them to speak. But they never recovered their equanimity during the rest of the siege; and the major was openly requested to inform the commander-in-chief that our men would never go out with the 2nd-21st again. I do not know whether their message reached head-quarters; but as a matter of fact they were not taken out again.

In the camp laager a riot ensued that night. The carbineers and artillery, who considered they had been deserted by the 2nd-21st, turned out in force, and made an attack upon them. The row began with taunts, but went on to blows, and the officers had great difficulty in patching up a peace, and did not succeed in doing so till some bloody heads and noses had resulted.

Next day our prisoners were released, and the enemy returned the ambulance with the wounded. A pretext was made by the authorities that the transaction was not an exchange of prisoners, but the pretext was too transparent to deceive any one. Strange to say, while all the hospital attendants were wounded, the doctor in charge, who was mounted, escaped unhurt. Most of our men were wounded in the legs or the lower part of the body. The enemy always shot low, and they shot well. They killed or wounded seventeen of our men, while, according to their account, they did not lose a single man.

came.

After the Red House Kraal fiasco nothing of importance occurred till the end of the siege. The end soon On the 15th of March a flag of truce was sent in by the enemy. The bearer brought with him a Boer "Government Gazette" and a copy of the Free State paper De Express, containing an account of the

See "De Vrijheids Oorlog," p. 354.

Majuba fight, and of the armistice concluded by Sir Evelyn Wood with the Boers. These were followed by copies of English papers containing a confirmation of the news. We had a short time previously received most circumstantial information relative to the advance of General Colley to relieve us, and at the time the flag of truce arrived, he was supposed to be encamped on the High Veld, about fifty miles from Pretoria. Several lotteries were started depending on the date of the relief column arriving in the Pretoria valley, and expectation was at its height when the news of the British reverses arrived. The intelligence was a cruel disappointment; but comfort was picked out of the fact that the same papers which gave us the bad news also brought information of the despatch from various points of overwhelming reinforcements, and that a motion in the House of Commons condemning the annexation had been negatived by a majority. Not a soul dreamed. of the desertion which was impending over us. The news of a peace having been concluded, involving the surrender of the Transvaal to the Boers, was first communicated to us by the enemy, but we laughed it to scorn as a fabrication. But on Monday, the 28th, 102 days after the hoisting of the Republican flag at Heidelberg, some British officers came into camp bearing the humiliating news that the English Government really intended to surrender the country, and to desert its loyal defenders.

The scene which ensued baffles description. The men hoisted the colours half-mast high. The Union Jack was pulled down and dragged through the mud. The distinctive ribbons worn round the hats of the men as badges were pulled off, and trampled under foot. I saw men crying like children with shame and despair.

1

Some went raving up and down that they were Englishmen no longer; others with flushed and indignant faces declaimed against the treachery which had misled them into a useless sacrifice; while others again, with stricken and woe-begone faces, sat contemplating their impending ruin, "refusing to be comforted." It was a painful, distressing, and humiliating scene, and such as I hope never to witness again. While I write, the remembrance of it comes vividly before me; and as I recall to mind the weeping men and women, the infuriated volunteers, and the despairing farmers and storekeepers, half crazy with the sense of wounded national honour, and the prospect of loss and ruin before them, my blood boils within me, and I cannot trust myself to commit to paper what I think. The lapse of two years has but deepened the feeling which I then experienced. The subject may perhaps be only unpleasant to people at home, but to me personally, who have seen the ruin and dismay brought upon the too credulous loyalists, the recollections it stirs up are more bitterly mortifying than words can describe.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FIGHTING IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Attack on the 94th Regiment at Bronker's Spruit-Over-confidence of Colonel Anstruther-Particulars of the surprise - Boer courtesy to prisoners-Murder of Captain Elliott-Siege of Potchefstroom-The garrison-Surrender of the Government officesIll-treatment of Raaf and his volunteers-Death of FindlayMurder of Van der Linden-Murder of Dr. Woite-Other murders-Story of the defence of the fort-Miserable situation of the ladies-The daily life of the soldiers-Attack on the Boer trenches-Attempts to deceive the garrison-Boers firing on the white flag-Treacherous surrender-Garrison march out with the honours of war-Siege of Standerton-Bravery of Hall -Use of the cat-The dummy cannon-Siege of LydenburgMurder of Green-Appearance of Aylward-Mutiny of the troops-Siege of Rustenburg-Siege of Marabastad-Siege of Wakkerstroom-Ill-treatment of Mr. Moffat at Zeerust - Natives hostile to the Dutch-Their entreaties to be allowed to fight— Their cruel desertion.

It has been stated in a previous chapter that when the Republican flag was hoisted at Heidelberg the Boers despatched three bodies of troops in various directions. One proceeded to Potchefstroom, to get the proclamation of Independence printed; the second marched to the south-eastern frontier, to meet the British troops hurrying up from Natal; the third was detailed to attack a detachment of the 94th Regiment on its way from Lydenburg to join the garrison at Pretoria.

The detachment of British troops consisted of two companies and the headquarters of the regiment. They were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther. Considerable delay was experienced in setting out from Lydenburg in consequence of difficulties in procuring waggons, The Boers were unencumbered by transport arrangements; a little biltong served for food; and the nearest stream supplied water. Our troops, on the contrary, were impeded by a long train of waggons, which not only acted as a hindrance to their march, but contributed indirectly to =the fatal results which followed. It was the same in

Zulu-land during the Zulu war. The lumbering oxwaggons loaded with stores were responsible for many -disasters. If Colonel Anstruther had left Lydenburg in light marching order, he would have been in Pretoria before the Boers could have attacked him; and even if he had not been able to get there, his forces would not have been weakened by the constant necessity of guarding the waggons, and might not have suffered so severely as they did.

The detachment left Lydenburg on the 5th of December. It reached Middleburg on the 14th, and proceeded from thence to Pretoria. While at Olifant's river, on the way, Colonel Anstruther received a letter from Colonel Bellairs, warning him that 500 Boers had left the Boer camp, and advising him to be cautious, and to guard against any sudden attack or surprise of cattle. The letter did not say anything about the proclamation of the Republic, and it is only fair to Colonel Anstruther's memory to state that he did not gather from the letter that war had actually broken out. At the same time he can hardly be acquitted of blame. After the After the warning he received, a good