it was not denied that they would be enrolled in the fighting forces of their country as soon as they reached its soil, it was held that they did not leave New York in an organized condition. Their warlike uses were too remote for them to be considered as a portion of the combatant forces of France in such a sense that American neutrality was violated by their departure, though they could have been made prisoners of war if the vessels which carried them had been captured on the voyage by German cruisers.

The three cases we have given will enable us to form a fair idea of what constitutes a warlike expedition. It must go forth with a present purpose of engaging in hostilities; it must be under military or naval command; and it must be organized with a view to proximate acts of war. But it need not be in a position to commence fighting the moment it leaves the shelter of neutral territory; nor is it necessary that its individual members should carry with them the arms they hope soon to use. When a belligerent attempts to organize portions of his combatant forces on neutral soil or in neutral waters, he commits thereby a gross offence against the sovereignty of the neutral government, and probably involves it in difficulties with the other belligerent, who suffers in proportion to his success in his unlawful enterprise. The injured neutral may not only demand reparation and indemnity, but may also use force, if necessary, to prevent the departure of expeditions from its territory or seize the persons and things of which they are composed. The exact limits of its powers and duties in such cases will be discussed when we deal with the obligations of neutral states towards belligerent states.1 Here we need do no more than lay down the general principle that its operations should be confined to its own territory and its own jurisdiction, without stopping to inquire whether there are any exceptions to this rule.

1 See § 264.

§ 251.

We will consider next the duty of belligerent states

To obey all reasonable regulations made by neutral states for the protection of their neutrality.

enjoy

Per

(8) To obey all tions made by

reasonable regula

neutral states for

the protection of

their neutrality.

This duty relates chiefly, though not exclusively, to maritime affairs. The land forces of the combatants are not permitted to enter neutral territory; but, unless a neutral expressly forbids the entry of belligerent war-ships, they may freely the hospitality of its ports and waters. mission is assumed in the absence of any notice to the contrary, but nevertheless it is a privilege based upon the consent of the neutral, and therefore capable of being accompanied by any conditions he chooses to impose. Belligerent commanders can demand that they shall not be asked to submit to unjust and unreasonable restraints, and that whatever rules are made shall be enforced impartially on both sides. But further they cannot go. Where they enter on sufferance they must respect the wishes of those who permit their presence. Only when their vessels are driven by stress of weather, or otherwise reduced to an unseaworthy condition, can they demand admission as a matter of strict law. Their right to shelter under such circumstances is called the Right of Asylum, and it cannot be refused by a neutral without a breach of international duty.

In recent times neutral states have acted upon their right. of imposing conditions on belligerent vessels visiting their ports. The twenty-four hours rule is the oldest and the most common. It lays down that, when war vessels of opposing belligerents are in a neutral port at the same time, or when war vessels of one side and merchant vessels of the other are in the like predicament, at least twenty-four hours shall elapse between the departure of those who leave first and the departure of their opponents. The object of this

injunction is to prevent the occurrence of any fighting either in the waters of the neutral or so close to them as to be dangerous to vessels frequenting them. Sometimes the word of the commanders that they will not commence hostilities in or near neutral territorial waters has been accepted as sufficient. Greater precautions were generally taken for the restraint of privateers; but the practical abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris has made obsolete the distinction between two classes of belligerent cruisers. The possibility of evading the twenty-four hours' rule was shown by the conduct of the United States steamer Tuscarora at Southampton, in December, 1861, and January, 1862. The Southern cruiser Nashville was undergoing repairs in the harbor, and by keeping steam up, claiming to precede her whenever she attempted to depart, and then returning within a day, the Tuscarora really blockaded her in a British port. In the end a British ship of war, exercising a right which a neutral possesses in extreme cases,1 escorted the Nashville past the Tuscarora and out to sea, while the latter was forbidden to leave the port for twenty-four hours.2 This and other circumstances caused the British Government to issue on Jan. 31, 1862, a series of neutrality regulations more stringent than any hitherto published. They provided that no ship of war of either belligerent should be permitted to leave a British port from which a ship of war or merchant vessel of the other belligerent had previously departed, until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of the latter. They laid down further that war vessels of either belligerent should be required to depart within twenty-four hours of their entry, unless they needed more time for taking in innocent supplies or effecting lawful repairs, in which case they were to obtain special permission to remain for a longer period, and were to put to sea within

1 Wheaton, International Law (Dana's ed.), note 208.

2 British State Papers, North America, No. 2 (1873), pp. 242–244; Wheaton, International Law (Lawrence's ed.), note 216.

twenty-four hours after the reason for their remaining ceased. They might freely purchase provisions and other things necessary for the subsistence of their crews; but the amount of coal they were allowed to receive was limited to as much as was necessary to take them to the nearest port of their own country. Moreover, no two supplies of coals were to be obtained in British waters within three months of each other. These restrictions upon the liberty of belligerent vessels in British ports have been reimposed in subsequent wars. The United States adopted them in 1870 at the outbreak of the conflict between France and Germany, and other powers have copied them wholly or in part. In fact they have become so common that they are sometimes regarded as rules of International Law. This is especially the case with regard to the supply of coal. It is often said that a neutral state is bound to allow belligerent cruisers to take on board no more than is sufficient to carry them to the nearest port of their own country. Such an obligation is unknown to the law of nations, which arms neutrals with authority to impose what restraint they deem necessary, but does not condemn them if they impose none. It classifies coals, not with arms and ammunition, the supply of which is prohibited, but with provisions and naval stores, the supply of which is allowed. It is a grave question whether the rule ought not to be changed. In modern naval warfare speed is becoming more and more important, and coal is as much a necessity for fighting purposes as gunpowder. The presence or absence of a full supply of it may make all the difference between victory or defeat in a naval engagement, and determine whether a cruiser is to be an effective commercedestroyer or a useless log. There is good reason, therefore, for making it into a forbidden commodity; but the change must be effected by general consent or universal custom, and

1 British State Papers, Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners. pp. 77, 78.

2 Wharton, International Law of the United States, § 402.

meanwhile nothing is gained by representing limitations of supply due to the will of the neutral as restraints imposed by the international code. Belligerents are bound to submit to reasonable regulations in this as in other matters, and neutrals are bound to take efficient means for the protection of their neutrality; but no more precise obligations have as yet been laid upon them.

In modern wars the armed vessels of the combatants have not been allowed to bring their prizes into neutral ports except in the cases covered by the Right of Asylum. Till recently, free entry was permitted, and prizes were sometimes adjudicated upon, and even sold, while lying in neutral waters, when it was not safe to bring them into a port of the captor's country. These practices caused much discussion as to the limits of the jurisdiction of Prize Courts, and were inconsistent with the newer and stricter views of stateneutrality. The transition from them to the present custom of total exclusion is seen in the regulations issued by the neutral maritime states during the struggles of the middle of the present century, especially the American Civil War. Some powers allowed prizes to be brought in by belligerent cruisers, but prohibited the sale of them in their ports and waters; others excluded them from certain ports and admitted them into the rest; while a third group excluded them altogether. The practice of total exclusion rests upon a wide basis of recent custom, and is not likely to be departed from by civilized states; but at present it can hardly be regarded as obligatory, though in time it will probably become so.

In land warfare belligerent troops are excluded from neutral territory. Instead of being allowed, like sea forces, to come and go freely unless the government of the neutral state expressly forbids their entry, they are kept out altogether, not by the mere will of the neutral power, but by the common. law of nations. The only case in which they may be per

1 British State Papers, Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners, pp. 39-79.