blessed by the love of song and the appreciation of the beautiful; and as the north wind scatters the roses that are blooming about his tomb, and the soft white doves out-spread their pinions above it, one cannot help thinking-when remembering the terrible fates that have but too often overtaken unsuccessful aspirants to Empire in a semi-barbaric age-that, in spite of his thirteen years of durance, poor Jem did not get so very badly out of the scrape of being a 'pretender' after all, and, more especially, of a pretender to the Turkish Throne.

MARY MONTGOMERIE CURRIE.

AGRA IN 1857

A REPLY TO LORD ROBERTS

IN his Forty-One Years' Reminiscences in India Lord Roberts has devoted a few paragraphs to very scathing criticism of affairs at Agra during the period from May to October 1857. Lord Roberts visited Agra with Brigadier Greathed's column in the latter month, and his information is based, I believe, on what he then learned, confirmed by Mr. Thornhill's Indian Mutiny, published in 1885. Having studied that book when writing my Memoir of Mr. Colvin for the 'Rulers of India' series in 1895, I briefly laid before Lord Roberts, after reading his Chapter XXI., my reasons for disputing his own conclusions, and for my inability to accept Mr. Thornhill as an authority. Failing to convince him, I am enabled, through the courtesy of the Editor of this Review, to avail myself of its pages in reply to Lord Roberts.

Before I go further let me for a moment refer to the Appendix of Volume I., in which Lord Roberts, basing himself on Sir Donald Stewart's narrative, has described that gallant officer's ride from Agra to Delhi. On my pointing out to Lord Roberts an inaccuracy in his version, he frankly apologised for his error. He also agreed to my request that the matter should be set right in future editions. As many who have read earlier editions may not know of the subsequent correction, I venture to explain that, as originally written, the Appendix (no doubt unintentionally) put Mr. Colvin in a singularly odious light. Sir Donald (then Captain) Stewart would seem according to that account to have gone to Agra in June, and to have placed his services at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor, who in reply proposed to him a most perilous enterprise, viz. to find his way alone to Delhi in charge of despatches from the Governor-General to General Anson, the Lieutenant-Governor meanwhile declining all responsibility whatever should Sir Donald accept the mission. The fact was that Sir Donald Stewart, having made up his mind to go coûte que coûte to Delhi, the Lieutenant-Governor told him that if he chose he could, at his own risk, carry the despatches. The point of difference lies, of course, in Sir Donald Stewart's foregone resolve to go to Delhi antecedently to

any communication with the Lieutenant-Governor or to any mention of the despatches.

I may supply here the concluding words of the narrative furnished by Sir Donald Stewart to Lord Roberts (of which I possess a counterpart), because, while Mr. Colvin's action was placed inadvertently in an unfavourable light in the Reminiscences, Sir Donald Stewart's generous testimony to the aid received from him is not there recorded. 'Mr. Colvin was at the time' (about June 15)' in good spirits, and seemed to me to look at the difficulties before him with a degree of calmness and courage which was not very common at that time; and I attribute much of the success of my proceedings to his suggestions and advice.'

I turn now to the subject-matter of this paper, viz. the criticisms passed by Lord Roberts on the conduct of affairs at Agra.

It is necessary to recall summarily to the reader the situation of the Agra Government in May 1857. Agra was at that time the seat of the Civil Government of the North-West Provinces, which contained a population of 35,000,000, and covered an area of about 120,000 square miles. The head of the Civil Government was its LieutenantGovernor, Mr. Colvin. The Agra British garrison, under the orders of Brigadier-General Polwhele, consisted of a Company's regiment of 655 effective rank and file, and of a battery of six guns, the drivers of which were natives. The whole effective British force in the Provinces, scattered throughout it, numbered in round figures 4,200. The Company's native army within the same area (apart from a large quantity of native-contingent troops) numbered roundly 41,400. About the Lieutenant-Governor were the heads of the several civil departments of the Administration. At the head of the district of Agra, as of the fifty-three districts into which the Provinces were sub-divided, was a magistrate, charged with magisterial, police, and general executive and administrative functions. The magistrate of Agra was Mr. Robert Drummond. Scattered throughout the Provinces were the other civil officials, by whose aid its Administration was conducted.

As soon as the Mutiny broke out, on the 11th of May, Agra was entirely cut off from all communication with Delhi (which was at that time comprised in the Province), with the country beyond Delhi, and therefore with the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of the Punjab. It was not till the 28th of May that any news was received from that quarter. The Meerut British garrison was at once sent to join the army before Delhi; the Cawnpore and other detachments were locked up in self-defence. With the exception of the Agra garrison, not a British soldier was available for the maintenance or restoration of order in the Province. At Agra was a large fort, an important arsenal, and a European and Eurasian population numbering from 2,000 to 3,000, consisting largely of clerks, women, and children. Their number was swelled almost day by day, as refugees poured in

from the several adjacent districts and native States. Anarchy and disorder gained ground daily in all the surrounding country. The fall of Delhi, it was learned on the 28th of May, would be indefinitely deferred. The pressing question which presented itself to the Lieutenant-Governor was that of the policy to be pursued, in view of the powerlessness of his position, at headquarters. I may quote from the Memoir to which I have above referred in order to show what was the line he decided to follow:

