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The question whether Great Britain had sufficient legal and moral justification for her Intervention in the Transvaal has been hotly debated all over the civilized world. Space does not allow us to discuss it fully. Only a few of the chief considerations applicable to the case can be mentioned here. In the first place we may put aside the notion that the infringements of Great Britain's rights under the Convention of 1884 justified her interference. They were irritating pin-pricks, important as shewing the direction of Boer policy, but too trifling in themselves, and as to some of them too doubtful, to make proper a resort to war. The grievances of British citizens stand, however, upon a very different footing. One of the most essential interests of a state is the good treatment of its subjects abroad. It has a right to intervene on their behalf, if their grievances are sufficiently great and redress is persistently denied. It may well be argued that the Outlanders were in this position. Undoubtedly some of them acquired large fortunes. Mine-owners and stock-brokers were not "squeezed" in Johannesburg as they would have been in similar circumstances by Turkish Pashas. But of full, free, worthy citizen life there was none for them or other Outlanders. A corrupt executive worried them at every turn; and they were denied many of the amenities of civilized municipal existence. Their treatment as a subject race in the Transvaal was a serious blow to British prestige all over South Africa. In fact their position, and that of their political masters, was an outcome of those historical circumstances that seemed to lead irresistibly to a conflict between the two nationalities. All over South Africa, except in the Transvaal, Briton and Boer had equal political privileges. In the Transvaal the latter kept the former in subjection in order that he might live his own isolated life in his own patriarchal fashion. The strangers within his gates were too numerous and too able to be allowed any certain foothold. The citizenship the Outlanders claimed was not the

right to share with the old-established population in the government of the country, but the power to mould the institutions of the state in a way fundamentally opposed to the ideas of its makers. The independence for which the Boers tyrannized and fought was not the right of the inhabitants of a territory to control their own political destinies, but the power of a dominant minority to impose its wishes on a subject majority.

But the best justification for Great Britain's action is to be found in the evidence that is accumulating of a fixed design on the part of the leaders of Dutch opinion all over South Africa, to push English power and influence out of the country, and substitute for it Dutch power and influence, centred in the two Republics, and extending outwards till it covered the country from the Zambesi to the Cape. This is constantly spoken of as the great Dutch conspiracy; but conspiracy implies secret plotting for a definite object to be attained by definite means on a definite occasion. If there was anything like this, it was confined to very few. But it seems clear that the hopes and aspirations of the statesmen of the two Republics were directed towards a South Africa under a Dutch flag, and that constant propagation of those views had caused them to spread far and wide among the Dutch population. England's difficulty would have been their opportunity. The Transvaal began arming before 1895, though to what extent is still doubtful. After the Raid she armed to the teeth, and her armament could have been directed against no power but Great Britain. The Orange Free State threw in its lot with the northern Republic, though its own relations with the British had been for years cordial and friendly. Ten thousand Dutch rose in Cape Colony and joined the invaders, though they had not a single grievance of their own to allege. The struggle was to a large extent a civil war. Wise statesmanship in the past, conciliation on both sides in the present, might perhaps have avoided it. But in the main it was

an effort on the part of Great Britain to preserve her threatened supremacy and retain her position as the paramount power in South Africa.

It may be interesting to note that there are many points of resemblance between the last warlike ventures of the two great branches of the English-speaking people. The United States went to war in Cuba to abate an international nuisance at its gates. Great Britain went to war in South Africa with much the same object in view. The United States intends to extend ordered liberty after a period of military tutelage. Great Britain has exactly the same intention. The motives of the American people were in the main good, but with the good there was mixed some evil. The desire of vengeance for the Maine mingled with sympathy for the woes of the Cubans. Some men wished and worked for war to further their political and financial schemes, not from indignation against Spanish cruelty. It was the same with the English people. Some wanted easier terms for their mining ventures, and thought that under British rule in the Transvaal the fortune-hunter and the cosmopolitan financier would have better opportunities than were given by the Boers. Some shrieked for vengeance for Majuba. But the great majority were determined that their brethren in the South African Republic should no longer be treated as a subject race, and their country should no longer be flouted by ignorant Boers. Humanitarian considerations swayed the minds of many; though some hoped to grow rich by means of plentiful supplies of cheap Kafir labor. Moreover, in the results of the two wars there is great similarity. Neither power entered upon the conflict in order to gain territory; but both find themselves in possession of additional dominions as a consequence of their victories. But the most striking resemblance of all is found in the fact that for each nation the unexpected consequences of the war are by far the most important. The United States has entered upon a career of expansion which will alter materially her

policy and her position in the world; while the assistance rendered to Great Britain by her self-governing colonies, and the magnificent outburst of Imperial patriotism which has accompanied it, are earnests of greater things to come when the Empire shall have acquired organs through which to express its desires and aspirations.

SECTION III.

POWER OVER TERRITORY LEASED BY ONE STATE TO

ANOTHER.

WHEN dealing in the text with territorial rights we laid down (§ 101) that a state might possess power over territory as (a) a part of its dominions, (b) a protectorate, and (c) a sphere of influence. To these three must now be added a fourth. A state may possess a lease of territory granted by the power which previously exercised the rights of sovereignty therein. For instance, in the spring of 1898 a treaty was negotiated between Germany and China whereby the latter leased to the former Kiao-chau Bay and the adjacent territory for a term of ninety-nine years. About the same time Russia obtained from China a similar concession. To quote the language of the official communication sent to the Russian press, "Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, with the territories adjacent thereto, and the territorial waters dependent thereon, have been ceded in usufruct to the Imperial Government for a term of twenty-five years, which may be extended later by common accord." Great Britain followed by acquiring the port of Wei-hai-wei, on the same terms and for the same period as had been arranged for the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. In addition she obtained a lease for ninety-nine years of a strip of territory opposite her island of Hong Kong, in order to provide effectively for the defence of the city. France, not to be outdone by other powers, demanded and obtained a lease of the Bay of Kwangchau-wan on the southern coast of China.

It is difficult to say what is the precise legal effect of such concessions as we have enumerated. In private law both

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