The disgust of the remainder of the population at being suddenly thrust back into the dark ages would probably have developed into rebellion and civil war. Those of us who knew the country when it was under the direction of the men who addressed the High Commissioner the other day, are not likely to forget the quality of their rule. It was not simply education and administrative ability that were wanting there was the narrow-mindedness which elevated ignorance into a virtue, and the low cunning which knew how to turn peace and power into occasions for personal aggrandizement, and which filled subordinate offices with men who would yield themselves as tools to prejudice and dishonour for their own advantage. There was corruption everywhere. Caprice, not law, was paramount. And these characteristics prevailed to the last day of the Republic. We are not likely to forget the lawlessness of the Landdrosts and their underlings, and the uncontrolled authority of the field-cornets. These latter did just as they chose, especially in the matter of war-taxes, making the sum light or heavy according as the party happened to be a friend or otherwise.

3

With reference to the financial condition of the Republic I need only refer to the able report of Mr. Sargeaunt, the Special Commissioner appointed by the British Government to examine into the finances of the country after the annexation. It is unnecessary to trouble the reader with a detailed account of the financial circumstances of the country, since it is admitted on all hands that it was bankrupt. I extract, therefore, only one or two paragraphs illustrating in a general way the condition at which things had arrived. Under the head of "salaries" Mr. Sargeaunt remarks:—

When the country was taken over by Sir T. Shepstone, the salaries of the Government officials were in arrear to the extent of 35127. 16s. 8d., and the postal contracts to the extent of 7334l. 48. 9d. On the other hand, there was not a cent in the treasury, and current receipts scarcely provided for current expenditure.

In another part of the report Mr. Sargeaunt remarks:

The Republican Government was without assets to meet these heavy liabilities, without a farthing in hand, and without credit; it could not raise funds for most pressing requirements, except on the most exorbitant terms, having agreed to pay in a few instances ten, and even as much as twelve per cent. for small advances, repayment being personally guaranteed by some of the executive officers.

Some time before the late Government had reached this state of insolvency, its one-pound notes had been depreciated to such an extent that they were current in the country at a nominal value, varying from 2s. 6d. to 58. ; thus, without funds, without credit, with a permanent debt of more than 156,000l., with a floating debt of nearly the same amount, the late Government of the Transvaal may be described as indeed bankrupt.

As

Mr. Sargeaunt in the course of his report says there were 17,000l. of quit-rents due by farmers to the Government in arrear; and the poll-tax of 10s., payable by every burgher not having a quit-rent farm, and by every native, yielded only 1000l. per annum. regards the native taxes generally Mr. Sargeaunt says: "I can come to no other conclusion but that the late Government did not attempt to collect from any of the strong and powerful tribes."

With reference to the public accounts the report states:-"It would be at once tedious and unprofitable to cite the numerous instances of irregularities which came under my notice, and it may be sufficient here to state that the public revenue was irregularly collected, and that there was no real audit of either revenue or expenditure."

A member of the Government of President Burgers told me that when the railway plant at Delagoa Bay was seized for debt, a deputation (of which my informant was one) was organized to go down to the Bay to endeavour to get it released. The Republic could not pay the expenses of the deputation, amounting to about 300l.; and it was only after great difficulty

that the required sum was obtained by a mortgage of some Government property near Pretoria. Indeed, the Volksraad itself passed a resolution to the effect that it appeared, "from the report of the Financial Commission, that the taxes have not for the greater part been paid, and it has become impossible, under such circumstances, for the Government to carry on the administration and control of the country."

The insolvency of the Republic was perhaps not of itself a sufficient reason for annexation. But the insolvency was an element in the powerlessness of the State to defend itself against the hordes of Ketchwayo and Sekkukuni, and the British Government could not overlook it. It was one of a series of considerations which compelled interference.

No doubt there are people who would never be convinced by any arguments whatever that we were justified in annexing the Transvaal in 1877. It is no use appealing to such persons; but I ask the ordinary, sober-minded, common-sense readers of this book, whether the evidence adduced in the preceding chapters is not sufficient to justify the proceedings of Lord Carnarvon. When we consider the express stipulations of the Sand River Convention with regard to slavery, the duties of the paramount power to the black races, and the dangers which loomed over British subjects in South Africa through the acts of the Boers, I think, we can come but to one conclusion. The British Government did not want to annex the country. It was compelled to do so.

There are others, again, who think that the annexation, though ultimately inevitable, was premature, and therefore impolitic at the time it took place. use the words of one observer, the country was like a

To

cherry nearly ripe, which would have fallen into our hands of its own accord, if suffered to mature. In other words, if we had waited a little longer, the difficulties of the Boers would have become so pressing that they would themselves have sought to be annexed. Very likely this is what would have occurred; but the theory throws out of view the fact that the annexation took place not for the sake of the Boers only. It was undertaken mainly on account of the dangers to which our possessions in South Africa were exposed by the conduct of the Boers and the condition of the Transvaal, and also for the sake of the oppressed and suffering natives. To have waited longer might possibly have saved some of our after troubles. It might have been politic, but it would not, as circumstances then stood, have been morally right.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRANSVAAL DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF SIR
THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE.

The news of the annexation received with satisfaction in England— The majority of the Boers tacitly acquiescent-The natives and Europeans jubilant-Remission of the war-levy-The first deputation to England-Absences of the administrator on the border -The beginning of disaffection-The petition to the Colonial Secretary-The proclamation of the 11th of March, 1878-The retirement of Lord Carnarvon-The meeting at DoornfonteinThe second deputation to England-My first visit to the Transvaal-The Sekkukuni war-Attack on Masselaroon-Colonel Rowlands appointed Commandant-General – The Zulu war-Piet Uys and the Utrecht Boers assist; the other Boers hold aloofMeeting at Wonderfontein-Joubert's interview with Sir Bartle Frere-Recall of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and appointment of Colonel Lanyon.

THE news of the annexation was generally received with satisfaction in England. Some members of the Opposition, headed by Mr. Courtney, objected to what they considered a high-handed act of tyranny over a weak people. But the responsible members of the party either openly welcomed the annexation, or tacitly acquiesced in it. A motion was brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. Courtney, protesting against it as unjustifiable, and calculated to be injurious to the interests of the United Kingdom and of its colonies in South Africa; but it received such little