from other Part-Sovereign States in that the attributes of sovereignty which the domestic rulers lack are not vested in the government of any other community. In Part-Sovereign States of the first kind the Suzerain exercises the powers of which the local government is deprived. In loose Confederations the central authority transacts with foreign powers the business which the rulers of the separate states are not competent to transact for themselves. But when a state is permanently neutralized, no external authority can involve it in offensive war. The powers which its domestic rulers cannot exercise are not given to the rulers of some other state: they are suspended altogether by public law. As long as the state remains neutralized they do not exist. No one, for instance, can legally involve Belgium, Switzerland, or Luxemburg in war for any other purpose than the defence of their own frontiers. Their territories are neutralized; and therefore neither their own governments nor any others have by International Law the right to make offensive war on their behalf. Their position is in many respects peculiar. We have defined it here so far as is necessary for our present purpose. When we come to deal with Neutrality we shall have to refer to it again.1

§ 53.

Civilized Belliger

not being States.

We have now to consider the relation in which Civilized Belligerent Communities not being States stand to International Law. We have reckoned them among its subjects and it remains for us to justify our classifi- ent Communities cation. These communities have not received recognition as Sovereign States; but their governments possess the essential attributes of sovereignty, and they desire admission into the family of nations. Why then are they excluded? Because the fact of their sovereignty may be a temporary phenomenon. They are endeavoring by war to cut themselves adrift from the state of which they form a

1 See §§ 245, 246.

part, and set up a separate national existence of their own; and while serious efforts are still being made for their subjection, the government they have created may at any moment be overturned, and they may relapse into their former condition of component portions of a larger political whole. Accordingly they are not recognized as independent states while the struggle is proceeding with any semblance of vigor on the part of the mother country. But meanwhile they are levying armies, equipping cruisers if the contest is maritime, and carrying on war in a regular and civilized fashion; and those states who are brought into contact with their operations must decide whether to regard them as lawful or unauthorized. In a case such as we have supposed there can be no doubt of the decision. War exists as a fact, and interested states must open their eyes to it. This they do by according to the incipient political community what is known as Recognition of Belligerency. The effect of their action is to endow the community with all the rights and all the obligations of an independent state so far as the war is concerned, but no further. Its armies are lawful belligerents, not banditti; its ships of war are lawful cruisers, not pirates; the supplies it takes from invaded territory are requisitions, not robbery; and at sea its captures made in accordance with maritime law are good prize, and its blockades must be respected by neutrals. But on the other hand, its government cannot negotiate treaties, nor may it accredit diplomatic ministers. The intercourse it carries on with other powers must be informal and unofficial. It has no rights, no immunities, no claims, beyond those immediately connected with its war. It is thus a Subject of International Law only in a limited and imperfect manner. The subjection is very real as far as it goes, but it covers but one portion of the activity of a state and does not extend in any way to the normal relations of peaceful intercourse. Should the belligerent community succeed in defeating all the attempts of the mother country to subdue it, sooner or later existing states

will accord to it Recognition of Independence, and it will then stand on the same footing as they do and become a Subject of International Law in all things. We shall see later on in this chapter what are the conditions of Recognition of Independence, and when we come to deal with the subject of War we shall discuss under what conditions Recognition of Belligerency may be given without affording to the parent state just ground of offence.1

§ 54.

ordinary and privi

Corporations come fourth in our list of the Subjects of International Law; and if we had none but ordinary corporations to deal with, a very few words would Corporations both suffice to indicate the nature of their connec- leged. tion with it. As owners of property they may under certain circumstances come under its rules, especially in matters connected with belligerent capture. If a state in time of war makes a lawful seizure of enemy property on land or at sea, it matters not whether the private owner be an individual, or a group of individuals associated together in a company for trading or other purposes. In either case the property will be confiscated, and all right in it will be lost. to the original possessors. The Prize Courts which administer the law of maritime capture frequently decide upon questions involving corporate ownership, and the rights of corporations may come before international tribunals or be the subject of diplomatic correspondence. Thus far the matter is simple; but we enter upon a sphere of great complexity when we endeavor to describe the international position of those great chartered companies which have been called into existence within the last few years by some of the colonizing powers, especially Great Britain and Germany, to open up enormous territories recently brought within the sphere of their influence. We refer to such privileged corporations as the 1 See §§ 162-163.

German East Africa Company, the British East Africa Company, the Royal Borneo Company, the Royal Niger Company, and the British South Africa Company. The last is probably the strongest and most important of them all. It may be considered typical of its class; and an examination of the powers conferred upon it will enable us to fix the position of the great chartered companies in International

Law.

By Order in Council dated January 18, 1889, Queen Victoria granted to a group of noblemen and gentlemen a royal charter of incorporation as a British company formed for the purpose of carrying into effect concessions made by the chiefs and tribes of a region which stretches, as extended by further grant from Her Majesty in 1891, from the Transvaal territory and the 22d parallel of south latitude to the southern limits of the Congo Free State and German East Africa, and is bounded on the east and west by Portuguese and German spheres of influence and the Nyassaland Protectorate of Great Britain. Within this enormous territory the company possesses by royal grant the liberty to acquire by concession from the natives "any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of government." This right is to be exercised subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose consent has to be gained to the legislative ordinances the company may promulgate, and whose arbitration may be offered, and must be accepted if offered, in case any differences arise with any native chief or tribe within the territory. The company may establish a police force and use a distinctive flag indicating its British character. It is bound not to set up any monopoly of trade, nor to allow the sale of intoxicants to the natives, nor to interfere with their religious rites except for purposes of humanity. It must establish courts for the administration of justice and pay due regard therein to native laws and tribal customs. The discourage

ment and gradual abolition of the slave-trade and domestic servitude are made obligatory upon it. The suggestions of the Colonial Secretary are to be adopted if he dissents from "any of the dealings of the company with any foreign power," and proper attention is to be paid to the requirements and requests of the British High Commissioner in South Africa and other officers of the Queen who may be stationed in its territories. Further, it is bound to perform, under the direction of the Colonial Secretary, all obligations contracted by the Imperial Government with foreign powers in so far as they relate to its territory and its activities. And lastly, the Crown reserves a right to revoke its charter at any time, if it exercises its powers improperly, and to alter or put an end to so much of the charter as relates to administrative and public matters after twenty-five years from the first grant, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years.1

It is easy to see how the natives must regard a body of men armed with such authority as that granted to the British South Africa Company, and possessed of skill, energy, scientific machinery, and weapons of precision. To them the company must be all-powerful. They know little or nothing of the Imperial Government, and indeed the control exercised by the Colonial Secretary, though it looks imposing on paper, must from the nature of the case be merely nominal except in very great emergencies. He is thousands of miles from the scene of action: his information is what the company gives him, and he is busied with a multiplicity of other and more pressing matters. Practically the company rules its territories in so far as they are ruled at all. It legislates, it administers, it punishes, it negotiates, it makes war, and it concludes peace. As regards the native tribes, it exercises all the powers of sovereignty. And what is true in fact is true in theory also. Powers of internal government are expressly 1 London Gazette, Dec. 20, 1889; Statesman's Year Book for 1894, pp. 193-195.

G