materials, not indeed to complete the work as he designed it, but to produce a more finished result than he has actually accomplished. But the reason which partly influenced the editors of Pascal (whose practice, however, was by no means faithful to their profession), is decisive in determining the rule to be adopted in all similar cases"Ce n'eût pas été donner son ouvrage, mais un ouvrage tout différent." A fragment, however imperfect, from the pen of a Pascal or a Hamilton, has a value which would not belong to a more finished production of doubtful authorship.
The few additions which the Editor has found it necessary to make are carefully distinguished from the original matter of the Author's own papers. Those which have been incorporated with the contents of the papers, whether to complete the sense or to supply references or quotations, are included within square brackets. Entire sentences added by the Editor are distinguished by the signature “ED.”*
In those Notes which are compiled from separate fragments, the Editor is responsible for the selection and arrangement. In this, as in the whole of his task, he has received most valuable advice and assistance from the Author's son, Hubert Hamilton, Esq., who has most zealously and efficiently taken part in the endeavour to complete this monument to the memory of his Father.
* In reference to this signature, it is necessary to point out an ambiguity which was not discovered till it was too late to correct it. In the portion of the work published by Sir W. Hamilton, he is in the habit of distinguishing Reid as "the Author," and himself as "the Editor." In preparing the subsequent papers for publication, the usual distinction of Author and Editor was adopted, and the discrepancy was not noticed till after some sheets had been stereotyped. In this latter portion of the work, including the Memoranda for a Preface and the Supplementary Dissertations from p. 915," the Author" is Sir W. Hamilton, and the signature “ED." denotes the present Editor.
[References to Sir W. Hamilton's Foot-Notes are distinguished by the initial H.-ED.]
Abernethy, (Rev. John,) quoted, 377 a.
Abstraction, Essay on, 989-412; see General Con-
ceptions, General Words, Universals,
Abstraction (proper) distinguished from Gene-
ralisation, 394; we may abstract without gene-
ralising, but we cannot generalise without ab-
stracting, 394 b; the operation of, in forming
General Conceptions, 394, 395.
Absurdities, of mental philosophers, alluded to,
358 b, 359 a.
Academics, (the,) held the senses to be fallacious,
Accidens, as a predicable, 686.
Accountableness, Moral, argument from, in favour
of Free-Will, 620-622.
Action, Active power, meaning of the words, 514,
515, 603, 604.
Action, Principles of: Essay on, 543-599; on, in
general, 543-545; defined, everything that in-
cites us to act, 543; difficulty of a knowledge of,
543, 544; various opinions held by philosophers
regarding, 544; divided into, 1. Mechanical, 545-
551; 2. Animal, 551-579; 3. Rational, 579-599.
Active Power, the notion of, 512-518; see Power.
Active Powers, Essays on the, 511-679; the distri-
bution of our powers into Speculative and Active
objectionable, 511 H.
Activity, Dr. James Gregory's opinions on, criti-
cised, 81, 82; as a source of enjoyment, 493 b,
494 a
Addison, quoted to the effect that Colour is not a
quality of bodies, but only an idea in the mind,
139 a; his division of the objects of Taste, 493 a;
quoted on the attractiveness of Beauty, 499 a,
500 b.
Adelandus the Arabian, referred to, 263 H, 300 H.
Enesidemus, referred to, 203 H.
Affections: on, in general, 558-570; have persons
for their object, 558; how distinguished from
Passions, 558, 559; the Benevolent, (to wit, of
Kindred, of Gratitude, of Pity, of Esteem, of
Friendship, of Love, of Public Spirit,) consider-
ed, 560-566; the Malevolent, (to wit, of Emu-
lation, of Resentment,) considered, 566-570;
Affections accompanied with an
Benevolent
agreeable feeling, 559; imply a desire of good
and happiness to their object, 559, 560; general
reflections, 564-566;
sources of pain, 570 b.
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Agent, meaning of, in connection with that of
Cause, 607; every operation supposes an agent,
232.
Agents, Moral, Essay on the Liberty of, 599-636.
Aguilonius, his Optics referred to, for a case of
double vision, 169 b and H.
Akenside, his division of the objects of Taste, 493 a;
held that Beauty dwells originally in the Mind,
503 a.
Alcibiades, Second, not Plato's, 583 H.
Alcinous, quoted in regard to Memory, 353 b.
Alemæon, his theory of Knowledge, 300 H.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis, quoted in regard to
Phancy or Imagination, 353; states admirably
the purely formal character of Logic, 695 H;
quoted in defence of Aristotle's rules for the con-
version of propositions, 696 H; on Formal Ne-
cessity in syllogisms, 701 H; referred to, 300 H,
372 H.
Alison, (Rev. Archibald,) Letter from Reid to,
89; his Essays on the Nature and Principles of
Taste, ib. H.
