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120. The use and importance of precision, may be deduced from the nature of the human mind. It can never view, clearly and distinctly, above one object at a time. If it must look at two or three together, especially objects among which there is a resemblance or connexion, it finds itself confused and embarrassed. It cannot clearly perceive in what they agree, and in what they differ.

Illus. Thus, were any object, suppose some animal, to be presented to me of whose structure I wanted to form a distinct notion, I would desire all its trappings to be taken off, I would require it to be brought before me by itself, and to stand alone, that there might be nothing to distract my attention. The same is the case with words. If, when you would inform me of your meaning, you also tell me more than what conveys it; if you join foreign circumstances to the principal object; if, by unnecessarily varying the expression, you shift the point of view, and make me see sometimes the object itself, and sometimes another thing that is connected with it; you thereby oblige me to look on several objects at once, and I lose sight of the principal. You load the animal you are showing me, with so many trappings and collars, and bring so many of the same species before me, somewhat resembling, and yet somewhat differing, that I see none of them clearly.*

121. This forms what is called a loose style; and is the proper opposite to precision. It generally arises from using a superfluity of words. Feeble writers employ a multitude of words to make themselves understood, as they think, more distinctly; and they only confound the reader.

Illus. They are sensible of not having caught the precise expression, to convey what they would signify; they do not, indeed, conceive their own meaning very precisely themselves; and, therefore, help it out, as they can, by this and the other word, which may, as they suppose, supply the defect, and bring you somewhat nearer to their idea; they are always going about it and about it, but never just hit the thing. The image, as they set it before you, is always seen double; and no double image is distinct. When an author tells me of his hero's courage in the day of battle, the expression is precise, and I understand it fully. But if, from the desire of multiplying words, he must needs praise his courage and fortitude; at the moment he joins these words together, my idea begins to waver. He means to express one quality more strongly; but he is, in truth, expressing two. rage resists danger; fortitude supports pain. The occasion of exerting each of these qualities is different; and being led to think of both together, when only one of them should be before me, my view is rendered unsteady, and my conception of the objects indistinct.

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Corol. From what has been said, it appears that an author may, in a qualified sense, be perspicuous, while yet he is far from being precise. He uses proper words, and proper arrangement; he gives you the idea as clear as he conceives it himself; and so far he is perspicuous; but the ideas are not very clear in his own mind; they are

Blair's Lect. on Rhet. Vol. I.

loose and general; and, therefore, cannot be expressed with precision. All subjects do not equally require precision. It is sufficient, on many occasions, that we have a general view of the meaning. The subject, perhaps, is of the known and familiar kind; and we are in no hazard of mistaking the sense of the author, though every word which he uses be not precise and exact.

122. Precision is frequently violated by the introduction . of supernumerary words and phrases, (Illus. 1, and 2.); but chiefly by the accumulation of those which are either nearly synonymous, or which, though not synonymous, include the signification of one another. (Art. 123.)

Illus. 1. "I should be glad to know what intervals of life such persons can possibly set apart for the improvement of their minds."* The adverb possibly is superfluous. It suggests no meaning not implied in the auxiliary can, which denotes all the power or capacity of an agent.

2. "The pleasures of imagination are more preferable than those of sense or intellect."-" The very slightest singularity." More is superfluous, when added to preferable, and very is the same when added to slightest. Preferable, and slightest, express every idea contained in more preferable, and very slightest. These redundances are derived from conversation, the vulgarities and inaccuracies of which frequently insinuate themselves insensibly into our written language.

123. The more frequent violations of precision, those indeed more difficult to be avoided and corrected, are of the second class, and appear when words or phrases are introduced, which have their meaning anticipated by the general sense, or by other words of the sentence.

Illus. 1. Horace himself is not altogether unexceptionable.

"Quod si me vatibus Lyricis inseres,

Sublimi feriam sidera vertice."

The adjective sublimi is perfectly agreeable in sound, nay, necessary to complete the versification, but it is superfluous in communicating the sense; because, after acquainting us that his head would strike the stars, the poet had no need to add that it would be raised very high. 2. Addison begins the tragedy of Cato with a series of tautologies. "The dawn is overcast, the morning low'rs,

And heavily in clouds brings on the day,

The great, the important day, big with the fate

Of Cato and of Rome."

