be the most likely symptoms in a state of a sickness unto death. Quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans: LUCRET. There are some conjunctures, wherein the death or dissolution of government is more lamentable in its consequences, than it would be in others.And, I think, a state can never arrive to its period in a more deplorable crisis, than at a time when some prince in the neighbourhood, of vast power and ambition, lies hovering like a vulture to devour, or, at least, dismember its dying carcase; by which means it becomes only a province or acquisition to some mighty monarchy, without hopes of a resurrection. I know very well, there is a set of sanguine tempers, who deride and ridicule, in the number of fopperies, all such apprehensions as these. They have it ready in their mouths, that the people of England are of a genius and temper never to admit slavery among them; and they are furnished with a great many common-places upon that subject. But it seems to me, that such discoursers do reason upon short views, and a very moderate compass of thought. For, I think it a great error to count upon the genius of a nation as a standing argument in all ages, since there is hardly a spot of ground in Europe, where the inhabitants have not frequently and entirely changed their temper and genius. Neither can I see any reason, why the genius of a nation should be more fixed in the point of government, than in their morals, their learning, their religion, their common humour and conversation, their diet and their complexion; which do all notoriously vary almost in every age, and may every one of them have great effects upon men's notions of government. Since the Norman conquest, the balance of power in England has often varied, and sometimes been wholly overturned; the part which the commons had in it, (that most disputed point,) in its original progress and extent, was, by their own confessions, but a very inconsiderable share. Generally speaking, they have been gaining ever since, though with frequent interruptions and slow progress.The abolishing of villanage, together with the custom introduced (or permitted) among the nobles, of selling their lands in the reign of Henry the Se venth, was a mighty addition to the power of the commons: yet I think a much greater happened in the time of his successor, at the dissolution of the abbeys; for this turned the clergy wholly out of the scale, who had so long filled it; and placed the commons in their stead: who in a few years became possessed of vast quantities of those and other lands, by grant or purchase. About the middle of Queen Elizabeth's reign, I take the power between the nobles and the commons to have been in more equal balance, than it was ever before or since. But then, or soon after, arose a faction in England, which, under the name of Puritan, began to grow popular, by moulding up their new schemes of religion with republican principles in government; and gaining upon the prerogative as well as the nobles, under several denominations, for the space of about sixty years, did at last overthrow the constitution, and, according to the usual course of such revolutions, did introduce a tyranny, first of the people, and then of a single person. In a short time after, the old government was revived. But the progress of affairs for almost * thirty years, under the reigns of two weak princes, * is a subject of a different nature: when the balance was in danger to be overturned by the hands that held it, which was at last very seasonably prevented by the late revolution. However, as it is the talent of human nature to run from one extreme to another, so in a very few years we have made mighty leaps from prerogative heights into the depth of pularity, and I doubt to the very last degree that our constitution will bear. It were to be wished, that the most august assembly of the commons would please to form a pandect of their own power and privileges, to be confirmed by the entire legislative authority, and that in as solemn a manner (if they please) as the magna charta. But to fix one foot of their compass wherever they think fit, and extend the other to such terrible lengths, without describing any circumference at all, is to leave us and themselves in a very uncertain state, and in a sort of rotation, that the author of the Oceana † never dreamed on. I believe the most hardy tribune will not venture to affirm. at present, that any just fears of encroachment are given us from the regal power, or the few: and is it then impossible to err on the other side? How far must we proceed, or where shall we stop? The raging of the sea, and the madness of the people, are put together in holy writ; and it is God alone who can * Charles II. and James II. + Mr James Harrington, who, in the time of the Commonwealth, published an Utopian scheme of government, entitled, The Commonwealth of Oceana. Several speculative persons, and among others Mr Henry Neville, embraced his visions as realities, and held a club called the Rota, in Palace Yard, Westminster, to consider of means to make his plan efficient. One article was, that a part of the senate should go out by rote, and become incapable of serving for a certain time. say to either, Hitherto shalt thou pass, ther. and no far The balance of power in a limited state, is of such absolute necessity, that Cromwell himself, before he had perfectly confirmed his tyranny, having some occasions for the appearance of a parliament, was forced to create and erect an entire new House of Lords (such as it was) for a counterpoise to the commons. And indeed, considering the vileness of the clay, I have sometimes wondered, that no tribune of that age dust ever venture to ask the potter, What dost thou make? * But it was then about the last act of a popular usurpation; and fate, or Cromwell, had already prepared them for that of a single person. To I have been often amazed at the rude, passionate, and mistaken results, which have at certain times fallen from great assemblies, both ancient and modern, and of other countries as well as our own. This gave me the opinion, I mentioned a while ago, that public conventions are liable to all the infirmities, follies, and vices of private men. which, if there be any exception, it must be of such assemblies, who act by universal concert, upon public principles, and for public ends; such as proceed upon debates without unbecoming warmths, or influence from particular leaders and inflamers; such, whose members, instead of canvassing to procure majorities for their private opinions, are ready to comply with general sober results, though contrary to their own sentiments. Whatever assemblies act by these, and other methods of the like * Pride the Brewer, Hewson the Cobler, and such other upstarts as the civil war had called into eminence, were summoned to this Upper House by writ. nature, must be allowed to be exempt from several imperfections, to which particular men are subjected. But I think the source of most mistakes and miscarriages in matters debated by public assemblies, arises from the influence of private persons upon great numbers, styled in common phrase, leading men and parties. And therefore, when we sometimes meet a few words put together, which is called the vote or resolution of an assembly, and which we cannot possibly reconcile to prudence, or public good, it is most charitable to conjecture, that such a vote has been conceived, and born, and bred in a private brain; afterward raised and supported by an obsequious party; and then with usual methods confirmed by an artificial majority. For, let us suppose five hundred men, mixed in point of sense and honesty, as usually assemblies are; and let us suppose these men proposing, debating, resolving, voting, according to the mere natural motions of their own little or much reason and understanding; I do allow, that abundance of indigested and abortive, many pernicious and foolish overtures would arise, and float a few minutes; but then they would die and disappear. Because, this must be said in behalf of humankind, that common sense and plain reason, while men are disengaged from acquired opinions, will ever have some general influence upon their minds; whereas the species of folly and vice are infinite, and so different in every individual, that they could never procure a majority, if other corruptions did not enter to pervert men's understandings, and misguide their wills. To describe how parties are bred in an assembly, would be a work too difficult at present, and perhaps not altogether safe. Periculosa plenum opus alea. Whether those, who are leaders, usually arrive at that station more by a sort of instinct or se |