Alphonso X., (King of Leon and Castile,) his cele-
brated saying, 460 H.
Ambiguity of words, frequently arises from the
same name being given both to the cause and to
the effect, 113 b; a great impediment to the ad-
vancement of knowledge, 219; of the words
cause, effect, action, and active power, 605-608.
Ambition, (see Power, Desire of,) one of the most
universal passions of the human mind, 517, 518;
distinguished from Emulation, 566 b.
Amelius the Platonist, his supposed anticipation
of Malebranche, 264 b.
Ammonius Hermiæ, referred to, 242 H, 263 H,
629 H, 689 H.
Analogy, opposed to Reflection, as a means of study-
ing the mind, 201, 202; the old philosophy
purely analogical, the new more derived from
reflection, 202 b; as an instrument of reasoning,
236-238; its uses, 236 b, 237 a; a fruitful source
of error, when applied to the mind and its ope-
rations, 237 b; instance of the ass between two
bundles of hay, 238 a.
Analogy of Existence, as implied in knowledge,
doctrine of, 300 H.
Analysis, of the human faculties, necessary, 99 b ;
intellectual, compared with chemical, 396, 397;
we cannot reason from the one to the other,
897, 398; see General Conceptions.
Analytics, First, of Aristotle, account of, 693-704;
Last, of Aristotle, account of, 705, 706.
Anatomists, their employment of Analogy, 237 a.
Anatomy, mental, compared with physical, 98 a.
Anaxagoras, referred to, 203 H; his theory of
Knowledge, 300 H.
Anaximander, referred to, 203 H,
Anaximenes, referred to, 203 H.
Andala, (Ruardus,) quoted as holding a doctrine of
Perception similar to that of Reid and Stewart,
257 H.
Anepigraphus, (Joannes Rudolphus,) his fanciful
account of the Idomenian philosophy, 150, 151.
Anepigraphus "the Philosopher," 151 H.
Anger, the nature of, 568; characterised as a short
fit of madness, 619 b.
Animal Spirits, theory of, 179, 248 b.
Animal Principles of Action, (to wit, Appetites,
Desires, Affections,) 551-579; Reid's wide use
of the term criticised by Stewart, 551 H; re-
quire intention and will in their operation, but
not judgment, 579 b.
Animal Resentment, see Resentment.
Animals, Brute, laws of vision in, 166, 182 H;
their memory, 359, 360; do not measure time,
360; the instinct of, 545, 546; whether they have
belief, 548 b; how far they have desires, 554,
555; parental affection in, 560, 561; gratitude
in, 562; whether they have opinions, 577; have
no conception of Good upon the Whole, 581a;
have no conscience, 596, 597; incapable of testi-
mony or promise, 665.
Anschauungen, (Intuitions,) see Begriffe.
Anteprædicamenta, account of the, 683, 684.
Antigonus Carystius, referred to, 259 H.
Apollonius, noticed, 241, 701 b.
Apperception, according to the system of Leibnitz,
308, 222 H, 551 H.
Appetites considered as Animal Principles of Ac-
tion, 551-554; definition and characteristics of,
551, 552; are three in number, (Hunger, Thirst,
and Lust,) 551 b; obeying appetites neither vir-
tuous nor vicious, 552, 553; neither social nor
selfish, 553 a; some principles like appetites,
but which do not commonly get that name, ib.;
besides the Natural, there are Acquired appe-
tites, 553 b.
Apprehend, two meanings of the word, 223.
Apprehension, Simple, why so called, 106 b and H,
243 a and H: performed by analysing an original
judgment, 107 a, 376 a; impossible without
Judgment, 243 H, 375 H, 414 H; with Judg-
ment and Reasoning, belongs to a logical, not a
psychological, distribution of the cognitive facul-
ties, 242 H, 692 H; on, in general, 360-368; see
Conception; erroneously represented as the first
operation of the Understanding, 376; distin-
guished from Judgment, 414 a.
Approbation (and Disapprobation), Moral, con-
sidered, 592-594; the object of, 646-651; see
Morals; argument that it implies a real judg-
ment, 670-679; the contrary maintained by
Hume, 670, 671, compare 651; his arguments
examined, 676-678; consequences of the oppo-
site doctrine, 678, 679.
Aquapendens, (ab Aquapendente,) noticed, 181 a.
Archelaus, referred to, 203 H.