In the first two lines, the same sentiment is three times repeated in different words. "The dawn is overcast," means no more than" the morning lowers," and both these phrases denote exactly the same sense with the line that follows," and heavily in clouds brings on the day." Three synonymous words appear in the third line; "the great, the important day, big with the fate." The author might as well have repeated any one of these words three times, had it not been for the sake of the measure.

3. What is farther remarkable, is, that this example points out one of the classical sources from which Addison derived many of the splen

*Swift.

† Addison.

Elements of Criticism.

did sentiments of this work. Lucan introduces the day on which the battle of Pharsalia was fought in terms, which leave no room to doubt, that Addison had the description in his "mind's eye," when he began the tragedy of Cato.

"Segnior oceano quam lex eterna vocabat,

Luctificus Titan, nunquam magis æthera contra
Egit equos, currumque, polo rapiente, retorsit.
Defectusque pati voluit, raptæque labores

Lucis; et attraxit nubes, non pabula flammæ ;
Sed ne Thessalico purus luceret in orbe."

It was unlucky that Addison could appropriate no circumstance of this magnificent description, but the one he has selected; the darkness of the morning, resulting from the quantity and thickness of the clouds, which induced him, perhaps, to dwell on it to excess.

Obs. 1. Cicero, in his orations to the people, seems to have been guided by the opinion, that full, flowing, and copious diction, was most congruous to the taste, and best adapted to lead the resolutions, of a popular audience; but that it was less correct in itself, that it was unsuitable to the oratory of the senate, and that it was still more discordant with the style of his philosophical and critical works.

2. His great master, Demosthenes, in addressing similar audiences, never had recourse to a similar expedient. He avoided redundances, as equivocal and feeble. He aimed only to make the deepest and most efficient impression; and he employed for this purpose, the plainest, the fewest, and the most emphatic words. Supernumerary words may swell a period, or captivate the ear, but they must diminish the effect upon the understanding or the heart."* (§ V. p. 70.)

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Illus. 1. In support of these remarks, we shall select some passages from the orations of Cicero against Catiline, addressed to the people. "Multi sæpe honores diis immortalibus, justi, habiti sunt, ac debiti; sed profecto justiores nunquam. Erepti enim ex crudelissimo ac miserrimo intentu, et erepti sine cæde, sine sanguine, sine exercitu, sine dimicatione, me uno, togato duce et imperatore, vicistis."

The words," cæde, sanguine, exercitu, dimicatione," are not synonymous, yet do they virtually include the meaning of one another, and therefore multiply words, without impressing or extending the meaning, without completing or embellishing the picture.

Again. If there was no slaughter, it was unnecessary to add, that no blood was shed; and if there was no army, there could be neither slaughter, blood, nor fighting. He might as well have subjoined many other puerilities; as "without marching, without swords, without dust, without fatigue." Besides the quaintness of supposing himself a general" without an army," expressed in the clause," me uno, togato duce et imperatore," duce and imperatore are perfectly synonymous, and one of them is therefore superfluous.

2. "Neque nos unquam, dum ille in urbe hostis fuisset, tantis periculis rempublicam, tanta pace, tanto otio, tanto silentio, liberassemus." The words, "otio, silentio, pace," like those specified in the preceding example, all imply the signification of one another; they swell the period; they detain the same idea in view; but they convey no additional information.

3. Tillotson is among the most remarkable of English writers of reputation, for the profuse use of synonymous terms; as, for example, the following.

* Barrow.

"Acquiesce, and rest satisfied with."- Upon the testimony and relation of others."- -"Governed and conducted."-" Corruption and degeneracy.' -"Embroiled and disordered."-" Wavering and unsettled." "Apprehensions and fears."-"Support and bear up.""Positive and peremptory."-" Special and particular."

4. Even some late authors of great eminence, will not, perhaps, be admitted to be altogether exempt from reprehension. "I am certain and confident, that the account I have given is true."- -"Many excursions, fortuitous and unguided, have been made."—" A word is unfamiliar by disuse, and unpleasant by unfamiliarity."

In the first of these examples, the words, "certain" and "confident;" in the second," fortuitous" and "unguided;" and in the third, "disuse" and "unfamiliarity," will be held, by nice critics, to be either too nearly synonymous, or to include too much the meaning of one another, to permit, with propriety, their being placed in juxta-position in the same sentence. (Art. 113. § VII.)

