nihil ponit in projecta merce, et tamen, &c.-Nec etiam evaditur dicendo, quod, quia actus eveniens est provisus a Deo, et inevitabilitas ejus sequitur esse provisum, ut res respectiva ad Deum; actus eveniens est de facto inevitabilis respectu Dei, non autem respectu nostri. Hoc enim æquivalet nihilo: quoniam si de facto inevitabilis est a Deo, ergo et de facto inevitabilis est, et simpliciter, et a nobis; quoniam impossibile est a quocunque vitari, quod a Deo de facto vitari non potest, propter ipsius summam efficaciam. 66 Oportet igitur, si quæstionis hujus ve ritas quietare debet intellectum nostrum, alterum duorum dicere;-aut quod esse provisum non sequatur inevitabilitas; aut quod inevitabilitas eventus provisi non deroget evitabilitati eorundum eventuum.—Et hoc secundum quidem, propter rationem supra adductam, non capio quomodo possit verificari Liquet enim, quod non nisi secundum quid evitabilitas salvari apparet. - Primum, autem, quamvis communiter a Doctoribus destruatur, dicentibus quod esse provisum, seu volitum, seu prædestinatum (pro eodem enim quoad hanc difficultatem omnia accipio) sequitur inevitabilitas; ego tamen, non ut opponam me contra torrentem, nec asserendo, sed stante semper captivitate intellectus in obsequium Christi, suspicor, quod, quemadmodum esse provisum, nec contingentiam nec necessitatem ponit in eventu proviso, (ut in Litera dicitur,) eo quia Deus est causa superexcedens, eminenter præhabens necessaria et contingentia (per hoc enim evadit Sanctus Thomas ab illa ratione VI. Metaphysicorum hic allata; intendit enim quod propositiones Aristotelis verificantur in causis particularibus, quarum aliæ sunt necessaria, aliæ contingentes, aliæ per se, et aliæ per accidens, non autem in causa universalissima excedente necessarias et contingentes per se et per accidens, quoniam ad eam spectat producere, ut effectus electos, non solum res, sed omnes rerum et eventuum modos) ;-ita elevando altius mentis oculos, ipse Deus, ex sua altiori, quam cogitare possimus, excellentia, sic rebus eventibusque provideat, ut esse provi sum ab eo sequatur aliquid altius quam evitabilitas vel inevitabilitas, ut sic ex passiva provisione eventus, neutrius combinationis alterum membrum oporteat sequi. "Et si sic est, quiescet intellectus, non evidentia veritatis inspectæ, sed altitudine inaccessibili veritatis occulta. Et hoc ingeniolo meo satis rationabile videtur;-tum propter rationem prædictam; tum quoniam, ut ait Gregorius, minus de Deo sentit qui hoc tantum de illo credit, quod suo ingenio metiri potest. Nec propterea negandum aliquid eorum, quæ ad divinam immutabilitatem, actualitatem, certitudinem, atque universalitatem, et similia, spectare scimus, aut ex fide tenemus, suspicor: sed aliquod occultum latere, vel ex parte ordi- | nis qui est inter Deum et eventum provisum; vel ex glutino inter ipsum eventum et esse provisum, arbitror; et sic intellectum animæ nostræ oculum noctuæ esse considerans,* in ignorantia sola quietem illius invenio. Melius est enim, tam fidei catholicæ quam philosophiæ, fateri cæcitatem nostram, quam asserere tanquam evidentia, quæ intellectum non quietant; evidentia namque quietativa est. Nec propterea omnes *He refers to Aristotle. [Metaph. A minor, c. 1.] Note in Discussions, p. 627. Doctores præsumptionis accuso, quoniam balbutiendo, ut potuerunt, immobilitatem ac efficaciam summam et æternam divini intellectus, voluntatis, potestatisque insinuare intenderunt omnes, per infallibilitatem ordinis divinæ electionis ad eventus omnes; quorum nihil præfatæ suspicioni obstat, quæ altius quid in eis latere credit. Et vere, si sic prædicaretur, nullus forte circa prædestinationem erraret Christianus, sicut non errat in materia Trinitatis;* quia dicitur et scribitur et ita est, quod occulta est humano intellectui, et sola fides sufficit. Optimum autem atque salubre consilium est in hac re inchoare ab his, quæ certo scimus et experimur in nobis-scilicet quod omnia quæ sub libero arbitrio nostro continentur, evitabilia a nobis sunt, et propterea digni sumus pæna vel præmio. Quomodo autem, hoc salvo, divina salvetur providentia ac prædestinatio, &c., credere quod sancta mater Ecclesia credit. Scriptum est enim-'Altiora te ne quæsieris; plurima enim sunt tibi supra sensus hominum revelata. Et hoc est unum de illis." *This was written before 1507; consequently long before Servetus and Campanus had introduced their unitarian heresies. Note in Discussions, p. 628. NOTE U*. ON SCIENTIA MEDIA. [Reference omitted, and to be supplied from A. P. 632 b.] There is a good account of Scientia | Media in Fonseca, Comm. in Arist. Metaph., vol. iii. pp. 119, 120. The doctrine was invented by Fonseca, adopted and developed by Molina, Suarez, Vasquez, Mendoza, and others. Fonseca does not make the scientia visionis and simplicis intelligentiæ equivalent to scientia libera and naturalis, but makes scientia media between the two latter, not as given above [p. 632 b, n. *] after Leibnitz. [The title of this Note is given in the Author's list; but no portion of its contents has been found, except a memorandum, the substance of which is given above. The Note appears to have been intended as a supplement to p. 632 b, n.