other an Act of 1873. There are persons who have never ceased to denounce the closing of the Indian mints and to call for their being opened anew. But the strongest advocate of a gold standard would hesitate to apply to such men the language which has been freely hurled at the democrats of the West. True, it will be urged, but the difference of twenty years is in this case vital; interests have been made, arrangements effected, debts contracted upon the basis of the dollar as it is, and the lapse of time continually extends the magnitude of the obligations thus arising, whilst effacing those of a previous period; and it would be in the highest degree unjust to allow a freely minted dollar of silver to satisfy claims resting on the dollar of gold. It must be admitted that this is a very effective argument, but the amount of weight to be attributed to it must depend upon an examination of the quantity of debt still existing, created before 1873, upon review of the changes that have been effected in the interval in the value of the current dollar, and further upon the conditions that may be laid down as to the future satisfaction of debts created in the interval. In reference to this last point it must be remembered that the American constitution nullifies all legislation made in derogation of pre-existing contracts, so that whenever a debt had been contracted to be paid in gold dollars it could be satisfied only by their tender; and the platform of the democratic party upon which Mr. Bryan stood, accepted, and necessarily accepted, this constitutional provision, whilst it proposed that for the future no contracts should be legally valid which could tend to demonetise silver. The case therefore stands that with respect to debts contracted before 1873 the remonetisation of silver would be a reversion to the condition under which such debts were contracted, the debtor having in the interval suffered all the injustice upon which stress is now laid; whilst with regard to obligations created since 1873, those specially contracted in gold would remain payable in gold only, and the rest were created with complete knowledge of the right and power of Congress to remonetise silver, for the exercise of which there has been an unceasing demand, and the contingency and probability of which are attested by the special provision contained in so many contracts that they shall be satisfied in gold only. These considerations appear greatly to attenuate the force of the argument I have repeated, and indeed it must be obvious that, however undesirable frequent changes in the standard of value may be, a nation cannot be debarred from reversing a step it has taken little more than twenty years ago, if by experience the inconveniences, not to say hardships, attendant upon it have been demonstrated, and regard to the general good of the nation requires that it should be reversed. It is now not unfrequently admitted by the staunchest adherents of the gold standard amongst ourselves that the demonetisation of silver by France, Germany, and the United States was an error to be regretted, and if possible repaired. We, they say, can make no change in our own law, but it is a great pity that other nations were so illadvised as to make changes in theirs, and if they can only be brought back to the situation in which they were, it would be a common international benefit. The House of Commons practically embodied this opinion in a unanimous resolution passed in February 1895, when Sir William Harcourt was its leader. It decided on the motion of Mr. Everett: That this House regards with increasing apprehension the constant fluctuations and the growing divergence in the relative value of gold and silver, and heartily concurs in the recent expressions of opinion on the part of the government of France, and the government and parliament of Germany, as to the most serious evils resulting therefrom. It therefore urges upon Her Majesty's Government the desirability of co-operating with other Powers in an international conference for the purpose of considering what measures can be taken to remove or mitigate those evils. This resolution, it must be confessed, is eminently characteristic of ourselves in its insularity, but it rests on the clear principle that has been already enunciated: our monetary law has been unchanged for a century, and we hesitate to consider any change in it now. But if our neighbours who were so unwise to make changes in 1873 will only go back to their previous laws, it would be to their benefit and our own, and we should be delighted at their action. The House of Commons at all events recognised no difficulty in retracing the course of legislation under such conditions as each legislature might deem reasonable and just. If the proposal to re-establish free coinage of silver cannot be blocked at the outset as beyond the moral competency of Congress, the consideration of it must be determined by an examination of the effects it will produce. What would have been the practical consequences of the election of Mr. Bryan to the Presidency? It seems absurd to reply nothing at all,' and yet for some considerable time this answer would be accurate. It was practically confessed at a very early stage in the contest that, even though Mr. Bryan had been chosen by the college of electors, the election of new members of the House of Representatives, chosen as they are in single-member districts, could not have given him a majority in that chamber to support his views. The choice of Mr. Bryan might have been a most significant note of warning as to what would have come hereafter, but it would for two years at least have been ineffective in opening the mints to silver. The excitement that prevailed so largely on this side of the Atlantic was at least premature. We should have had a great flutter in the prices of American securities, fortunes of speculators might have been lost and gained, but arter a time it would have been seen that nothing was about to happen at once, and the permanent investor would have been consoled.2 Let us, however, put aside this view and 2 Since the above was written I have received information which gives a practical assume what was most improbable, that, concurrently with the election of Mr. Bryan, a House and a Senate would have been found ready to support his platform, so that the mints might in a few months have been opened to the free coinage of silver. What would have been the consequences? The mints could not have been opened till the early summer, but in the interval silver would have been ready to be poured in, as it would when summer came have been available for all purposes, its use would have been rapidly discounted by a continuous advance of its price in relation to gold. There would have been just the reverse tide of operation which was witnessed after its demonetisation by several governments, the last and smallest wave of which was seen when the Indian mints were closed. It is impossible to say to what extent this rise would have gone, still less what would have been the point reached when the mints were in actual operation. Many believe that the readmission of silver into monetary use on so large a scale, with the consequential liberation of the demand for gold for monetary use, coupled with the stimulus that would have been given to production in the States by rising prices, would have raised silver to the old par of exchange of 16 to 1 which prevailed in America before 1873. I cannot say that I hold this view myself. The value of the freely minted Mexican dollar in relation to gold is little more than half its former amount, and to double the ratio by opening the Washington mints, seems to be an excessive estimate of the effect of the change. Taking into account, however, the breadth and extent of the demand that would have been created and the consequent relief of gold, I cannot but think there would have been a very large rise, and although a premium on gold would have remained, it would have been so diminished that other nations would have been largely encouraged to follow the example of the United States, with the effect of making gold and silver freely coinable, and coined in the mints of the civilised world. In this way the isolated action of the United States might have helped to produce the concerted action which Republicans aim at, and a condition of things would have been restored which the House of Commons pronounced desirable. A clearer view of the operation may perhaps be gained by the use of figures, although they must be regarded as more or less arbitrary. The silver in a dollar is now worth something about 28. 