Scholia. 1. It is observed by Barrow, that these accumulations of words may perhaps appear, in part, to result from the deficiency of language, which supplies not a pertinent word for every idea; but they are much more the offspring of indistinct apprehension in the authors. When our ideas are not clear, our expression savors of similar embarrassment. As we do not perceive completely what we intend to communicate, we multiply words, concluding, most erroneously, that the meaning is more fully and accurately expressed, and that the chance is greater of our being better understood. We do not attempt to remove the origin of the error-the obscurity of our thoughts; we do not attend to this fact, that the deepest impression is made when no more words are employed than are necessary to convey the sense, and that every superfluous expression contributes to confound, not to enlighten the understanding. "Obstat quicquid non adjuvat."*

2. But a considerable number of words, either synonymous, or nearly so, in a language, is so far from being a blemish, or a cause of disorder, that they are a source of much conveniency, and even of some pleasure. They enable us to infuse variety into style; and to prevent the monotony which arises from the too frequent recurrence of the same sound. These changes of words, and modulation, constitute the richness of a language, and the writer possesses important advantages, who finds his endeavours to improve his composition, seconded by the structure of the tongue which he employs.

3. Yet the number of synonymous words is not so great in any language as is commonly supposed. Few people are at much pains to ascertain the meaning of the words they use; or to inquire whether the sense which they affix to any word, is the most pertinent, or adopted by the most accurate judges. Even authors frequently assign their own meaning to their words, without inquiring scrupulously, whether it is the most classical, or the most proper. They generally infer, that the reader's opinion will coincide with their own, or that he will easily perceive the difference; so that no ambiguity shall arise.

4. For these reasons, synonymous words are supposed more numerous than they are, and much more so than nicety of criticism will admit. Authors, on one hand, are careless in the meanings which they affix to words. The critics, on the other, are refined, in establishing meanings which even accurate authors neither remember nor ap

* Quinctilian.

ply. The labors of the critic may excite attention, and diminish improprieties; but they cannot expect that practice will realize, in any language, the nice distinctions, or refined varieties, which they may have endeavored to introduce.

124. The instances which are given in the following illustrations, may themselves be of use; and they will serve to shew the necessity of attending, with care and strictness, to the exact import of words, if ever we would write with propriety or precision.

Illus. 1. Austerity, severity, rigor. Austerity relates to the manner of living; severity, of thinking; rigor, of punishing. To austerity, is opposed effeminacy; to severity, relaxation; to rigor, clemency. A hermit is austere in his life; a casuist, severe in his application of religion or law; a judge, rigorous in his sentences.

2. Custom, habit. Custom, respects the action; habit, the actor. By custom, we mean the frequent repetition of the same act; by habit, the effect which that repetition produces on the mind or body. By the custom of walking often in the streets, one acquires a habit of idleness.

3. Surprised, astonished, amazed, confounded. I am surprised, with what is new or unexpected; I am astonished, at what is vast or great; I am amazed, with what is incomprehensible; I am confounded, by what is shocking or terrible.

4. Desist, renounce, quit, leave off. Each of these words implies, some pursuit or object relinquished; but from different motives. We desist, from the difficulty of accomplishing. We renounce, on account of the disagreeableness of the object, or pursuit. We quit, for the sake of some other thing which interests us more; and we leave off, because we are weary of the design. A politician desists from his designs, when he finds they are impracticable; he renounces the court. because he has been affronted by it; he quits ambition for study or retirement; and leaves off his attendance on the great, as he becomes old and weary of it.

5. Pride, vanity. Pride, makes us esteem ourselves; vanity, makes us desire the esteem of others. It is just to say, as Dean Swift has done, that a man is too proud to be vain.

6. Haughtiness, disdain. Haughtiness, is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; disdain, on the low opinion we have of others.

7. To distinguish, to separate. We distinguish, what we do not want to confound with another thing; we separate, what we want to remove from it. Objects are distinguished from one another, by their qualities. They are separated, by the distance of time or place.

8. To weary, to fatigue. The continuance of the same thing wearies us; labor fatigues us. I am weary with standing; I am fatigued with walking. A suitor wearies us by his perseverance; fatigues us by his importunity.

9. To abhor, to detest. To abhor, imports, simply, strong dislike; to detest, imports also, strong disapprobation. One abhors being in debt; he detests treachery.

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