*, to explain an apparent discrepancy between the account there given, after Leibnitz (Théodicée, Partie i. § 39-42), and that of Fonseca, as regards the origin of the name scientia media. Fonseca distinguishes between scientia naturalis, or that knowledge which God cannot but have; as of things possible and their possible relations to each other; and scientia libera, or that knowledge which God may or may not have, according to his own will; as of things actually existing or destined to exist, which are actual, and therefore known as actual, only in consequence of God's will to bring them into existence. Between these two, there is a knowledge called by Fonseca scientia conditionata or mixta, and by others scientia media, which in one point of view may be regarded as natural, in another as free. This is the knowledge of the future actions of voluntary agents; which is free, inasmuch as it is in the power of the agents to act otherwise, and therefore the actions as foreknown might have been different; but natural, inasmuch as God knows how they will act. This is divided into scientia conditionata futurorum, or the knowledge of free acts which will hereafter come to pass, and scientia pure conditionata, or the knowledge of acts which would have come to pass under certain conditions never actually realised. As an instance of the latter, Fonseca cites the case of Tyre and Sidon, which would have repented had the works been done in them which were done in Chorazin and Bethsaida. A similar account is given by Molina, Concordia, Disp. lii.; In i. Partem D. Thomæ, Disp. xvii. This account slightly differs from that given by Leibnitz, inasmuch as Fonseca does not identify the scientia naturalis and libera with the scientia simplicis intelligentiæ and visionis respectively. This iden tification is made, however, by some other exponents of the doctrine, with whom Leibnitz's account agrees. See e.g. Suarez, Opusc. de Scientia Dei futur. conting., Lib. ii. c. 3; Vasquez, In primam Partem S. Thomæ, Disp. lxvii.; Mendoza, Disputationes Philosophica, De Anima Disp. ix. Sect. vi. subs. 5; Ruiz, Commentarii ac Disputationes, pp. 799, 802.—ED.] all of them [are found in one or other of two stages of progress; for they are] either such, as, received from foreign hands, and in a state of previous cultivation, have obtained a more articulate development from those to whom they have been latterly transmitted; or they are such as are still in the hands of their original authors, and, as is then usually the case, only on the first step of their advancement,-a step, however, of far greater importance than all the progress they can ever accomplish by the aid of any subsequent promoter. For the principle-the commencement (according to the proverb) is in everything more than half the whole.* But, for that reason, it is also in everything the point of difficulty. For whilst a principle, as in effect the mightiest, is in magnitude the least, nothing is found more difficult than its detection. But this once discovered, all else it is comparatively easy to add and amplify. ciple or method; for the scope of their instruction was to communicate to him, not the art, but certain products of the art. It was as if a man, professing that he would expound the science of protecting the feet, should then, in place of teaching the craft of shoemaking and its subsidiaries, hand you an assortment of every variety of shoe. This, it is true, might satisfy your present need, but not furnish you with the art of always doing so. 'But while on Rhetoric there has been much written, and from an early period, on Syllogism-on the art of Reasoning,* there is absolutely nothing extant previous to our own researches; and these have cost us not a little time and trouble. If, therefore, it may appear to you, upon examination, that this system, in which, from the foundation, everything had to be supplied, may yet worthily stand a comparison with those others which have been built up by the labours of successive generations; it remains for you to accord your indulgence to what in it may be found wanting, and your very grateful acknowledgment for the discoveries which it contains.' KANT. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur zweyten Auflage, p. viii. 'That Logic has, from the earliest times, This is what took place in the art of Rhetoric; but nearly the same might be affirmed of every other. Those who first discovered the principles of that art, brought it out but a little way in its development; but by those who are now celebrated as its cultivators, it was only amplified to what it is, as an inheritance gradually accumulated from the acquisi-proceeded in this secure course that it tions of a long series of predecessors. Thus Tisias after the founders, Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after Thrasymachus, and many others, made many partial contributions; so that we need not marvel if the art of Rhetoric be now, in certain respects, not only full, but overflowing. But of the doctrine on which we are engaged, it cannot be said, that, prior to us, one part had been elaborated and another not. There was, in fact, nothing done whatever. For those who made a mercenary profession of teaching the art of disputation, followed a mode of instruction similar to that of Gorgias. For, as he (lege & μèv) gave ready-made rhetorical, so they gave ready-made questionary, discussions, to be learned off by their disciples, which, as in both cases was intended, should comprise the more usual topics in which an argument on either side could be maintained. With them, indeed, the pupil learned rapidly,-but without prin * See Arist. De Cœlo, L. i. c. 6; Eth. Nic. L. i. c. 8; Probl. x. 15. Cf. Erasmi Adagia, pp. 10, 509, ed. 1629; Magirus, (Polymnemon), v. Principium. + Alexander leaves it doubtful whether Dialectic or Logic. has never been compelled to fall back in search of another path,-is manifest from this: since left by Aristotle it has not needed to retrace a single step, unless we choose to reckon as improvements-what, however, pertain more to the elegance of the science than to its certainty-the omission of some unessential subtleties, and a more perspicuous exposition of the doctrines. But, moreover, it is remarkable in regard to Logic, that, to the present hour, it has been unable to advance a single step, and thus presents itself, to all appearance, as concluded and complete.' timonies to the same effect have been [The following translations of other tesfound among the Author's papers.—ED.] 1.-DEGERANDO.-Des Signes, &c., t. iv. p. 28. The philosopher who reflects attentively on the rules of the ancient Logic, is astonished to see how far its authors have carried the analysis of reasoning. With the most severe impartiality, he cannot but confess, that each * See above, p. 708 b, note t. |