2d. of our money. The opening of the American mints might raise this to 38., in which case there would be a premium on gold in the United States of nearly 35 per cent. But this would not be the whole of the operameasure of what was anticipated in the States themselves, as to the possible result of the election of Mr. Bryan. An English gentleman being owed a large sum of money in dollars insured himself against a fall, after the election, at the rate of 1 per cent. Now the betting against Mr. Bryan was four to one, or, in other words, the chance of his success was reckoned at one-fifth, and since 1 per cent. covered a loss that would follow an event the chance of which was one-fifth, the loss that would have ensued was reckoned at 5 per cent. tion prices would have risen in respect of gold not only in the United States, but throughout the commercial world, so that while silver was lifted up, gold was being brought down; and whilst we may measure the change as between silver and gold, we cannot put so easily into figures the change which would be traced in the index numbers of commodities. The difference between the Bryan platform and the Republican platform would be this, that whereas the former would in my judgment leave a premium on gold and so introduce just such an element of inconvenience into the external trade of the United States as the trade of India suffered through the varying rates of exchange of the rupee, the latter, bringing silver further up and gold further down till the old par was established, would have removed this premium altogether, have left the foreign trade of the United States, and indeed of the world, undistracted by divergences between the metals, and would have raised the niveau of prices in all markets. Continuing the arbitrary figures already used, the silver dollar and the gold dollar would be freely exchangeable for one another, but both in relation to commodities would suffer a decline which might be shown by an increase of as much as a fifth in the index numbers. The issue therefore before a citizen of the United States was whether he should vote for an opening of the mints to silver as soon as the forms of the constitution would allow, or whether he should support a proposal to wait until the other commercial nations could be induced to open their mints simultaneously; and in respect of this issue the point to be regarded is the measure of the inconvenience and loss that would be suffered by a nation. having a standard of value different from that of the more important of its fellows. Is the balance of expediency, in a word, in favour of free silver although the foreign trade of the States might be hampered by varying rates of exchange? On this issue I do not desire to pronounce a very positive opinion; had I been an American citizen I might, and probably would, have hesitated. The dim forces of conservatism might have prevailed. But it would not have been the conservatism of honesty, which would have had nothing to say to the decision; it might perhaps be stigmatised as the conservatism of uncertainty. I suspect that much of that rallying of the democracy to the Republican platform which has provoked such admiration in statesmen so different from one another, must be attributed to a similar feeling on the part of the voters-it is very doubtful whether they at all saw their way to what would follow free coinage of silver —and not to a rejection of the opposite platform as immoral and unjust. The American Democracy must have all the credit that is due to the prudence of ignorance. If indeed we conceive the problem on a large scale the balance of morality may be claimed on the other side; the final result of the free mintage of silver contrasted with the effect of its present exclusion. would be the raising of the prices of the products of labour, and concurrently therewith of the wages of the labourers, whilst the burdens of debt and of charges which have been aggravated would be brought back to their former level; the rentier who has benefited by the monopoly of gold would lose that benefit again; the workman, the farmer, the manufacturer, in a word, the industrial community, would be relieved of the added charge that has been thrown upon it. The great issue of the presidential contest which attracted attention on this side of the Atlantic was that of free silver, and upon it indeed the combatants concentrated their energies as the fight progressed. But there were other points of difference between the contending parties, more clearly defined and of more lasting importance. The Republican party has had a great record. It adopted, enforced, and carried through the war against slavery, when the Democrats were the upholders of the evil system and weak-hearted in the maintenance of the Union, even if they were not indifferent to its continued existence. It is impossible to forget this past, and it is therefore painful to write anything that may savour of harsh judgment of the Republican party of to-day. Yet its platform was an appeal to some of the worst tendencies of the American democracy, and a defence of one of the most unequal and unjust systems of taxation. Protection and jingoism were rampant all along the line. The best characteristics of American citizenship seem to have disappeared. In a former generation the Republican North was content with peaceful colonisation of the untravelled West, while the Democratic South advocated aggression as a means of adding to the slavepeopled States. Now the Republican party cast their eyes about the world and demand the protectorate of Hawaii, the acquisition of Danish islands in the West Indies, intervention in Cuba, and for these and similar purposes would extend the naval power of the Federation. To meet the cost of such a policy protective duties would be increased, and the burdens to be borne by the masses would be aggravated by the exclusion of foreign supplies extending to some of the necessaries of life. This formidable tariff would not only shut out the manufactures of Europe, it would restrict every citizen to the use of sugar which was home grown. The Democratic party, on the other hand, was seen in their platform to be occupying much the same position as Sir Robert Peel filled amongst ourselves half a century ago. All of us, with few exceptions of no importance, look upon the action of Sir Robert Peel, in the years from 1841 to 1846, as a new and glorious departure in our commercial and fiscal policy, and we are grateful to his memory for liberating the industry of the kingdom, and for calling upon property to supply deficiency in the national revenue. He cleared the tariff, and he restored the income tax. This is precisely the policy embodied in the democratic platform. The following are the words of the Chicago platform: |