security of her own trade the plan whereby they would shelter theirs from her attacks. Considerations such as these have induced several English writers1 to advocate the principle of the exemption of private property from capture at sea; but they have not succeeded in converting their government, and at present public opinion is apathetic. § 217. Arguments for and posed exemption. On the whole, it may be said that motives of self-interest have determined the policy adopted by states on this question, whereas publicists have usually argued it on moral grounds. Those who are in favor against the proof the change point to the security from pillage now enjoyed by private property on land, and denounce as barbarous its continued liability to capture at sea. Most of them 2 repeat the declaration of Portalis, which he in turn borrowed from Rousseau, that war is a relation of state to state, not of individual to individual, and, regarding it as axiomatic, have no difficulty in showing that the present state of maritime law is inconsistent with it. They also argue that, as the great naval powers have already accepted the doctrine of Free Ships, Free Goods, the further step of agreeing to complete exemption would be no great matter from the point of view of a powerful belligerent, while it would be a marked gain to humanity. The defenders of the present practice point out that the analogy of land warfare is deceptive. An occupied province can be made to assist the invader by its resources, whereas at sea there is no alternative between capturing private property or letting it go free to strengthen the resources of the enemy. Now that priva 1 e.g. Hall, Article in Contemporary Review for October, 1875, and Lawrence, Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law, VII. 2 e.g. De Laveleye in Revue de Droit International, Vol. VII., 560-602, and in Pall Mall Gazette of Oct. 10, 1884; Bluntschli in Revue de Droit International, Vol. IX., 549-557, and Vol. X., 70-82; Acollas, Droit de la Guerre, Chs. i. and xii. teers have fallen into disuse, the seizure of merchant vessels by the cruisers of a hostile navy far more nearly resembles the levying of a requisition than the indiscriminate plunder which has happily disappeared in theory, and to a large degree in practice, from land warfare. It is further contended that there is no more humane method of reducing an enemy's power to support the burdens of war than the destruction of his sea-borne commerce. The doctrine that war is now confined to the forces of the belligerent states, and affects individuals only in so far as they are agents of the state, is refuted by a simple enumeration of the rights possessed by an invader over the non-combatant inhabitants of the territory under his military occupation; and in answer to the argument that the proposed change would be but a small one, since the right of capturing enemy's goods in neutral ships has been already surrendered, it is pointed out that under present circumstances a state which is able to deliver a successful attack against the mercantile marine of its foe, can at the very least drive enemy merchants to the expensive and burdensome resort of seeking for their cargoes the shelter of neutral flags. A careful review of the controversy seems to lead to the conclusion that, though the advocates of exemption frequently overstate their case, particularly when they place it on humanitarian grounds, the balance of argument on the whole inclines to their side. The present practice gives direct encouragement to attacks upon defenceless merchant vessels in order to obtain prize-money, and thus tends to foster the idea that war may be waged by honorable men for their own private advantage. It also carries with it the retention as prisoners of war of the crews of the captured ships, though they are as truly non-combatants as the artisans and miners of an occupied province, whom no one dreams of reducing to captivity. It may be admitted that the weakening of an enemy by cutting off his ocean trade, and thus depriving him of his resources for war, is one of the least objectionable methods of bringing him to terms, seeing that it involves little or no bloodshed, and is free from the moral dangers attendant upon the presence of a victorious soldiery among the families of a territory they have overrun. But the cases in which such a result is possible are so few that they can hardly justify the retention of a severity which will generally exercise an infinitesimal influence upon the issue of the contest. Since the Declaration of Paris in 1856, ordinary belligerent trade has been safe at sea under a neutral flag; and since the introduction of railways a country bordering upon civilized peoples can always obtain what it most needs over its land frontiers at a slightly increased cost, even though the sea is closed to its merchant vessels. Only when a state is wholly surrounded by sea, or when its boundaries march with those of hostile or uncivilized neighbors, will it be in danger of losing the sinews of war owing to the inability of its trading vessels to navigate the ocean in safety. Neither in the FrancoGerman war of 1870, nor in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, was the result affected by the capture of private property at sea. In the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 such property was left unmolested; and no one has ventured to assert that Austria would have been able to reverse the issue, or even to prolong the struggle, had the navy which conquered at. Lissa been let loose upon Prussian and Italian merchantmen. The only instance in modern times in which successful operations against an enemy's commerce so weakened his resources that he was forced to surrender sooner than would otherwise have happened is found in the great American Civil War. But in that case it was the blockade of the Southern ports, and the consequent exclusion from them of neutral ships, which hastened the collapse of the Confederacy, not the destruction of a mercantile marine flying the Southern flag. While the right to blockade an enemy's coast exists, maritime superiority must tell enormously in any war with a country which cannot draw plentiful supplies across its land frontiers. But it may be doubted whether the right to capture enemy cargoes only when found in enemy vessels is of much value, except in the very rare cases when the carrying trade of the enemy is a chief source of his strength, or neutral ships are unable to take the place of his own merchantmen. Sea-power is most important in war. No state can maintain a widely extended empire without it. It is effective by cutting off supplies of arms and munitions, conveying troops and stores where they are wanted and keeping the enemy from doing the same, capturing coaling stations and islands, severing the communications with colonies and distant possessions, blockading ports, and destroying vessels of war. Such services as these tell heavily; but in the vast majority of wars little advantage can be gained by driving sea-borne commerce out of hostile and into neutral ships. We have to consider whether it is wise and right to keep up a rule always productive of considerable evil for the sake of the good it may do in a few exceptional instances; and we shall probably decide that the good is too problematical to justify resistance to a change which will at once decrease the sufferings caused by war and purge it still further from the sordid taint of personal enrichment. CHAPTER VI. THE AGENTS, INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS OF WARFARE. § 218. Soldiers The disputes as to of warfare. THERE is great doubt and much dispute with regard to the lawful use of some of the agents of warfare. and sailors of the regular armies and navies of the belligerents, including fully organized mili- some of the agents tia and reserves, are legitimate combatants. A state may avail itself of their services to the fullest extent; but the legality of other agencies is not so freely conceded. Some may be used in certain circumstances or under certain conditions, but not in other circumstances or under other conditions. Others are forbidden altogether according to one set of authorities, while another set allow them either unconditionally or with various restrictions. The only course to follow in order to attain satisfactory results is to consider each of these difficult cases separately. § 219. We will take first the much disputed question of whether it is lawful to use Guerilla Troops, and, if so, under what conditions of leadership, organization and armament. They may be described as bands not be longing to a regular army and not under strict Guerilla Troops. military discipline, but nevertheless operating actively in the field and devoting themselves entirely and |