of these rules is of a rigorous exactitude, and that, as a whole, they are so complete that not one of the possible forms of reasoning has escaped them. Aristotle, undoubtedly, was often destitute of the aid which experience supplies,-this was the misfortune of the age in which he saw the light; but he was, perhaps, the profoundest of thinkers, a genius the most eminently didactic, which has arisen on the horizon of philosophy. I question if there have ever subsequently been announced theories so beautiful as those which he has left us for a model. He combined views the most extensive with an eye for details the most acute. He created the art of classification, and then carried it almost to perfection. He executed a work, of all, perhaps, the most astonishing for those who know the march of our intellect; he conceived the method of science, when as yet the sciences did not exist; he pointed out with certainty the way which led to truth as yet unknown; he seemed to reason with prescience of all the future progress of the human mind.'

2.

PELISSON.-a.-Letter to Madame de Brinon, 1690. (Leibnitii Opera, ed. Dutens, t. i. p. 699.) He (Leibnitz) very well observes, that the Scholastic philosophy is the product engendered of the Dialectic or Logic of Aristotle, applied to religion; Dialectic or Logic, which, for my own part, I regard as one of the most beautiful discoveries of the human intellect. For who but must marvel, that a single man has, by his own contemplation, been able to reduce and comprehend within certain classes, and under certain forms, the infinite modes in which men reason, and to give us, so to speak, the external marks which may enable us to distinguish the true reason from the false.' b.-- Letter to Leibnitz, 1691. (Leibnitii Opera, ed. Dutens, t. i. p. 726.) was brought up in the philosophy of Aristotle, and with a great veneration for him; but this veneration was greatly increased when, having returned to my Greek in those years of solitude'-(he had just spoken of four years and four months of the Bastille, and of leisure perforce'), 'I read him in himself, and found him of an infinite elegance, and beyond comparison clearer than all his commentators. I am aware of no

I

genius more extended or more elevated than his.'

3.-BILFINGER-a.- De Reductione Philosophiæ ad usus publicos, 1725, Varia, Fasc. ii. p. 62-63. To Aristotle we owe the noble design of collecting into the form of a discipline whatever conduces to the exercise of the art of demonstration, and to a security against the arts of deception. And he so accomplished his purpose, that, to the present day, few and small have been the additions made by others; additions made, too, only by fol lowing his guidance and method.'

b. De præcipuis quibusdam Discendi Regulis ex comparatione Corporis et Animi erutis, 1726, Varia, Fasc. ii. p. 247. 'I avail myself of this occasion to state my opinion of the Organon, since this has experienced at different times so different a destiny; for what is now neglected, and even despised, had formerly, in all the Universities, a peculiar professor set apart for its interpretation. I do not say this that he may be again recalled into the chair, since the form of the sciences, and of scientific disputations, is at present so different from what it was of old. But this I say confidently, and with a full know. ledge of the cause:-That the Organon of Aristotle is a book the first of its class, in order as in excellence, (see Sophist Elench. c. 34), that it is complete, and demonstrated, and useful, and of consum mate execution. If there be any of my readers skilled in the art of invention, let them examine the books of the First and Second Analytics, of the Topics, and of the Sophistics, according to the precepts of that art, and they will admire of it a specimen to which nothing similar is to be found out of Mathematics, nor even within them, if we regard the difficulties which it behoved to conquer in the accomplish ment. If any one undervalue this labour of Aristotle, let him go and discover for himself even one of these forms of rea soning. I shall laud the man, if he produce a better; laud him, even if he produce an argument as good. And yet the first inventors are very different from those who follow,' &c.

c.-Præcepta Logica, 1739, p. 2. 'Aris totle has reduced Logic into the form an art. By him the matter was handled to perfection. The moderns who despise, do not understand him.'

1.-PLATO, in Sauteri Institutiones Logicæ, § 8. Quam maxime, inquit Plato de Repub. vii.,* præcipiendum est, ut, qui pulcherrimam hanc habitant civitatem, nullo modo geometriam spernant. Scimus enim, ad disciplinas omnes facilius perdiscendas interesse omnino, attigeritne geometriam aliquis, an non.'-Ejusdem Platonis ap. Theon. Smyrn. Cap. i. hæc est sententia: Adolescentibus eorumque ætati conveniunt disciplinæ mathematica, quæ animam præparant et defacant, ut ipsa ad philosophiam capessendam ideonea reddatur. De arctissimo matheseos cum philosophia nexu adeo persuasum erat Platoni, ut neminem geometriæ ignarum in scholas suas recipiendum putavit. Academiæ, ab ipso institutæ, foribus inscriptum legebatur: Nemo geometria expers accedito.'+]

2.-ARISTOTLE.-a.-Eth. Nic., L. i. c. [3] :-[Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων· οἱ λόγοι δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων.]

b.-Ibid., L. vi. c. 8:-[nueîov d'or τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι και μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοί

P. 527, Steph.-ED.

↑ See Discussions, p. 278.-ED.

Αἴτιον δ ̓, ὅτι τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστι· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ ̓ ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δὲ ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ.]

3.-MILTON.[Of Education], Prose Works (ed. 1835), p. 99. And for the usual method of teaching arts, I deem it to be an old errour of universities, not yet well recovered from the scholastic grossness of barbarous ages, that instead of beginning with arts most easy, (and these be such as are most obvious to the sense,) they present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of Logic and Metaphysics; so that they having but newly left those grammatic flats and shallows where they stuck unreasonably to learn a few words with lamentable construction, and now on the sudden transported under another climate, to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy, do for the most part grow into hatred and contempt of learning, mocked and deluded all this while with ragged notions and babblements, while they expected worthy and delightful knowledge, &c.']