Archimedes, noticed, 241, 625 a.
Archytas of Tarentum, said to have written on
the Categories, 686 a; treatise on the Nature of
the Universe ascribed to him, spurious, 686 H.
Aristotle, his four causes, 75, 526, 690 a and H, 705
b; reckoned eight species of simple Tastes, 116
H: ignored the distinction of Primary and Se-
condary Qualities, 123 a, 131 a, 316 b; but com-
pare 131 H, 316 H; his doctrine of Common
Sensibles, 124 H, 301 H; called Imagination
a decaying sense, 140 H, 227 H; held that the
senses never deceive us in relation to their pro-
per objects, 194 H; compared with Bacon in
point of originality, 200 a; his definitions of the
Soul, 202 H, 203 b and H; account of the sys-
tem of Species vulgarly attributed to him, 204,
225, 372; materialistic tendency of his system,
205; his definitions, 220 a and H, 512 b and H;
on Man as a social being, 244 H, 557 H; likens
the mind to a tabula rasa, 253 H; impression,
type, &c., are with him mere metaphors, 254 H,
353 H; whether he derived all our notions from
experience of sense, 255 a and H, 705 H; his
theory of Perception, 267, 258; his division of
the functions of the soul, 267 II; the extent of his
influence over the minds of philosophers, 268;
his doctrine of Generation and Corruption, 269,
270; the doctrine of Substantial Forms receives
no countenance from his authority, 270 H; was
a declared advocate of experiment, 271 H; his
classification of the Principles of Association,
294 H; his theory of Knowledge, 300 H; his dis-
tinction of Subjective and Objective Qualities,
310 H; quoted touching the evidence of sense,
as compared with that of reasoning, 328 H; held
that contingent events cannot be foreknown,
have no certain futurity, 341 b, 629; his theory
of Memory misapprehended by Reid, 353 b and
H; his distinction between Memory and Re-
miniscence, 359 b; his use of the terms eldos and
idéa, 372 H; his opinion about Universals, 405
b; has been considered as a Realist, a Concep-
tualist, and a Nominalist, 405 H; held that de-
monstrative evidence is to be found in abstract
knowledge only, 428 b; admitted to be the fixer
of the received rules of deduction, 437 b, 637 a;
extent to which he demanded first principles,
462; his distinction of active and passive power,
519 H; what is called the Pythagorean system
of Morals a plagiarism from, 540 H, 588 H;
referred to on the distinction of Emulation and
Envy, 566 H; on the Passions, 571 H; on the
saying Corruptio optimi pessima, 575 H; on
the value of national education, 578 H; his
the best development of the theory of Pleasure,
579 H; his portraiture of the Magnanimous
Man referred to, 592 H; his doctrine of Cause,
607 a and H; quoted on the necessity of past
events, 631 H; Brief account of his Logic,
681-714; his character as a man and as a philo-
sopher, 681-683; eulogies on, 681 H, 682 H;
fortune of his writings, 683 H; Porphyry's In-
troduction, 683; Book of the Categories, 683-685;
Book concerning Interpretation, 685; four Pre-
dicables of, 687; Categories of, analysed, 687 H;
many of his Distinctions merely verbal, 689, 690;
his doctrine of Definition, 690, 691; its defects,
691; his theory of Propositions, 692, 693; First
Analytics, 693-704; his rules for the Conversion
of Propositions, 693, 694; his theory of the Pure
Syllogism, 694, 695; his rules for the invention
of a Middle Term, 695; remarks on his rules of
Conversion, 696, 697; additions made to his
theory, 697, 698; his use of Symbols to illus-
trate his rules, 698; his demonstration of the
theory of syllogisms, 699-701; founder of Logic,
700 H, 708 H; his definition of the syllogism,
701 H; criticism of his Syllogistic Theory, 701,
702; his doctrine of the Modality of propositions
and syllogisms, 702, 703; his enumeration of im-
perfect syllogisms, to wit, Enthymeme, Indue-
tion, Example, 704; Last Analytics, 705, 706;
Topics, 706; Book concerning Sophisms, 707,
708; his classification of logical Fallacies, 707;
criticised, 707, 708; his Organon contrasted with
that of Bacon, 712 H; notices the distinction of
proper and improper Quantity, 716 a; casually
noticed, 264 H, 375 a, 415 b, 432 b, 435 H, 455
H, 476 H, 548 a, 550 a, 621 H, 642 H.
Arnauld, his controversy with Malebranche, 266 b,
295, 296; his theory of ideas, 295-298; his dis-
tinction between Perceptions and Ideas, 296 H;
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