Three lines of action presented themselves. The Lieutenant-Governor and all the Christian community might withdraw into the fort and await events; or the women and children might be sent into the fort; or the whole community might remain in their houses, subject to adequate precautions against surprise. By a section of Mr. Colvin's advisers the second course was violently pressed upon him. He decided on adopting the last. For a moment on May 13, when the position was in its first obscurity, he thought of sending the women and children into the fort; but on reflection he refused. The fort was unprovisioned, and in every respect unprepared. His military force was too small to be divided. There was no mutineer force at hand, therefore there was no pressing risk. It was his duty to show a resolute front. He had with him an English regiment, and could organise volunteers. His officers in their districts were endeavouring to hold their posts. He would not set the example of seeking safety behind walls. He could ensure at least the security of headquarters. On May 22 he wrote to Lord Canning that he would decidedly oppose himself to any proposal for throwing his European force into the fort, except in the last extremity. In Mr. Drummond, the magistrate of Agra, he had a strong man, on whom he could rely to keep order.

This policy was angrily opposed by the majority of the community, who were anxious to avail themselves of the shelter of the fort, at least for the women and children, and who distrusted newly raised police levies, on which the Government relied to keep order in Agra and its environs. But, for political reasons, it was the LieutenantGovernor's deliberately adopted policy to show a bold front to the danger at the headquarters of his Administration, and, backed by the British garrison and by volunteers, to that end to utilise in Agra as best he might what native agency he had at his command. 'It is not by shutting ourselves in forts in India that our power can be upheld,' he wrote on the 22nd of May to Lord Canning, and I will decidedly oppose myself to any proposal for throwing the European force into the fort, excepting in the very last extremity.' The LieutenantGovernor's action has been attributed to Mr. Drummond's insistence. What weight Mr. Drummond may have possessed was due to the fact that his courage, vigour, resource, and local influence made him the best available agent for putting Mr. Colvin's policy into effect.

The augmentation of the native police force, alleged delay in securing the defence and provisioning of the fort, and other acts of omission and commission imputed to the Government by Mr. Thornhill, have led Lord Roberts to the conclusion that, far from adopting a definite and resolute policy, such as I describe, the authorities wholly

failed to understand the true character of the crisis, and that their measures were adopted in a fatuous confidence in the loyalty of the native civil population and of the soldiery, which showed itself in unwillingness to give offence to them, or to take the most ordinary measures of precaution. I wish first to examine the character of the evidence by which this conclusion is supported, and then to point out certain considerations of a more general kind which seem to me to have been lost sight of.

Mr. Colvin may be permitted to refute, by the evidence of his own letters, the statement that though warned by many, among others by Scindia and his Minister (a warning, by the way, of which I should like to see the evidence), that the whole native army was disloyal, he refused to believe it, and failed to understand the nature and magnitude of the crisis. I quote passim from letters to Lord Canning of the 29th of May and the 21st of June. On the former date he writes:

I had the honour of receiving yesterday your letter of May 24. With it came a letter for the Commander-in-Chief, which I have really no means of forwarding at present. I took the great liberty of opening it, as one justified by the entire ignorance we have been in of His Excellency's movements and plans, and because I might be able to extract, in a brief form, the essential parts of it, which could be passed through the country in the concealed way which used to be familiar in the old Indian wars. The difficulty of sending messages, even to Meerut, is inconceivable. The country is in utter disorder; but bold men, holding together, should still make their way through. The real reason, I grieve to say, why messages do not get delivered is that the belief in the permanence of our power has been very deeply shaken, and that men think it is a better chance for them to take to open plunderings than to engage in special risks for our service. Still, I shall relax no effort which may be at all likely to be useful for the purpose. Not a line has reached me from the Commander-in-Chief since the commencement of the disturbances.

I fear from the purport of some of your remarks in your letter to General Anson that his advance will be slow. His difficulty-all our difficulty-is not the force of the mutineers in Delhi, but the condition of entire lawlessness which is rapidly overspreading the country.

With the invaluable aid of Mr. R. Drummond, the magistrate here (whose energy, influence, and spirit are beyond all praise), I have been able to maintain order as yet in all the Agra district. Muttra has been quieted by the Bhurtpore and Ulwar forces-Muttra, that is, on the right bank of the Jumna, for on the left fearful murders and violence have been committed. But the country north of Meerut (part at least of the Mozuffernuggur district) is at the mercy of the most daring and criminal. There are many good men whose feelings are with us, but the vicious, the disappointed, or the desperate are the most bold in all such convulsions of order, and on the whole there is (its police force being dispersed) no support to the Government. Quiet men think and arm only for their own defence. With the 120 remaining Mahomedans of the 1st Gwalior Contingent Cavalry corps (80 having gone off to Delhi), and the aid of European volunteers from Agra, I do what I can to clear our front towards Allygurh, but it is but precarious and temporary work. The 120 men are hardly worked, and more or less disinclined to take part against their brethren in the army, though they will help in suppressing plunderings. Seventy steady and, I believe, reliable Hindoos of the same cavalry corps I have sent under Major Raikes to Mynpooree. This