4.-LEIBNITZ.-[Schreiben an Wagner], Opera Philosophica (ed. Erdmann), pp. 423 b, 426 a.-['Ich bin selbst der Meinung, man thaete wohl, dass man die Mathematik, Historie, und anderes vor der ausfuehrlichen Logik lernte; denn wie

between Intuitions and Conceptions into general recognition. Others indeed, long before him, had observed that some of our representations have only an individual object, others a plurality of objects. Thus Aristotle remarks, (Analyt. Post. i. 31):-Aiotáveolai μèv yàp àváyкn kаe' ἕκαστον· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν Tò opav μèv χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάστης, νοῆσαι δὲ ἅμα ὅτι ἐπὶ TаOWY OUTWS. And in Wolf's Logic, (§ 43,) | it is said: 'Quidquid sensu percipimus, sive externo, sive interno, aut imaginamur; id singulare quid est, soletque Individuum appellari; and in [Psychologia Empirica] § 49: Repræsentatio rerum in universali, seu generum et specierum, Notio a nobis appellabitur.' But the clearest distinction is expressed in the words of Baumgarten (Acroas. Log. § 51):-Objectum conceptus vel est ens singulare seu individuum, vel universale, h. e. pluribus commune. Conceptus singularis seu individui idea, (as we now say, intuition), conceptus communis, seu ejusdem in pluribus, est notio (conception).'Such remarks and divisions might, indeed, have led to the proper distinction, which obtains between Intuitions and Conceptions, as explained above; but as we do not find them further followed up, we cannot say that any one before Kant had a clear apprehension of this distinction; still less, that any made use of it. With regard to the above definitions; in the first place, the expression individuum is liable to be misunderstood; for, unless it be more exactly defined, it might be interpreted to mean that the object of an intuition must be simple, which is by no means the case. In the second place, without the addition that the Intuition must be a simple representation, the definition is too wide, inasmuch as there are some complex representations which in like manner represent only a single, (nay, only a simple) real object, and yet are not Intuitions.

"Kant's own statement of the distinction is given in two forms. 1. In his Logik, § 1, he says, 'All Representations relative to an object are either Intuitions or Conceptions. The Intuition is an individual representation (repræsentatio singularis); the Conception is an universal or refected representation (repr sentatio per notas communes, repræsentatio discursiva). The Conception is opposed to the Intuition, for it is an universal representation, or a representation of that which is common to a plurality of objects; therefore a representation in so far as it can be contained in several things.' 2. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, § 11 [p. 377, ed. 1799], we find Intuition defined as a representation 'which is related immediately to an object;' whereas Conceptions are related to objects only 'mediately'-that is to say, by means of the Intuitions."

Both Kant's definitions are criticised at considerable length by Bolzano in the continuation of the above passage. The criticisms have not been transcribed, as the purpose of the reference in Sir W. Hamilton's MS. seems to have been historical rather than critical.

To the above anticipations of Kant's doctrine may be added that furnished by the scholastic distinction between intuitire and abstractive cognition, some account of which has been given by Sir W. Hamilton, above, p. 812, and also in Discussions, p. 54, and in Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 71. The definition of Durandus (In Prol. Sent. Qu. iii. § 7) nearly resembles one of those above quoted from Kant. "Vocant cognitionem intuitivam, illam quæ immediate tendit ad rem sibi præsentem objective, secundum ejus actualem existentiam : sicut cum video colorem existentem in pariete, vel rosam quam in manu teneo. Abstractivam autem vocant, omnem cognitionem quæ habetur de re non sic realiter præsente in ratione objecti immediate cogniti."-ED.]

[From a reference in the Author's MS. it is probable that he intended in this Note to give some account of the oration of Pfaff, a copy of which he had procured after the printing of the foot-note to p. 293. Pfaff's work is a small pamphlet of 27 pages, entitled "Christoph. Matthæi Pfaffii, Theologi Primarii et Cancellarii Tubingensis Oratio de Egoismo, nova Philosophica Hæresi, Tubingæ d. IV. Nov. MDCCXXII. in Aulâ Novâ publicè recitata, Tubingæ, a. 1722." In the beginning the author speaks of Egoism as a new philosophical heresy, lately sprung up in France, England, and Ireland; and refers to Wolf's "Vernuenftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen," (c. 1, § 2; c. 6, § 944,) as containing mention of a sect of Egoists lately arisen in Paris, and a refutation of their opinions. The greater part of the pamphlet, however, is occupied with a criticism, or rather a denunciation, of Materialism and Idealism; and the only fur

| ther historical evidence advanced to shew the existence of persons professing Egoism is the following quotation from the Memoires de Trevoux, 1713, p. 922,-“Un de nous connoît dans Paris un Malebranchiste, qui va plus loin que M. Berkeley; il lui a soutenu fort sérieusement, dans une longue dispute, qu'il est très probable qu'il soit le seul être créé qui existe, et que non seulement il n'y ait point de corps, mais qu'il n'y ait point d'autre esprit créé que lui."

Sir W. Hamilton's MS. contains also a reference to Fuelleborn's "Beytraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie," Part V. p. 143, where there is a short notice of a certain Brunet, the author of some philosophical writings, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, one of which was entitled "Projet d'une nouvelle Metaphysique." His philosophy is characterised by Fuelleborn as "der unverholenste und entschlossenste Egoismus der sich nur denken laesst.”— ED.]